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
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CHALK LINES OVER MORALS

BY



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Biblical Criticism."*

Mutabo pro causa

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PREFACE.

"*DE omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis?*"

Yes, how could it be otherwise?

The material of which this book is composed was delivered, mainly as it here stands, as a series of lectures in Hershey Hall, in the city of Chicago, in the winter and spring of the year 1882.

A number of gentlemen, who may be described as "progressive conservatives," were of opinion that there ought to be at least one series of lectures in each year, in Chicago, giving rational treatment, popular as far as possible, of any subjects that might be in the field of thought, either in religion, philosophy or sociology.

I was asked to give the first course. This I did as above stated. Beyond my effort, the plan was not carried out. These lectures were published in the Chicago Times, and fairly full reports of them were given in other Chicago papers. Since that date they have been on the scaffold, seasoning.

In reviewing my work I have not felt called upon to obliterate marks of time and place connected with their origin. If some of my work seems now outlawed I have still felt that it might have value as indicative of the state in which the questions treated stood at that former date. However miscellaneous this work may appear, I think one thread, to wit, the ethical, can be traced through it all.

I am justly liable, perhaps, to the criticism that I have given exhaustive treatment to nothing. But more people need some help on many things than need complete elaboration of one. I wrought for the former class. But succinctness may not lack comprehension; brevity may be adequate to a certain intent.

PREFACE

If I have failed to give credit as I ought to other and better thinkers for my dues to them, I am deeply grieved. It is impossible for me now to review my work with this end in view.

I owe thanks to my friends Rev. Edward F. Williams, D. D., and Rev. J. M. Williams, D. D., for their kindly and continued encouragement, as the years have gone by, to publish these lectures.

With some hesitancy to ask a reader for his time, the book is offered—"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN."

CHARLES CAVERNO.

Boulder, Colorado, 1897.

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MORALS.

“Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός.” John iv. 24.

“The poorest, stupidest, wickedest man you can meet with, seeing he is a man, wants to know what he is himself, and what God is, and how he is related to him.”

F. D. MAURICE.

“I will do it for I am weak by nature and very timorous, unless where a strong sense of duty upholdeth and supporteth me. There God acteth and not his creature.”

LADY JANE GREY.

“I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh remarks, ‘has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action,’ it is summed up in that short but imperious word, *ought*, so full of high significance.

“It is the most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of his fellow creature, or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause.”

C. R. DARWIN.

“The so-called realist raises doubts in my mind when he assures me that he, and he alone, gives me the facts of life. Too often all I can say is, if these are the facts, I do not want them. The police reports give me more than I care for every day. But are they the facts? I had much rather believe them to be the accidental and transitory phenomena of our existence here.

“The real and abiding facts are those that are recognized as such by the soul when it is in that upper chamber of our being which is farthest removed from the senses and commences with its true self.”

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL.

“Stern daughter of the voice of God!

O Duty! If that name thou love

Who art a light to guide, a rod

To check the erring, and reprove;

Thou who art victory and law

When empty terrors overawe;

From vain temptations dost set free,

And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity.

* * * *

“Stern lawgiver! yet thou dost wear

The Godhead's most benignant grace;

Nor know we anything so fair

As is the smile upon thy face;

Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,

And fragrance in thy footing treads;

Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,

And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong.”

WORDSWORTH, *Ode to Duty*.

CHALK LINES OVER MORALS.

CHAPTER I.

MORALS AND GOD.

I USE the term *morals* as equivalent to right adjustments, or, the adjustments of right, between man and all beings and things. I desire that when any one has trouble in understanding me, he shall recur to this definition.

The philosophers have sought for God and the skeptics tell us to prove that he exists. The answer to the craving of philosophy and the inquisition of skepticism is very near at hand. It lies in the moral nature of man, in the necessity to notice moral distinctions. If the philosophers have not overlooked this ground, they have looked everywhere else before they have looked here, and then over this realm they have only cursorily glanced. They have sought to take God in the meshes of the intellect; whereas he enmeshes them in the ties of the moral nature. They have supposed that they must first prove God intellectually. What they have to do is to account for the power that is at work on them morally. They stumble at that stumbling-stone.

"The eyes of" doubt "are in the ends of the earth." If it will call home its roving thoughts and look steadily at what is going on in the moral nature of man it will find atheism reduced to absurdity, and the melancholy vacancy of agnosticism startled into intelligence.

If matter has in it "the promise and potency" of life, we may find in moral experience the promise and potency of God.

We often pursue a lame method in the attempt to establish the existence of God. We try to conquer skepticism on its own chosen skirmish line. We go off on a search for proof to the intellect that there is a God over the ex-

ternal world. When we find him, if we find him at all, we must still bridge the gulf between the world-artificer and a moral ruler—between the intellectual conclusions and the moral experiences of man. The method commonly chosen would prove an intelligent author and hence infer moral government. That order should be reversed. We can find moral government and may thence infer an intelligent author. The argument intellectual may be valid, but it does not follow the line of shortest distance between the soul and God.

If we are to lay a foundation for religion our prime assertion must be—*a moral nature in man*; our prime duty analysis of that nature, and synthesis of its meaning.

We must begin here: Man has the capacity to make moral distinctions, and in his actions he is held to the necessity of making such distinctions—what does that signify?

It may be desirable to find a way from the moral order of the universe to the order physical and psychical. If it is, it is as easy to take that step from the moral base to the intellectual, as in the reverse order. But suppose there are difficulties about making this transfer and securing the connection?

While I think that the argument for the existence of God, for example, from design in nature, is growing more and more convincing as the universe is opened to thought, and as the individual widens his experience in the universe—so that it even carries a mind as reluctant as that of John Stuart Mill in its favor—yet it must be borne in mind that it takes much skill to make this argument and much learning to feel the force of it.

Then, after all, it is ground not clear of dispute. And if it is established, it, per se, does not lay the foundation for religion. You may find an intelligent Governor of the universe; from thence you are entitled to infer but little respecting the *quality* of his being, and your finding would determine little respecting our relationship to him.

He may be a bad intelligence using his craft and power to bad ends. We may have no actual relationship to him. We may look upon him and his dominions as we look

upon a sovereign of a foreign country—as we look on the kingdom of Genghis Khan and contemplate his potency. And he may look as unconcerned upon us as we upon the denizens of an ant-hill. What is he to us or we to him? is a still subsisting question.

We lay immediate foundation for religion when we find a *moral* Governor and find him working *in* the moral nature of man.

Whether we go over to the examination of the external world for evidences of design, or for other proof, is a matter of secondary consequence; is in fact a matter of no necessary importance.

The argument from design can be drawn from the moral base. An intelligent Governor can be inferred from facts developed from the study of the moral nature, and the argument drawn from the external world may stand as it may.

We have little need of syllogistic forms in argument from the moral exercises of man for the existence of God. We may proceed by simple appeal to the content of consciousness. We may find in moral apprehension what might elude us in argument.

Is it not true in religion, as in invention, that advances often come in an unexpected way, from an unexpected quarter?

Good has no business to come out of Nazareth; but to everybody's astonishment it does. Here is One out of Nazareth whose "goodness" is the one marvel of time.

Because a man does not bring all wisdom we may shut our eyes to the wisdom he does bring. Out of the eater sometimes comes forth meat. Theology has had no such contribution for a hundred years as lies in Matthew Arnold's expression, "The power not ourselves that makes for righteousness," and in his position that whatever may be the case with any other religious or theological proposition, *that is verifiable*. This is Excalibur against the agnostic heathen of the northern seas. The thought of the age is upon dynamism—upon powers and forces. The demand of the age is for dynamic as distinguished from forensic, juridical conceptions in theology. The gateway to sureness of the existence of God

lies more broadly open by way of the phrase of Matthew Arnold than in any other that has been given in the thought of modern times. Yet in theological quarters it is often set up as a target for ridicule. We often become too busy with what we have to know what to do with additions to our stores. Yet such an error may be fatal. Additions are always coming. New adjustments are always called for. It is bad in religion, as everywhere else, not to know a thing when you see it. It is not well to have a work wrought in one's day which one shall "in no wise believe though a man declare it" unto him. Precisely what the world wants to know is, whether or not there is a "power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." It is precisely that which the world can verify, if it will only attend to its own moral sensations.

Physical sensation gives us knowledge of the fact that there is an external world and reveals to us some of its qualities. Moral sensation makes us aware that there is a power, not ourselves, operant upon us, and reveals to us that such a power makes for righteousness.

I believe both these statements, respecting physical and moral sensation, are verifiable. They do not need argument to sustain them. Physical perception in the one case and moral perception in the other makes, each, its revelations, and all we have to do is to attend to what is brought out in the field of consciousness.

We know a something not ourselves when we touch a table. Sensations of heat and cold, hardness, softness, are taken up by our physical organism from the external world and are reported to the conscious self.

We take up from the field of moral exercise certain moral sensations, which are reported also in our consciousness. The externality of the cause of the one sensation is as evident as that of the other. We are no more the cause of the moral sensation we experience when we perform a bad act than we are of the physical when we touch a hot iron—when we perform a good act than we are when we are fanned by a breeze in June. The hot iron is *there*. If we put ourselves in contact with it, it burns. The bad possibility is there. If we get into it, it *it* burns. But we have made neither the heat that scorches flesh nor that

which scorches soul. *There* is the June breeze. We take up its delightful sensations if we put ourselves in its flowing current. *There* is the good possibility. If we enter it we enjoy its delights; but we are not the author of the winds which blow across the spirit any more than we are of those that blow across the sky.

It is vain to expect to silence all dispute in reference to this matter. The disputers will never die. But men whose heaven is not debate may find restful conclusions.

I do not feel called upon to argue the question as to whether the origin of moral sensation can be referred to considerations of utility. In my judgment that debate is closed. If any one desires to go over that ground I must refer him to the general literature on the subject. One of the best summaries to be found is, I think, in Leckey's introduction to his "History of European Morals."

I do not believe the human being breathes that can in his own consciousness resolve moral sensation into pleasure and advantage and their opposites. Right and wrong are not the same thing to anybody as the agreeable and disagreeable.

The latter are often involved in mental exercises together with the former. The connection may even be necessary; but given a real moral conclusion, and there is an element in it which pain and pleasure cannot supply.

Nor am I carried by the philosophy which would make right rest in love.

In that case there is *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, unexplained, as in the metamorphism from utility.

There may be love which is not duty and duty which is not love. Both utility and love may furnish a reason for duty, but the reason for a thing is not the thing itself.

Just as we begin with the outer world through sensation, so we begin with God through duty, or rather he begins with us. We may advance in both cases to higher ground. But thus we begin. Duty is the first tact.

The latest attempt at a philosophic resolution of the problem of morals makes them to result from the restrictive influence of social forces—to be a product of evolution in "the kingdom of man." On analysis, so far as the

nature of morals is concerned, I think this scheme resolves into utilitarianism. It differs from the old in positing new methods of accounting for the origin of the considerations of utility.

Perhaps they do this, but *that unknown element plus the utility* all the while eludes their grasp. They shed little or no light on the origin or nature of that.

I suppose in passing I must take notice of Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics." It is hard to resist the impression from Mr. Spencer's treatise as a whole that he has any other view of morals than that of utilitarianism. His treatise appears to be an attempt to account for the origin of morals if utilitarianism be true.

Mr. Spencer seems, however, to have glimpses that run out beyond utilitarianism. Take, for instance, the statement that "political, religious and social controls do not constitute the moral control. They are controls within which the moral control evolves."

But he seems to have no adequate conception of the entire uniqueness of the latter control.

It may well be that even utility furnishes a platform on which moral principles are deployed. But the actors are different from the platform. It may well be that Mr. Spencer has shown a line of development, in the conduct of man, along which moral considerations have attached. In that case the significant thing is the *line* on which moral development has arisen.

Who made the *line* and held men to it through the ages? The moral groove is there—who cut it? Why the *incline* directing human action to it?

If we admit Mr. Spencer's ideas of the *origin* of ethics, our question then is—What is the meaning of the *line* of development? And beyond that the old question still persists—What have we in hand in an ethical product?

Our sensations of right and wrong are not referable for origin to the approbation or disapprobation of society. Nor are they accounted for by hereditary social control.

Nothing is more common than for a man to feel that he is right when society says he is wrong, and wrong when society would say he might be right. Luther at Worms and John Rogers at the stake are not luminous

examples of moral conduct evolved under social control, present or hereditary. The truth is that not only the high examples, but the general drift of moral development has been evolved in the teeth of social control.

Men have taken their lives in their hands, *usually*, who have put one foot further forward in morals than the masses.

Finally, on appeal to consciousness we know that social judgments are not the source whence our moral sensations spring.

I call attention, however, to the immense power regulative of moral conduct which society possesses. It is not strange that men should have looked to society as the source of the feeling of moral obligation. That is a tremendous power which society exerts over the moral actions of men. The fact that society has been mistaken for the originator of the moral forces within us ought to make us aware of the importance of society as a multiplying, inductive moral power. It will not be unmixed evil if the philosophers who refer us to the power of social life for the source of moral sensation compel us to realize the possible reinforcing influence of society and inspire us wisely and charitably to direct this almost boundless force.

Mr. Arnold's expression is correct. There is a power not ourselves individually or combined, that makes for righteousness. And righteousness is a simple principle, not resolvable into anything else. It is not the product of fear, favor or the hope of reward from any quarter in the universe. The business which we have with this power is not very complicated and yet it is very comprehensive.

What is communicated to us is very simple. We are told by it that there is a right and a wrong, and that in our action we are to find *the adjustment of right*. This *finding* is what is primarily given us to do. *Seek* is the command, and *ye shall find* is the promise in our very moral nature.

The power does not tell us *what* is right. It puts the burden upon us to find that out. It may be submitted to consciousness whether the conviction of being in the

wrong, which we know as a part of our experience, has come upon us because the wrong was unknown to us and so we blundered into it, or because we did not *seek* to distinguish between the right and the wrong. It may be safely stated that a conviction of wrong never arose in a human mind when it could say that it had tried to make the distinction between right and wrong and had tried to follow the right.

The prime command upon us is to discriminate—to find out if there be a right and a wrong lying before us. The next command is *to execute the right*. Now that is not a very involved affair, yet see how much springs from it. There is evidently, to borrow language from Mr. Carlyle, a Yea and a Nay side for our life. There is a great deal of room on that Yea side and it is a very pleasant country there. St. Paul says that there is no law in the sense of restriction on that side of life. There is room too on the Nay side. I think there is an ever growing sense of constriction about that realm, and it is not agreeable there. We know the ugliness of the situation in that realm. But what have we? A clearly defined outline for human conduct—*plan* for human conduct. Then we find in our consciousness an evident solicitation to fall into this plan on the one side and not on the other. We find certain arrangements always made on the theater of the soul itself to meet such action as we take—to every man that worketh good is allotted on that theater “glory, honor and peace”; to every man that doeth evil “indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish.” You need not go outside of morals to find plan, design—to find that *intelligence* which you wish to attribute to God. Further, if the *constant pursuit* of plan indicates *will* in man, what shall be said about the *persistency* of the operation of the power not ourselves making for righteousness upon our souls? If we can conceive of *will* at all, the conception of it must come to the mind as we experience our perpetual reminding to make moral distinctions.

The significance of the other form of Mr. Arnold's expression can be appreciated—“*The Eternal* not ourselves that makes for righteousness.” We are held *eternally* to the distinction between right and wrong.

There we are before a sleepless presence—in the grasp of an immutable *will*.

The object pursued by this intelligent will is clearly enough seen in the field of consciousness. While good and bad possibilities are open to us, we know the pressure of the power is toward the good and against the bad. The solicitation employed upon the soul is to the Yea side of the moral universe, and away from and against the Nay side. No man ever went over to the Nays without feeling that he went against the advice and plainly indicated desire of the power not himself revealed in his moral sensation—went against a “categorical” suggestion and solicitation to right, a suggestion and solicitation in which there was no variableness nor shadow of turning. He is conscious that that power makes for righteousness always and ever more.

Our experience with right and wrong and their consequences gives us another conviction with reference to this power not ourselves that makes for righteousness. The ways on the Yea side of life are “ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace.”

What shall be said of a power that incessantly, unintermittingly points to these ways of joy and peace and entreats and warns against entrance on the path where only misery abounds? We have no conception of love if it is not attributable to such power. We have before us, then, an outline analysis of our simplest moral sensation and of what we accumulate by moral experience.

And what does it give? *It gives us intelligence and will, righteousness in character, and benevolence in disposition, in the operant power.* If that is not all we want in God, yet that given without doubt entails all we do want. And this comes out of moral sensation. It does not take learning to develop it. It only takes careful attention to consciousness to find it revealed. You can find it in the consciousness of the humblest intellect where there is moral capacity, and it is in the being of the intellectual genius.

Tact then gives certainty of contact with the external world. Moral feeling gives the conviction that you are in contact with the power not yourself that makes for

righteousness—rather that He is touching you. Along intellectual lines you hunt for God. Along moral lines God hunts for you. Whether you can find or not, He does.

Inasmuch as I have pressed Matthew Arnold so closely into my service, it is but just that I make a criticism upon the disdain with which he flings away the term "An intelligent and moral Governor of the universe."

I confess to sharing in his impatience when I see theology grinding in the old mill of proving, in the first instance, the existence of God by way of the old argument from design in the material universe. But after all, the old expression will be found to be true when it is transferred to the moral ground. What is "the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness" but exactly moral government? You can put the sign of equality between the two expressions, for they are exactly equivalent. And is not intelligence necessarily implied as you contemplate either side of the equation?

In aid of the conceptions we have before us let me quote the following from F. D. Maurice:—"Do not suppose that by the consciousness of such a supremacy I mean the general recognition of a Supreme Power existing somewhere, to whom the world is subject, and therefore to whom I as one of its inhabitants am subject. The conscience has nothing to do with such vague and distant propositions. It is emphatically a witness of a supremacy over *me* as one of the atoms of which the world is composed. I do not proceed from the world to myself, but from myself to the world. I know of *its* Governor only so far as I know of *mine*. Nor do I begin from the acknowledgment of a Power who as a Power governs me. I own only one who has a *right* to govern. *The conscience takes no account of Power except as it is joined to Right—except as it has its ground in Right.*"

Julius Müller puts it plainly: "Conscience is the consciousness of God."

We reach this conclusion: In moral exercise, we are in contact with God—we see God in the burning bush and the bush is not consumed. Moral obligation is the grip of God upon the soul of man.

In moral consciousness self is not given more than the power not ourselves making for righteousness. We have been searching the universe, ascending into heaven and descending into the deep to find God, when he has all the while been nigh us, even in our hearts. We have been seeking for a sign of the Divine existence when we never could away with the Divine presence.

The church barely escapes being in as much fault in this respect as the world. If the world has said, "God is not revealed," the church has said, "But he once *was* revealed or at times has been revealed;" and that is about as bad as the infidelity of the world. That wonderful old seer, Carlyle, writes in this way:

"Is there no God then; but at best an *absentee God*, sitting *idle*, ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside of his universe and seeing it go?"

The church is possibly as guilty as the world for the creation of this conception of an absentee God who has leased the world to second causes, only now and then, spasmodically putting in a hand to rectify when his lessees seemed in danger of running the state to ruin. The church has dolefully sighed respecting revelation, "*Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria Teucrorum*"—it was—it was. It has tried to prove that God is because he revealed himself in former days; whereas it may prove that he is because he is always revealing himself, and hence carry over a violent presumption that he did reveal himself to prophet and apostle of old. God as inspiration to right and negation to wrong in the human soul—God as love, or God as consuming fire, in men as they have chosen right or followed wrong—this has been at the foundation of all religion and all the religious experiences of man. It has been the one permanent thing in religion from the time when God sought Adam in the garden in the cool of the day to his last seeking in the heart of a child as it contemplates a proposed or accomplished act of obedience or disobedience to its mother. "The beginnings of moral experience are the beginnings of revelation, and the persistence of moral experience is the persistence of revelation."

The workings of the power not ourselves making for

righteousness in retribution of sin constitute a marked part of the common knowledge of man.

Adam hid and Cain went out from the presence of the Lord. So it was. So it is. The Nemesis of Greek tragedy interprets the experiences of the soul of man when he has done evil before the power that makes for righteousness. The "damned spot" will not "out" from the hand when the soul is touched with sickness by the invisible power that scourges wrong.

We are finding out now that Nathaniel Hawthorne is one of the masters of psychology—and because of that a master of theology. We have had kinship enough with wrong to recognize the truth of the "Scarlet Letter" to man's moral experience. If we could not have written the book ourselves, when written we assent to its analyses.

Some of Hawthorne's sketches are masterpieces of theological psychology. "Roger Malvin's Burial" shows the blasting of a being by hiding within itself a single untruth. George Eliot's "Romola" is drawn in the same vein. Tito Melema smothers one humane and filial impulse, and the whole life becomes a fraud and a failure proceeding forth from that one wrong base. "The Silence of Dean Maitland" tells the same story. To write these masterpieces of tragedy requires only the genius that is a true observer and reporter of moral sensation.

My eye falls on the following sentence from Theodor Christlieb: "An old mystic says somewhere God is an unutterable sigh in the depths of the soul. With still greater justice we may reverse the proposition and say the soul is a never ending sigh after God." The old mystic is the nearer right. The power that makes for righteousness is always seeking for all men—and always *finds* them—if not on the Yea side of his government, then on the Nay, while men are not always seeking for God.

"In Chillon's dungeon deep and old,
There are seven columns massy and gray,
Dim with a dull imprisoned ray,
A sunbeam which hath lost its way,
And through the crevice and the cleft
Of the thick wall is fallen and left."

Light is subtle, but there must be a crevice in the wall that it may find its way through to the prisoner within. There is something subtler than light. Gravitation will find its way through the solid wall and lay hold of the prisoner's body. But there is something subtler than gravitation—subtler than the being and motion of those atoms behind the atoms, whose ceaseless somewhere-ward drift is supposed to cause gravitation. This subtlest potency is moral obligation. This will find its way through walls and bodies and attach to souls. This power seeks and finds and there is no escape from it. It has been, it is and it ever shall be, and no soul is without its presence. It comes to the farmer at the plow, the wife in the kitchen, the mechanic at the bench, the clerk at the counter, the merchant in the office, the student over his books, the lawyer over his table. This procession of the generations one after another—how marvelous it is! Yet in this unending procession there is never a being who comes up to the horizon of moral existence but is caught by the whirlwind of conscience and carried whither he would not. He does not like it—would like to dispossess himself of it, and yet there is no failure to the incessant visitation. There is no forgetfulness and no election of persons for its subjects. Come to the surface of existence any time, anywhere, and on you it fastens.

You think perhaps you drown its speech with the noise of your great cities. But there is no distraction that hushes its voice. It is heard by every soul amid all the din of commerce and trade as clearly as a village Sabbath bell in the morning air. It is heard in the home of virtue and in the den of vice. It is a simple voice, but it is ever there. Whoever is obedient to it has a possession outranking in value the riches of banks and the wealth of commerce. Eye hath not seen nor ear heard what he enjoys who has said Yea, to the power not himself that makes for righteousness. The presence is there with those who have said Nay, to the solicitation of this power. *They* have a consciousness of God as clear as that of the saint. All their struggles are to get rid of that consciousness. But it is never done. The power that makes for righteousness, soliciting and minatory, keeps

even pace with their souls. The consciousness of a moral being carries the Eternal Presence. An experienced state prison warden says it is untrue that intoxicating drink is the prime provocative to crime. He says *that* is one of the profound lies of sin—one that it makes use of, as if to drape itself still with the rags of respectability. He says drink is resorted to to cover up the consciousness of crime—to obscure to the soul if possible the sensations of sin. That is an overturning of the tables of popular thought, but I believe the warden is largely correct. The mere physical appetite for strong drink is not the base of the vice of drunkenness even. That vice the rather grows because of

"A battle lost within,
The shame of a soul in the coils of sin."

It is one of the buttresses to the fortifications men build to keep God out of the soul. So viewed, you may offer in evidence much of the liquor consumption as witness to the brooding of the Divine power over the soul of man. Man's sins as well as his righteousness are detective of that power.

But all this consumption of liquor is not successful in keeping God out of consciousness. Listen to what the drunkard says comes back upon him after a debauch. "Oh, but that is owing to nervous prostration." Quite likely.

Who made it "owing" to that? Who holds drunkenness to that "owing"? Something steps over from the prostration of drunkenness upon the prostrate soul quite unlike the effect upon the spirit of nervous prostration from duty done. So it is along the line of wrong.

"In every fearful shape
Guilt still alarms, and conscience, ne'er asleep,
Wounds with incessant strokes not loud but deep;
While the vexed mind, her own tormenter, plies
A scorpion scourge unmarked by human eyes.
Trust me, no tortures which the poets feign
Can match the fierce, unutterable pain
He feels who, night and day devoid of rest,
Carries his own accuser in his breast."

JUVENAL.

A detective, in Chicago, fastened on a defaulting bank officer from an eastern city, because he noticed his heavy drinking, fastened on him *from that fact*, before he knew who he was or what crime he had committed.

The sole reasoning of the detective was—that drinking is to make obtuse the consciousness of some crime.

Here is something from the Egyptian Book of the Dead, which may be set by the side of the case of the defaulting bank officer. The judges in the under world, when a good man approaches them, interrogate him—ask him questions about the life he has pursued—give him a chance to excuse, to justify himself; but when a bad man comes they *divine* the fact of his wickedness, have no words with him, but motion him along to his retribution. The Chicago detective proceeded upon the same psychological basis which the priests of old Egypt incorporated into the Book of the Dead four thousand years before Christ, to wit, the self-revealing character of moral action—the necessity to exhibit the eternal distinction between right and wrong placed upon them by the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness.

You have here a glance over six thousand years of human history—the mind of man all the while running in the same moral groove, capable of and forced to make and recognize the same moral distinctions.

Such are some of our experiences with right and wrong, and the only significance of them is that they are the result of coincidence or contest with God.

These experiences occur in the kingdom of man. But they are not an invention of that kingdom. They can only be the result of the marshaling of forces over that kingdom by a higher power. It is just as credible that man has invented the physical gravitation which seizes his body as that he has invented the moral gravitation which grasps his soul. The iron, vice-like clutch of moral duty is no invention of man. It is not his grip—it is one that is upon him.

Theologians are anxious to prove a judgment to come and to prove the fearfulness and inexorableness of its issues. What if we should take away the element of futurity which we project into that event, and should contemplate

a judgment actually going on in the presence of the ever living God? What if instead of trying to depict the torments of hell after death, we should try to get some conception of hell during life? What if the thought should dawn upon us that the most fearful of the visions of the retribution of sin set forth in the Apocalypse are actually realized in the experience of sin now? Suppose you could unveil all that is going on in souls now that are on the side of wrong—see all the troubled heavings of a sea that cannot rest—see all the commotions, all the fears, all the hidings, all the fleeings from the presence of the Lord, all the hasty, hopeless piling of barricades of crime and sin against the consequences of former crime and sin—see these processes going on—what is there in the imagery of the “lake that burneth with fire and brimstone” that is too highly colored to describe them? Why, righteousness is always saying: “Amen! Alleluia! Salvation and glory and honor and power unto the Lord our God!” And the smoke of the torment of sin “*ascendeth* forever and ever.”

Here are consequences wrought out in human souls—consequences to which neither the individual man nor society is adequate—wrought out of moral issues, and yet men say, “Where is God?” Why, the consciousness of the power not ourselves making for righteousness may become the prime consciousness to the almost total obliteration of the consciousness of everything else.

Some external object of beauty, or some source of pain, sometimes so possesses us that we are only conscious of its existence—we forget ourselves. So it is in moral experience. To the criminal and the saint there may come such conviction, from opposite experiences in moral sensation, that each may say, “*Thou* art, O God, and surely *I* must be.” The prime consciousness the existence of God, the secondary one the existence of self.

The Savior told the disciples of a Spirit that should convince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment. The world is convinced of sin, of righteousness and of judgment.

“ We hear with groan and travail-cries
The world confess its sin.”

We have our convictions of sin and its judgment as well as of righteousness and its judgment. Both convictions come to all men alike. What to do with such convictions, especially convictions of sin, is an important question.

Just look at these two cases:

BYRON.

"The fire that on my bosom burns
Is lone as some volcanic isle;
No torch is lighted at its blaze,
A funeral pile."

WHITTIER.

"Thy healing pains, a keen distress,
Thy tender light shines in;
Thy sweetness is the bitterness,
Thy grace the pang of sin."

Behind both utterances lies the recognition of one common fact—God sitting as fire upon the soul. The discernible difference between the two cases is that one is letting the fire consume himself, while the other turns it to consume his sin.

The latter habit of the soul is the leading art of salvation. An old prophet made the enquiry, "Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire, who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" and answered his question with the statement that it could be done by one who would make the adjustments of righteousness. The fire might burn, but he should not be consumed.

But it takes courage, high intent to deal with fire—to stand its consumption of our sin.

Let me illustrate. Charles Sumner, from the assault upon him in the senate chamber, received an injury to the spine which threatened to make the remainder of his life useless. The medical authorities in Paris recommended the moxa, i. e., a burning along the spinal column, unrelieved by anæsthetics. Out of this treatment came health to Mr. Sumner and years of his usefulness to the nation in its time of greatest trial.

God treats us with the moxa for our sins, and the trouble with us is that we do not have the courage to en-

duce it. We plunge into the outer darkness rather than endure the refining fire.

Much might be elaborated from this point, but what I wish to make special use of now is the fact that the fire is here—a fire which we have never set and which we would give the universe to quench.

Yet men say, "Where is God?" Why, the pure in heart see God and enjoy him forever, and the impure in heart apprehend God, just as distinctly, as consuming fire.

God is *here*, revealed to our moral being, and the only question is under which of his modes of administration we prefer to deal with him, that which runs along the line of sin and fire, or that which runs along the line of righteousness and love. This discussion may seem weighted heavily with considerations drawn from experiences when we are on the Nay side of the moral universe. But sensations drawn from that side have their bearing on theism, as well as those derived from the Yea side.

You would not make up a philosophy of physical sensation without bringing into view sensations of pain as well as of pleasure.

We may certainly ask, What is the meaning of the testimony borne by sensations of moral pain?

And now comes Mr. Herbert Spencer and deposes as follows: "They (nescientists) have dropped those early conceptions which imply that the power manifested in thirty millions of suns made a bargain with Abraham." But the power manifested in thirty millions of suns carefully weighed Abraham's body, varying ounces according as Abraham descended into and climbed out of the Jordan gorge.

Does Mr. Spencer wish to assert that the power that manages thirty millions of suns must stop on the hay scales?

But it is not a question of theory, it is a question of fact as to what has been and is.

Both facts are true. The power that manages thirty millions of suns has never ceased its physical stress on a human body, has never ceased its moral strain upon a human soul.

God will make substantially the same bargain to-day

with any man that he made with Abraham—that if he will walk with himself in righteousness he shall have its rewards.

In the modification of old conceptions regarding things scientific and religious, now going on, we seem to be now at pause, asking somewhat anxiously what direction religion shall take. There is an expression of fear that religion is losing its hold upon the people, and that as a consequence we may expect a moral interregnum—when wickedness shall abound and men shall wax worse and worse.

Many exhort to return to the old paths and repeat the battle cries of former days when religion was successful. All this is vain. It is the counsel of fear and despair. It is an attempt to conjure with words and processes that have lost their charm.

Religion cannot command and guide with chattering teeth.

New exigencies must be met with new expedients. Every battle must have its own watchword. If *morals* are being corrupted, then it is along the line of *morals* that the battle must be set. It is the business of those who believe in religion to know how to handle their forces, how to manage the issue and to organize victory. Some things ought to be plain.

Those who are witnesses for God ought to bear testimony to *his prime simplest revelation* in the sense of *moral obligation*. They ought to be able to help souls trace out the consequences of their attitude toward that revelation. They ought to be able to interpret

“The unseen grief

That swells with silence in the tortured soul.”

They ought to be able to convince men that righteousness tendeth to life, that the way of the wicked *is* turned upside down—that righteousness is order, kosmos, with its accompanying suggestion of beauty—that sin is chaos, that all the debris of the universe may be tumbled upon a man who steps therein—that man is helpless in that disorder, that no-land, where everything is without form and void and darkness is on the face of the deep, while

there is a land where the sun rules by day and the moon and stars by night, and everything is "very good." The soul of man must still be open to influences that shall save from an immoral regnum and organize the kingdom of God.

The belief in a hell of fire is passing away. To some that may seem as though the coast were clear for immorality. Because of that tendency many may regret the loss of the old terror. But men are still conscious that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness." Whether there is to be a hell of fire or not, it is still true that "our God is a consuming fire" and as such broods over the soul of man in all his sin. I think the old idea of hell was relieved somewhat by the notion of companionship in its woes. But in sin

"The fire that on the bosom burns
Is lone as some volcanic isle."

The sting of it, the shame, the fear, the remorse, the bondage, the helplessness are all personal.

It would be well if we had less of metaphysical theology, less of the eschatology of sin and more of its pathology. It would be well if we put less of study upon Calvin and Edwards and Watson and more upon Shakspeare, Hawthorne, George Eliot and our own souls. I feel sure that thus the terror of wrong would stand out in such bold relief that the desirability of avoiding it would be evident.

Then its pitiableness! To know what *is* would surely be enough to inspire men out of compassion to agonize for the world's redemption. Goethe said he never heard of a crime but he thought he might have been guilty of it. Sin has no outlook, however dark, but it might be ours—much of it is ours, and the rest is borne by some human sensibility. We shall want to save men when we realize *what is* and its tendencies.

When we analyze our moral sensation, I think we find in the suggestion to duty a challenge to its performance. I believe we first hear a clarion call before we hear a threatening. There is pull as well as push accompanying our sense of moral obligation. God, in moral sensation, issues an appeal to moral ambition—a fact I think

we should remember when we try to second the efforts of God for the salvation of men.

Men are as susceptible to ethical ambition as to any other function. The "joy of doing good" is a matter of common consciousness. The soul lies open to an invitation to that joy—to spur to its pursuit. Men feel within themselves the ability to do good.

"So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
So near is God to man,
When duty whispers low, 'Thou must,'
The youth replies, 'I can.'"

Yet how little is this ground worked! We are all the while trying to prove to men that they cannot do anything without God. Suppose we should try to impress them that there is nothing moral which they cannot do *with* God—that to be true to duty is to take God into partnership. Is not this what makes the gospel, gospel? By way of its hopes is it not appeal and promise to moral chivalry?

Is not the gospel to be administered as tonic to the moral nature? To secure its due effects, is it always necessary to begin with drastics and purgatives—always necessary to phlebotomize souls?

Herbert Spencer says the sense of duty will ultimately disappear. That can only be on the minatory side. The sense of moral obligation and the ethical ambition to meet it will ever remain. There is allurement as well as threatening in *ought*. There is attraction as well as propulsion to rightness of moral adjustment. Hope as well as fear holds us up to morals. The force of *ought* will survive on one side or the other or on both sides of this double line of operation in our being.

It may be said, that, if the prime command to our moral nature is to seek the right, man has not made much advance in clearing up the sphere of possible moral action—that still there is much confusion as to what is right and what is wrong.

It may well be that much is left to human endeavor and experience for determination. That is the beauty of the problem of moral existence—to have something to do—

something to settle under our guiding inspiration to find the right.

But it is not true that the race of man has not settled much—very much—in and by its moral exercises. It is a great realm that is covered by the moral findings of man.

In his dealing with God as a power making for righteousness man has found the family as a social relation, man has found the principle of private property and of honesty—*suum cuique*—in the exchanges of property necessitated by the struggle for existence and called for by the ambition for development and dominion over the resources and forces of the earth.

He has, aside from the Hebrew revelation, found the principles of the ten commandments—if to find such principles be not revelation itself—and the summary of them given by the Savior. These seem to be the common property of the race—at least in its upper reaches—worked out by its experience with the power not itself making for righteousness. This is only a part of what has been revealed in man. But how great is this realm!

“ See the universal race endowed
With the same upright form—the sun is fixed,
And the infinite magnificence of heaven,
Within the reach of every human eye;
The sleepless ocean murmurs for all ears;
The vernal field infuses fresh delight
Into all hearts. Throughout the world of sense,
Even as an object is sublime or fair,
That object is laid open to the view
Without reserve or veil; and as a power
Is salutary, or an influence sweet,
Are each and all enabled to perceive
That power, that influence, by impartial law.
Gifts nobler are vouchsafed alike to all.
Reason, and, with that reason, smiles and tears;
Imagination, freedom in the will;
Conscience to guide and check; and death to be
Foretasted, immortality presumed.
Strange, then, nor less than monstrous might be deemed
The failure, if the Almighty, to this point
Liberal and indistinguishing, should hide

The excellence of moral qualities
 From common understanding; leaving truth
 And virtue, difficult, abstruse and dark,
 Hard to be won and only by a few!
 Strange should He deal herein with nice respects
 And frustrate all the rest! Believe it not;
The primal duties shine aloft like stars;
The charities that soothe and heal and bless,
Are scattered at the feet of man like flowers.
 The generous inclination, the just rule,
 Kind wishes, and good actions, and pure thoughts—
 No mystery is here; no special boon
 For high and not for low; for proudly graced—
 And not for meek of heart."

That extract from Wordsworth shows how vast is the realm covered by the well understood common law of right.

There is nothing quite so verifiable as God; and nothing quite so clear as moral principles.

There is one other thing in which men will cling to the testimony of consciousness, discarding any philosophy from any quarter whatsoever that seems to violate it. This testimony is that God is always and everywhere a power making for *righteousness*.

Whatever difficulties we may have about the origin of sin, *this* ground is clear to consciousness, that God has no part, overt or covert, in the inducement to sin. Consciousness rejects any theory that makes God the author of sin, or decree it or ordain or foreordain or predestinate it in any way whatever. If we cannot do any better we shall go to the dualism of Persia—Manicheism, before we shall attribute to God the doing of that secretly, behind the back of consciousness, which he professes and protests he does not do before its face.

Ahriman—Satan as co-ruler, or the mind of man as creator—anything will be accepted rather than that God has direct or remote complicity with the origin of sin. No philosophic notions even of the necessity of unity for this system will stand before the human consciousness that God is always and everywhere, without subterfuges, mental reservations or recoupments, a power that makes for righteousness.

Any theory that God corrals a man in circumstances, so that there is no way out except into the trap of sin, is sublimated before the testimony of common moral sensation.

"The Lord is *righteous* in *all* his ways and *holy* in *all* his works," will be the assertion of the consciousness of man against any contrary assertion of philosophy, or theology "fasily so called."

Whatever else may be unexplained, *this* is not. God has written his explanation in this matter in the human soul.

Another thing comes out clear in consciousness, to wit, that while God has no complicity with man's sin, man has. The freedom of man is given as plainly in consciousness as the presence of God. Man owns his sin as *his own*—his own in spite of the well understood remonstrance of God. It is because it is his own that the bitterness of sin is felt by man. If he could find some one to whom to attach responsibility, the bitterness would depart. But all attempts in this direction are futile.

One cannot put the truth which is realized in this matter in every human soul better than St. Augustine has. "And I enquired what iniquity was and found it to be no substance, but the perversion of the will turned aside from thee, O God, toward these lower things." In spite of all the excuses of heredity and environment—the mere conditions of temptation—men will and must regard their wrong and sin as inexcusable, because choice of it is still *their own*.

Corollaries to our discussion are so numerous that I must remand the deduction of multitudes of them to the listener. I only hope what has been said is suggestive enough to compel minds to that exercise.

It is shallow work that will be done by attempting to teach morals without regard to *theism*. You will get no higher than conventional morals in that way. That does not meet the issue forced upon the soul.

"*Εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός*"—"One is the good," says the Master of righteousness.

You cannot account for moral obligation, except by the fact of the pressure of the One Supreme Will upon the soul.

It is difficult to see how one can teach morals without recurring to the source whence they spring. The greatest moral teacher was certainly the one most theistic.

Says Principal Shairp, "In the consciousness of Christ to see a thing to be right and at the same time the will of God, was one act. To him morality and the perceived will of God were identical." When God is forgotten or obscured, morals will share the same fate.

Here is Mr. Ingersoll: "My philosophy is that every one does as he must do, that every thought is a necessary product, over which no one has the slightest control, that the idea of accountability is a kind of moral mirage."

To which it may be said: It is not necessary for Col. Ingersoll to take that position. If he chooses to do so there is liberty. But he reduces himself to absurdity before the common consciousness of man. The sense of moral obligation is our experience of a perpetual assize of accountability.

But to this complexion will it come—the substantial denial of moral obligation—when you set out from an atheistic or agnostic base.

This does not make it necessary to maintain that the foundations of right lie in the mere assertion of the Divine Will. Not the fiat of God but the fact of God, with the relation thence springing, constitutes the ultimate ground in morals. Theism accounts as nothing else can for the enforcement of moral obligation upon our being. Why God so hovers over the soul, whereto this incessant moral stress tends, may be questions yet more ultimate. But neither the queries nor their answers can obscure the fact of his eternal brooding.

There is no separate God-consciousness—consciousness of God *and* of moral obligation as separate affairs. But moral consciousness *is* the consciousness of the *Operant God*.

Some one writing in favor of the enforcement of morals from the pulpit says: "Right doing and piety should never be divorced." They cannot be. Right doing *is* piety. They are synonymous, synchronous, co-terminous, equivalent.

We are not without historic illustration of the moral

effect of attention to the immediate revelation which God makes of himself in every soul.

The Quaker has dealt with God as an inner light—as a power not himself, yet within himself making for righteousness. The healthfulness of his moral results is a guaranty of the truthfulness of the procedure. In these days when we are fearing the precipitation upon us of an immoral regnum, it is well to refer to his experience. However doctrines may have gone to pieces in his mind, morality has not departed from his conduct; and conduct is not three-fourths of life, as Mr. Arnold suggests, but the whole of it. The Quaker has said he could find a voice to guide him in all his moral conflicts. As a consequence of his recognition of God within, he has put into history a body of human action that well expresses our ideal of that prime moral requisite—"To deal justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with God." We have had among us a Quaker poet, whose name has come to suggest the Divine benediction. Can we better take leave of our subject than in an utterance from him?

THE WORD

"Voice of the Holy Spirit, making known
 Man to himself, a witness swift and sure,
 Warning, approving, true and wise and pure,
 Counsel and guidance that misleadeth none!
 By thee the mystery of life is read;
 The picture writing of the world's grey seers,
 The myths and parables of the primal years,
 Whose letter kills, by thee interpreted
 Take healthful meanings, fitted to our needs,
 And in the soul's vernacular express
 The common law of simple righteousness.
 Hatred of cant and doubt of human creeds
 May well be felt; the unpardonable sin
 Is to deny the Word of God within."

THE INWARD JUDGE.

FROM INSTITUTES OF MANU.

The soul itself its awful witness is.
 Say not in evil doing, "No one sees,"

And so offend the conscious One within,
Whose ear can hear the silences of sin
Ere they find voice, whose eyes unsleeping see
The secret motions of iniquity.

Nor in thy folly say, "I am alone,"
For, seated in thy heart, as on a throne,
The ancient Judge and Witness liveth still,
To note thy act and thought; and as thy ill
Or good goes from thee, far beyond thy reach,
The solemn Doomsman's seal is set on each.

WHITTIER.

NOTE.—I have worked in this discussion by Matthew Arnold's formula interpretative of moral psychology. The same results can be reached by using Kant's "Categorical Imperative," or Paley's "Intelligent and Moral Governor." But Arnold's formula lends itself more aptly to popular service in these days when dynamic rather than legal conceptions rule in thought.

CHAPTER II.

MORALS AND THE BIBLE.

WITH a whole broadside of our being open to the constant ingress and egress of the Divine Being—in incessant communication with Him—we coolly sit down to the discussion of the possibility of revelation—whether word can come from “Him with whom we have to do.”

That men have *not* met God, when every man meets him, is not a very credible, or to man creditable, supposition.

If we find God in our ordinary moral motions, revelation ought not to be an astonishment. What *is* certainly ought to be regarded as possible. What *is*, if it also *was*, ought to have left a plain path in history. This struggle of men with the Power not themselves making for righteousness, ought to have left its impress on the thought and the conduct of man from the beginning of time. Such impress is *everywhere* evident. It is wrought in the history of the children of men. It is notably apparent in ancient times in the history of the Hebrew people—in later times in an influence, that indeed came out of Galilee, but that now seems to pass upon all men with utter indifference to race.

The book, or collection of books, which we call the Bible seems to be a history, not of the whole contact of the spirit of God with the spirit of man; for that would be to gather up all human experience; but of marked examples of such contact individually and nationally.

If you can suppose men endowed with the genius of attention and of obedience to the voice that spake within, you can get some conception of how the *ethics* of the Bible might have arisen. If men bear witness to holiness now, not as something self-originated but as something caught by the listening ear, and set in character by obedient conduct, it ought not to be hard to realize that in old time “holy men spake moved by the Holy Ghost.”

It is a short path along the line of *ethics* to *monotheism*.

The conviction of unity in the power ethically operant upon man is one that must come. There is one unchanging voice to the individual. He will judge that the voice which speaks to him speaks to all souls. Going only so far gives a God of Righteousness.

A more remote step is the one which identifies the voice speaking for order within with the power making for order without. But it is a step which the mind has an invitation to take. Socrates and Plato and Aristotle and Cicero seem to have taken it.

Did not Abraham and Moses have struggle here? Did not their *calls* spring in the conviction that the power operant within them was identical with the power regulative without? They and others of the patriarchs and prophets found settled convictions on this question and they give you their common result—a God speaking for righteousness in the heart of man and holding the forces of the universe subject to his righteous will. Is the conviction that one has a mission under the government of such a God so strange a thing to experience, or historic observation, that one would deny it to patriarch and prophet of old, and deny to them an outcome from it? Given a history of men as they were true or untrue, or sometimes true, sometimes untrue, to such convictions, and what would you expect essentially different from what you have in the Bible? Given one other thing—and you have only to go to your own experience to get it—to wit, that we are put to the exercise of finding specific moral adjustment ourselves, i. e., that adjustment which constitutes rightness in relation—or righteousness, and you will have the phenomena apparent on the face of the Bible, that men have made *progress* in morals as they have attentively gathered experiences together and taken just conclusions from them.

The *disposition* to morals which constitutes the sinlessness of man may be strong in the youth of the individual and of the race. The sum of actual results achieved may vary and ought to increase as the experience of individuals and that of the race accumulates.

Given then theism, ethically realized, and given the fact of progression in ethical possessions and results, and

why do you not have philosophy enough in hand substantially to cover the problem of the Bible?

It is true the Bible is not all ethics, but its dominant intent and purpose running through all the varieties of the literature of which it is composed, its leading spirit is ethical. If you are called upon to point out its most significant books or passages you will always take those of ethical import. There is a natural selection which has already passed upon this matter whose effects are visible upon every old family Bible. The worn edges are at the Ten Commandments, the Psalms, Isaiah, the Sermon on the Mount, the last discourse and prayer of Jesus with his disciples, the eighth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth of Romans.

Those lines, indicative of present use, are the best testimony possible out of what elements the scriptures came and what purpose they were intended to serve.

To say that the scriptures are not an abstract code of ethics is to say nothing, since there can be no such code, the very essence of ethics being the right adjustment of the individual to his circumstances. That is not to say that there may not be outlines of broad import drawn for human conduct to follow. But beyond the outlines there will always be an undetermined realm where place, time and circumstance—matters individual, personal, have sway.

Briefly you may say the Bible gives us glimpses of the history of the ethical struggles of man, beginning with an uncertain ethical *disposition*, perhaps, as appears in the delineation of the moral character of the first pair, sinking to unequivocal badness in heathen peoples and demoralized Hebrew kings, or rising to a passion for righteousness in bards and seers;—beginning with nothing for *capital* and ending with the magnificent moral syntheses of Paul and James and John.

The Bible shows us a progressive *nisus* in humanity toward righteousness. That God is a factor in that *nisus*, lies in the very conception of morals we are developing. Viewed in this way the moral imperfections of many or all of the servants of God in old times (in *all* times, for that matter), may be acknowledged.

These imperfections require no further treatment. "The times of that ignorance God overlooked." If he did, we can. Imperfect in many *results*, men may still be our guides as to moral *disposition*. You will ask if this separates the Bible from other records showing the moral struggles and attainments of other men—separates the influences operant upon men disclosed in the Bible from the influences operant in the latter case. I think it does not make a separation in *kind*. I do not think that is an idle statement of Paul:—"For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against *all* ungodliness and unrighteousness of men *who hold the truth* in unrighteousness. Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them." The difference between a prophet of God and a servant of Baal was in the sum of the experiences which had grown up out of their different moral attitudes toward that which God had made manifest in them alike.

Nor do I think that was a barren hypothesis of Peter:—"God is no respecter of persons. In *every* nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him."

Out of that which God shewed to all men, as set forth by Paul, and out of that acceptance with God and working of righteousness, as set forth by Peter, must have come many an utterance that represented the Divine mind as well as the mind of man—that was the truth of God as well as the utterances of our scriptures. If "the primal duties shine aloft like stars," it is because God presses them universally upon the mind of man. The golden rule Christ did not make. It is as old as Moses. Moses did not make it, any more than the barons of England made the body of liberties which they inserted in the great charter they obtained from King John. The golden rule was the common law of the moral nature of man before Moses wrote, and it is the common law of the moral nature of man where Moses and Christ are unknown. It is present everywhere in the moral codes of all peoples. It is not to be accounted for as a surviving remnant of a primeval revelation, but as a principle of an ever present revelation—as an utterance out of the com-

mon moral consciousness of man which God has never left without witness of his presence and his will. That man must do right in his relations with man is the voice of God. In order to do right, that he must love his neighbor as himself is a judgment to which he has been driven and held by the Divine Spirit. That has suffered him no other restful conclusion.

"Moolu never told a lie," says Drummond of his servant in Central Africa. Moolu's virtue was not a relict of an old revelation, it was a consequence of the common testimony of God against falsehood in all souls. You ask if this position does not degrade the scriptures to the level of the sacred books of other peoples. I think not. There is a natural selection (spiritual, if you prefer the term; I am willing to use the term "natural," since there is a natural method in matters spiritual and moral) which has passed upon this matter and marks the Bible off from other books, as evidently as the worn edges of the Psalms and the New Testament mark their ethical height above the rest of the Bible. The literatures of the world and of time are open to us. From what quarter are we likely to find a successful rival to the Bible as ethical instruction and inspiration to the race? Our ancestors generations ago passed on the excellence of the Bible as compared with such sacred books as then existed in the north of Europe. Is there any likelihood of a reversal of that judgment? • I do not care if our ancestors were first baptized by military command—by running them through rivers by armies. That crossing the stream was no idle ceremony after all. There was a this side and a that to the stream. That was forever abandoned; this is held. Nobody would be likely to receive very serious attention who should propose to drive the descendants of those who participated in this rude sacrament back again through the rivers to Thor and Woden. The thing that was done *stays* done. There is some significance in that.

As literature we may have a revived interest in rune and saga, but does any one suppose we are going back to them for inspiration in ethics or guidance in religion? It is quite possible we are coming to a more favorable estimate of the religious value of the Koran, of the Vedas,

of the teachings of Gautama the Buddha, of Confucius and Laou Tse. But do I anything more than echo the common judgment of thoughtful minds when I say that the sacred books of all nations are destined to be superseded as ethical instructors by the Bible? The comparison is *made* and the result foregone. Do you say that this is the conclusion of a vanity which puts *our* possessions first. Bear in mind that the Bible is *not* our Book. We are possessed by it rather than possessors of it. It comes to us as conqueror of a race as toughly alien to its thought and spirit as any it has yet to find on the face of the globe. The matchless simplicity of its ethics and monotheism gave it supremacy over the race or races whence we have sprung. Our conclusion that it will outrank all the sacred books of other nations, in the estimation of those nations themselves, is founded upon historic experience—that most reliable of all teachers.

Rays of Divine light may be seen glimmering here and there in the literature of all peoples. But when the sun rises no people will try practically to discriminate from its effulgence the light of moon and stars, and grope their way by that. They will walk in the light—the higher light—the highest light—if what they are after is the light.

But now comes the question how it is that this old book is still to persist as the moral guide of men, when, from its very face, we conclude for the principle of progression in morals. We have found in morals, *results* to be one thing—*disposition* another. And it is disposition that is the significant thing in morals.

As society develops, new questions will come up for moral judgment. The right adjudications upon them will constitute so much addition to the moral capital of the race. But the *inspiration* to righteousness may be very high in a very simple state of society, when moral ways and means are yet very widely undetermined. It is precisely this element of *inspiration* for righteousness that has put the scriptures ahead of all other writings, and that seems likely to keep them there even in Christian lands. The fact is here, and it is a fact whose significance cannot be avoided, that for eighteen hundred years

the Bible has outranked, as a moral influence, all the writings of the men who have been morally born and bred from it. Something did so elevate those old bards and prophets and apostles of the scripture record into the realm of moral inspiration and insight that they do to this very day secure allegiance as the moral kings of men. There have been many confessions of sin under the light of Christianity, yet no one of them has such hold upon the mind of men to-day as the confession embodied in the fifty-first Psalm, which is a thousand years older than the New Testament even. (Begging pardon of the Higher Criticism.)

The name of the books that have been written to help young men against the power of temptation is legion. Yet none of them supersede the stories of Joseph and Daniel.

Here is a new book entitled "The Morals of Shakspeare." It is made by culling the moral gems of that author. It has great value, for Shakspeare could and did read well the human soul and knew where the ethical lines run. But offer this book in one hand, and in the other the ten commandments and the first and fifteenth Psalms, to a dying mother bidding farewell to her boy, and see which she will give him. You know the selection which will be made as long as there are mothers and sons. Certainly there have been many forcible and eloquent presentations of moral truth in the last eighteen hundred years from the Christian pulpit. Yet men will turn for ethical inspiration to the concluding chapters of any of Paul's epistles. We have a very remarkable book in Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics." But is it likely to supersede the Bible? Here is a young man tempted and torn by appetites and passions. You want to lay his tormenting devils and put him in calm mastery of himself. You take your Herbert Spencer and read to him, as the highest moral tonic you can find therein: "Moral conduct is coherent, definite, unceasingly heterogeneous and tending toward equilibrium."

Undoubtedly that would be good philosophy for the young man, when its meaning was fairly reached. But would it be likely to stay the tides of passion's seas?

Read now St. Paul: "Be not deceived, God is not

mocked, for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption. But he that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." "Be not weary in well doing, for in due season we shall reap if we faint not."

Now which writer on ethics will be likely to startle with fear, and to thrill with hope and carry to virtuous resolution and conduct the tempted young man? Do you not suppose that men will be able to see who is the master of the ethical springs of human nature?

On the principle of natural selection and survival of the fittest, which one of these writings, as helps for the tempted, will survive, and which will be cast up as drift-wood on the shore?

One wonders why the scripture Canon of the Old and New Testaments is made up just as it is. But if you could toss each collection, with its accompanying Apocrypha, back again before the public mind without any marks to distinguish them, there is no doubt that that natural selection which passes upon spiritual things would soon again make the old separations and run the Canon lines substantially where we now behold them. Israel—so he himself thought—had had no prophet for hundreds of years before John the Baptist. *Why* this was so, doubtless you may query, as did the Israelites of those days. But that it was so is not to be doubted. You can see it for yourself, as you read the literature of the time between the restoration and the coming of Christ. There was something that stamped the old prophet that is certainly an art lost from the later writings. Even the best books like the "Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach" and the "Wisdom of Solomon" strike you as philosophizings *about* God rather than as indicative of communings *with* him. They are deductions from ethics rather than original inspirations therein. Their near congeners *in* the Canon are The Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. It is only necessary to read, in connection with these books, the Psalms and Isaiah to perceive the heaven-piercing moral altitude of the latter above the former. At best nothing in the Apocrypha comes up higher than the lowest level

of the Canon. Divide the origin of the Psalms and of Isaiah among the centuries, and the problem is not greatly altered. The fact is still patent that Israel had no prophet of eminence for four hundred years. The causes of the fact we may not be able so well to make out. But we may find a solution which shall have some elements of satisfaction. Come down to the Pharisee in the time of Christ. If we can read his psychology at all, this was its distinguishing feature—God had not spoken to man since the restoration. The conviction of that fact was the reason why he was so careful a custodian of the words which, he believed, *had* been spoken before, by Divine authority, from the mouth of the prophet—the reason why he invented all his cabalistic methods of interpretation—why he worshiped the letter while he forgot the spirit of the prophet—why he became so worldly, scornful and uncharitable in his moral being. His philosophy of revelation excluded the contact of the living God with his own soul.

Perhaps the restoration itself invited the processes which ended in this godlessness of the Pharisee; for the restoration was an outgrowth of attachment to the old regime. There might have been Simeons just and devout, and Annas who served God night and day with fastings and prayers, all through this long period, but no one arose with power to strike through the prevalent blindness, bearing to it testimony that God was still witnessing himself in the moral nature of man. The fact is that, in that period, ethics was at a low ebb except as matter of tradition.

If prophets are not made by the tone of public sentiment, and sometimes appear in spite of it, yet certainly the *natural* ground, out of which we might expect them to spring, is not a public sentiment which treats of God as a matter of antiquarian research and does not know the meaning of the voice speaking for righteousness within. In Christ's day the Jew was building the tomb of the prophet who had spoken for God eight hundred years before. But in the day of that prophet, the ancestor of the Jew was thinking of God as present in the flight from Egypt, and in the wanderings in the wilder-

ness. That same prophet was in his own time "a voice crying in the wilderness" that God was then present to the heart of every man—that every one could hear him say: "Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well." Out of the Jew's nothing, nothing came. If anything had come he could not have seen it.

The ethical descent is as marked from the New Testament to its Apocrypha as from the Old Testament to its. There is piety enough in the writings of the Fathers. But it is piety that soon drops to the plane of reverence for past Divine manifestation, or of comment on it or of fierce quarrel about it, and is no witness for the ever living presence of God in the being of all men. It is derivative rather than original religion that lives here.

Perhaps this discussion has opened ground enough before us so that we can with some degree of satisfaction answer the questions how the Canon grew, and why the Bible persists and dominates all other religious literature.

If I say with Matthew Arnold that the authors of the Bible were endowed with the genius for righteousness, I want to be understood as simply saying that while they were great men intellectually, they were the most obedient listeners among men to the voice of the Eternal speaking within for righteousness. They recognized the contact of God with them in the ethical direction of their being. They were alert to catch that direction. They took on induction from it, as the minute needle takes its induction from the magnetism of the great earth. They could point where God pointed because they turned where he indicated.

In the Princeton Review, Principal Shairp says: "In the Old Testament and in the New alike law-giver, prophet and apostle felt themselves to be the recipients of a message direct from God, the hearers of a voice which did not originate in their own heart and conscience, but a voice from without, coming from One who is supreme over the heart and conscience of man. And yet it is to be noted that those Hebrew men who believed most entirely in those appeals from without were the very men of all the world in whom the inward moral convictions

were strongest, in whom the belief in conscience and in God were absolutely at one, the one belief strengthening and deepening the other."

That means, to the best Hebrew minds, "*Morality and religion, righteousness and God, were not only in harmony, but identical.*"

We are now where we can see from what quarter inspiration comes and whither it tends. It comes from holiness and runs to holiness. That, I think, shows us our way out of the standing difficulty we have in reference to the inspiration of the scriptures, to wit, the evident fact that so far as intellectual conception and knowledge is concerned they are not above the common or the uncommon thought of the times whence they sprang—not above the possibilities of the best thinking of those times. In that element they are not different from the then prevalent philosophy.

Our mistake has been that where the scripture has spoken of *ἀγιωσύνη*, holiness, we have read *γνώσις*, or knowledge; where the scripture has read *ἅγιον πνεῦμα*, or holy spirit, we have read *γνώσιον πνεῦμα*, or intellectual spirit.

It is safe enough to say that so far as there is any misunderstanding to-day between religion, as it rests on the scriptures, and any of the sciences, it grows out of this misapprehension. The *ἅγιον πνεῦμα* inspires to *ἀγιωσύνη* and *primarily* to nothing else. Prof. Gray says: "Revelation in its essence concerns things moral and spiritual." To this view the scriptures consent in their marked descriptions of inspiration, its influence and intent.

"Holy men of God spake moved by the Holy Ghost."

"Search the scriptures, for in them ye think ye have *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*,—eternal life."

The merest babe in scripture interpretation ought to know that the ethical sense of *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* absorbs all others. The Savior means to say—you can find in the scriptures what will procure such ethical adjustment as can only be described by "eternal life."

I do not care to take advantage of the certainly better rendering of the famous declaration of Paul respecting the inspiration of scripture, to wit, "All scripture, God-

inspired, even is profitable for doctrine, for reproof," etc, because even the old and faulty rendering never had in it that which with so much tenacity has been asserted there to be, to wit, the guaranty of perfect immunity from *all* error. I am perfectly willing to take King James' translation as it stands. I submit that thereon the warranty of inspiration runs only to ethical intent and end. The usual way in argument on this matter is to quote from Paul the single scrap: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God," and to declare that that is the end of the matter on the authority of the inspired apostle Paul. But that is a snap judgment and has the standing among sensible men of all snap judgments. Do you remember what there is *in connection* with this oft quoted expression of Paul? Begin back a little. "From a child thou hast known the holy scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto"—what? "Wise *εἰς σωτηρίαν*—unto salvation." If "salvation" does not suggest an ethical result in the scriptures, then language is a failure for the expression of ideas. "Wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus"—if "faith in Christ Jesus" does not express an ethical process, then salvation is a mystery which is still hid. Then comes: "All scripture is given by inspiration of God and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness."

The fair presumption is that Paul does not assert for inspiration a warranty to all imaginable ends, but to the end which he has immediately in view and of which he specifies, to wit, profitableness "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." Is there any question that the ethical intent in each of those terms, singly, here swallows up all other meanings? Is there any question that in their collocation they are the survey lines enclosing the field of inspiration? The soil of that field righteousness preëmpts.

If this were not enough there is a further limitation which is decisive. The scripture is *declared* to be inspired and profitable to a *certain end*. That end is set forth in the last verse under view. "That"—(*ἵνα*, telic—in order that)—that is to say, with the end in view—

"the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all *good works*." If that language does not limit the purposes of inspiration to morals, language is an idle instrument.

I have been particular to hold attention to these crucial statements of the doctrine of inspiration, because if we really seize their true intent, we shall see that we can dismiss at once innumerable questions which we have assumed an obligation to debate and defend.

That no intellectual errors occur in the scriptures is not stated or claimed by the *scriptural* masters and judges of inspiration. That claim is a kind of Pharisaism foisted upon the scriptures by men who, in later times as well as those of old, have forgotten the difference between a spirit and a letter. *Whether* there are intellectual errors in the scriptures is a matter that stands by itself. You cannot close it out by attempting to spread the vinculum of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit over it. That is to confound the ἅγιον πνεῦμα with a γνώσιον πνεῦμα. That is both "to add unto" and "to take away from" "the words of the book of this prophecy." And there are plagues upon us consequent upon our rash pledge of God to that for which he has given no authority. What we have to learn from our discipline is that we are not called upon to defend a letter, but to assert a spirit.

I have heard the dispute, whether Cyrenius was governor of Syria in the days of Augustus Cæsar at the time mentioned in the second chapter of Luke, closed out by the declaration: "Oh, but the Holy Spirit has been here and passed upon this matter—will you deny the inspired utterances of the Holy Spirit?" Now it is an assumed authority which pledges the Holy Spirit to the fact that Cyrenius was governor of Syria at the time asserted. Whether he was such governor or not, is a matter outside the subjects with which the Holy Spirit is concerned. There is everything against the notion that the Holy Spirit was ever given any man to enable him to tell who was governor of any people, at any time and any place, from the days of Cyrenius to recent elections in the States of the U. S. A. You find out the latter fact by the returns, if you can; and Luke says he found

out the former fact because he "carefully traced it out." See the Greek text of Luke i. 3.

The Holy Spirit would inspire a man to be honest and careful in sifting his evidences if he wanted to make a historic statement.

The Holy Spirit might inspire a man to trace down carefully and to set forth orderly a history of things widely held as facts, in order that his friend might have certainty of conviction in reference to things wherein he had been instructed. A double ethical intent would hang over his whole work, and correctness might be expected in his results. But his inspiration would lie in his ethical intent. His correctness of statement would be a secondary reflection therefrom. He might fail in accuracy notwithstanding his intent. But a man having the Holy Spirit would not be very likely to say a man was governor of any place without having taken exhaustive pains to ascertain the fact.

To say, "The Holy Spirit has been here," is to close out no statement of matter of fact. That is to confound intellectual perception with moral purpose. The inspiration of the Holy Spirit will guaranty the moral purpose. But the plain and fair implication is that when you are outside your purpose you are outside your warranty. That leaves the matter of correctness of historic or scientific fact to rest on its own base. If incorrectness is found in such matters, that would not in the least detract from the ability of the scriptures "to make wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus."

Show what you please in regard to the philosophic, scientific, or historic notions, conceptions, or statements of the scriptures, they will still bear off the palm, over all other writings known to man, as the moral instructor of mankind.

While I allow so much—while I say that you may take the primary vinculum of inspiration off the science, history and philosophy of the scriptures, I want also to assert that there is a secondary effect of their moral inspiration, manifest in the accuracy of their statements of fact and in the acceptableness and reasonableness of their science and philosophy. These secondary effects are so

remarkable that it is no wonder that they have been confounded with the primary. I have said that it is a matter that stands on its own base, outside the warranty of inspiration from the Holy Spirit, whether Cyrenius was governor of Syria. No fact in history has been put to the rack of investigation more sternly than this statement, and up to this date the scales promptly incline in Luke's favor. Away back in Genesis is a statement purporting to cover the origin of the various races that have peopled the globe, or of such races as have woven its history. It is not the direct business of inspiration by the Holy Spirit to secure accuracy in such a statement. Yet such have been the indirect influences of such inspiration that Mr. Gladstone declares the tenth chapter of Genesis to be "the most valuable document of ancient ethnography known to man." Some one wrought under high ethical inspiration for the instruction of man, and his ethical intent wrought to an accuracy which still stands inquisition from the sharpest-eyed historic criticism. Yet the accuracy of that chapter is an incidental effect of the inspiration of its author. It is what you may expect from man when he is born to righteousness.

I challenge in the interest of the scriptures, and of the influence which we long to have them exert over men, and for which we devoutly pray, the definition of inspiration (usual, I think), as—"Such influence over the mind of the writers of the scriptures as secured them from the possibility of error in any statements they have made." There is no foundation laid by the scriptures themselves for such statement of the doctrine of inspiration. It is a violation of the fair meaning of the words and phraseology in which such doctrine is expressed and implied. It diverts to an intellectual channel a force that flowed in a moral conduit.

Why have we not an analogy that affords us a safe guide in a principle which prevails at common law, to wit, the distinction that is made in reference to legal decisions between what is matter "in point" and "obiter dicta"? Not everything which is said in a legal decision is law, but only what is "in point." Common law, as common sense, recognizes the discursiveness of the human mind

in reaching conclusions. The conclusions "in point" are law, but the discursions are "obiter dicta" and may be as they may, correct or not. We hold life and property under the regulation of such a principle in law. The principle in reality always sends the legal profession to search for the spirit of a legal decision, never to trust to its letter. This principle makes a just discrimination in reference to the operations of the human mind. Yet we find social salvation under its operation. Why may we not find ethical salvation while we make the distinction in the scriptures between what is ethically "in point" and what is "obiter dictum," discursive, illustrative, matter of "inducement"? What is "in point" in the Bible is righteousness; the "obiter dicta" are its various what-nots else.

"De minimis lex non curat." Why not *inspiratio*? Why may we not find moral salvation in inspiration though there be "little things" to which its care does not run? Shall we hold the free comprehensive spirit of moral inspiration to punctilios of letter which we would be ashamed to urge as law before a Justice of the Peace? A man would lose character before a court who should quote every scrap of a legal decision as authoritative, as we do scripture.

It is said that inspiration does not violate the fundamental laws of the human mind. Let us see then that we do not treat the outcome of it in a way which clearly implies that it does.

I shall be asked how I would treat the element of prophecy in the scriptures. I should begin by calling attention to the fact which every one knows, and straightway forgets, that a prophet, distinctively, was not one who foretold events, but one who spoke for God—for the Eternal making for righteousness. I regard the element of foretelling in scripture, except as it is felt out along moral lines, as insignificant in quantity and quality, even if it can be detected at all.

One of the worst stumbling blocks which we are obliged to remove out of the way of skeptical thought is the exaggerated estimate of the amount of prognostication in the Old Testament. Despite all the instruction that may have

been given, it is safe to say that it is commonly understood that an Old Testament prophet was a foreteller—a prognosticator. Now an Old Testament prophet, like a New Testament prophet, or apostle, was one who spoke to “edification, exhortation and comfort” morally. From righteousness his inspiration came and toward righteousness it went. Out of righteousness came his illumination. The direct routes over human problems are *via* morals. The short lines of perception between that which is and that which is to be are moral lines. The vision of righteousness, over matters collateral to its main line, is often clearer than the sharpest intellection morally unilluminated. The certain things are moral issues. Certainty in other matters comes from clarity of vision here.

Hence Israel’s prophets of *righteousness* were *seers*.

Given the optimism that comes from confidence in the government of a good God, given the recognition of the fact that the moral issues of his government are certain—that it shall be well with the righteous—man, or nation—and ill with the wicked—and you have the ethical elements for a prophet, and it makes no difference at what time he appears. It may as well be at one time as another. He will tell you who or what is going to the rocks and who or what shall sail on prosperous seas.

The prophets came to their vision naturally, normally, out of moral coincidence with the Divine righteousness and out of that which is directly and incidentally therewith connected.

Maurice makes the revelation coming out of prophetic inspiration equivalent to discovery in other departments of mental activity. There seems to me much light in this illustrative analogy.

If we estimate the moral discoveries of the Bible, direct and collateral, higher than the thought of Copernicus, it is because of the supremacy of the moral department in the thought and over the life of man.

It is useless to try to define inspiration. On the face of the scriptures it varies in degree and in purpose in view, as you can see when you compare the confessions of the fifty-first Psalm with the loving historic researches of Luke. It is not a constant quantity—it is a variant. It

risks to an ethical diapason in Isaiah and sinks into a tough struggle for genealogical accuracy in the antiquarian rummagings of Ezra.

But any likeness beyond the fact that each author wanted to state truth in the matter in hand, sought to be found between the inspiration which lay behind the composition of the fifty-first Psalm and that behind the composition of the books of "The Kings" and "The Chronicles," will be far-fetched.

We can say about the inspiration of such books as the latter, that, composed with good intent to preserve history—the history of a people in fact "peculiar" in respect to ethics and theism—and with perhaps intent to teach by example, they have had a providential appointment in the instruction of the race.

They are not toneless in ethical quality. One cannot read them without being impressed that their authors meant to convey the lesson that it was better to be a good king or a good man than to be a bad one.

It is both idle and unimportant to try to settle degrees of inspiration. It is as multifold as the ways of approach by the Power not ourselves making for righteousness to the moral nature of man, as varied as the appointments of duty we all find in life.

Mr. Ingersoll asks, in his brutal drollery, if we believe God inspired Moses to write a prescription for the priests' anointing oil. I do not know why he should not. God is not a non-resident. The whole will include a part. If Moses was inspired to infuse a nation with the morality of the ten commandments, that would entail the adoption of means necessary to the end. A man might be as much a servant of God while composing the last item of the ritual as in giving the greatest of the commandments. The vinculum of righteous intent coincident with the Divine intent would stretch over all. Moses ought to have been as able to say "And God said" to any particular of the ritual as to the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal." It would only take consciousness of community of purpose with God to enable him to say it in the one case as well as in the other. Of course the inspiration of a writer to his work is one thing, that of the actors behind the record is

another. The "call" of Abraham to leave his country primarily to him may have been a secular matter. But behind it we must put the Divine intent to secure a standing for theism and righteousness among men. But here we are going out on a vast system of Divine teleology—of Divine intents and purposes for the world and the universe which is beyond the purpose of this discussion. Out here we might find that all things, secular, natural and physical, are Divine. It is difficult to analyze all the elements that have made up the tendency to go west that has prevailed from primal times. But this is over and beyond any question concerning the inspiration of the scriptures. It rather pertains to a philosophy of the whole government of God over man, life and matter.

Diverse as the scriptures may be in their literary character or in the cast of their inspiration, they have established themselves as a whole and as such persist.

The critic finds his way through them, shows the discreteness of the books, perhaps of the same book. But they close up again as the sea traversed by a ship. The lines of division disappear and the people still go on speaking of "The Bible," and looking in it still for instruction in righteousness.

Suppose the critics do divide Isaiah; the people still read in the earlier: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well: though your sins be as scarlet they shall be as white as snow, though they be red like crimson they shall be as wool"; and in the later: "I will not contend forever, neither will I always be wroth. Peace, peace to him that is far off and to him that is near, saith the Lord, and I will heal him"—and to them, both utterances seem of the same spirit, and "Isaiah" will answer with them to cover its authorship.

There is another matter of great importance—the defense of inspiration is a matter for testimony and not for argument. I believe very much of the difficulty we are having now in reference to the inspiration of the scriptures arises from misconception here. We have assumed to do a great deal more than we are authorized to do, to wit, to *prove* to men the presence of God in the composition of these books. I do not think you can prove to any

man the presence of God anywhere. If a man does not himself *find* God, God will remain unfound. Or if he does not recognize God, as God finds him, *your proofs* will not be likely to have force beyond the Divine demonstration.

If the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness lay behind the composition of the scriptures, he will assert himself therefrom, to the souls who wish to find him, and we need not assume the burden of proof of his presence. He has, as Coleridge says, "found men" from out the pages of the Bible for now towards two thousand years, and he will continue to find men therefrom to the end of time. Inspiration is not and never was a matter of intellectual demonstration. It has been found as an inference from the moral searchings of the individual man, and supported, if at all from an extraneous source, by the testimony of men who have taken on the ethical likeness of the Bible. You cannot prove that a rainbow is beautiful. If a man does not himself see it you cannot enforce perception by argument. If you ask me if I believe in the inspiration of the scriptures, I say yes. But I should want to assert it with somewhat of the modesty with which I would set forth the possibility of my own moral salvability.

They have made their case with me as coming from men who were coincident in spirit with the God of righteousness. If they have not made such a case with my questioner, I should want to ask in what attitude he stands towards righteousness. If he is on the search for it with earnest intent I would like to refer him to the first Psalm, simply asking him, if there is an Eternal that loveth righteousness, and man can be inspired by him, what better utterance for the moral guidance of man such inspired man could frame than is put forth in that Psalm. If a man does not see inspiration in the scriptures I should want to suggest to him scrutiny as to whether he is himself ethically inspirable.

I do not believe a man was ever inspired to righteousness by an argument for the inspiration of the scriptures. But many a man, moved to righteousness by the Eternal making for righteousness working in his moral nature,

has said, when he has read the scripture, "Surely the Lord is in this place and I knew it not." The prime question in regard to the scriptures is not one of inspiration, but of availability for moral purposes. Out of use in the latter direction and of effect received, will come conviction on the former matter.

If the scriptures are explained and their moral teaching enforced, inspiration will take care of itself.

Some people die of propriety. The scriptures are dying of the sanctity with which we invest them. We offer them to God in our public worship much as we offer prayer, or as an old Hebrew offered a sheep or a goat; whereas God has *offered them to us*. We read the scriptures either as an act of worship of God, or of rhetorical delectation of man. One act is about as sensible as the other, and both are far removed from a rational use, or the use shown to be made of them by scripture writers themselves.

It is said that Ezra and his assistant priests and Levites "caused the people to understand the law."

"So they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading." The crying need of the times is *enforcement of the ethics of the scriptures from the pulpit*. If we are not to *argue* for the inspiration of the scriptures we ought to read them enough, and enough of them, for them to make their own case.

We are relying on Sabbath-school instruction to keep the people in knowledge of the scripture. We are doing our work with a class of mind that has no difficulty in the case and are neglecting that class which *has and always will have difficulty*. The instruction of the children is well. But to grow is to come up to the questioning condition. It is at that point that application should be made. Yet how much effort is made by the pulpit to meet the demands of the day? A minister preaches one hundred and four sermons, founded on one hundred and four texts, which come as they may from the whole Biblical wilderness. He generally reads the chapter in which his text is found. That constitutes the main effort of the pulpit to put the scriptures before the minds of the people.

Connected reading with careful exposition is exceptional.

If a minister had before him the idea that no three years should pass without his reading in that period, to his congregation, the whole New Testament, giving them the light of the best helps he can find, we should hear less about difficulty respecting the inspiration of the scriptures.

Ministers are anxious not to leave a place till they have had a revival. Suppose they were equally anxious not to leave a place till the New Testament and the Psalms and Isaiah had had a chance to make out their case with souls.

The scriptures are given not to be worshiped as a fetich, but to be applied as a working force to man's moral nature.

Vicious as are some of his methods in handling the scriptures, Mr. Moody shows, in the results of his work, what can be achieved by regarding them as a practical, working power.

We shall make a great advance when all who believe that the scriptures are able to make wise unto salvation through loyalty to Jesus Christ are equally bold and forceful in pressing the moral truth of scripture upon the minds of men.

Let me sum up such philosophy as I may have upon this whole subject with an illustration.

The historic line along which our scriptures came seems to me a telegraph wire which God has stretched through the ages. He has opened offices here and there and dictated messages of greater or less interest to men. Some of these messages were merely temporal in their character and some were time-lasting. Step into a telegraph office. Here come some messages. "The price of wheat to-day is one dollar and six cents"; "Send four box cars to Janesville, ten platform cars to Oshkosh." Traffic merely of the day, local. But what is coming now? "The President has to-day issued the following proclamation: 'I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforward shall be free, and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval

authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. Abraham Lincoln.” Ah! that is universal in interest. That will alter the face of history. Let it go on forever, wheresoever men live and wires run.

Now try the old scripture line. “Thou shalt make a tabernacle with ten curtains of fine twined linen and blue and purple and scarlet.” Business of the day, merely local. But the click is again heard and you stoop to read: “Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts: and let him return unto the Lord and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon.”

That is universal in interest. Let it go where time shall run.

So through the old historic scripture wire God has been working. How it runs back till its beginning is lost in the dimness of the days of old! And how difficult it is to tell what *did* come over the wire in the early ages! How difficult to tell how much of the faded record, with its evident gaps, which we pore over with such intent inquiry, was message, and how much is what the men of those days said or sung about the message! The old wire! How rusty, frail, storm-beaten, time-worn and eaten it looks! Handle it tenderly, reverently. Along it God has done a mighty business with mankind.

CHAPTER III.

MORALS AND CHRIST.

IN looking back through history and in studying the characters delineated in the scriptures, we pause before one remarkable personage—Jesus of Nazareth. In the realm of morals, both in insight and in practical application, he comes to the front, easily the one commanding figure in the history of man. Can any study be more interesting than an attempt to understand this personage—to determine who he is and what is his relation to morals?

There is one thing very notable at the outset, as we come to examine the bearing of the *moral evidence* upon the question, Who was Jesus of Nazareth? It is this:—The world in no other department shows such supremacy of man over his fellows as Jesus shows in the moral realm over all other men.

Some men seem to lead the race in some spheres; but there is no such gap elsewhere, between man and man, as in the department of morals seems to exist between Jesus and the rest of the race. No such numbers of intelligent people will be content to bear the name of a literary, scientific or political leader as in morals delight to be called Christian. Christ seems accepted without question as the moral ideal.

There are those, I know, who pretend to find instances of moral imperfection in the character of Jesus, and dullness in his moral perception.

But when you come to consider the moral scrutiny through which Jesus has passed, the number of these critics does not seem greater than you might expect from overweening egotism in man, and from his capacity for blundering. Indeed it is astonishing that the subjects of vanity and mistake are here so few.

When examined, this criticism seems to rest on misunderstanding of the circumstances of the case, or of the language used descriptive of the matter at issue, or on a cynicism which will allow nothing to sit easily in the not im-

moral custom or habit of thought and speech of its age. The great tide of common assent sweeps us past the necessity of further examination of such criticism upon the moral comprehension and character of Jesus.

I return to my statement that the supremacy of Jesus in morals is not only allowed by common consent, but that also it is a supremacy which shoots ahead of the mastery acknowledged to men on other foundations.

In other departments we have rivalry among leaders. In eloquence who is the acknowledged master, Demosthenes, Cicero, Chatham, Fox, Burke, Sheridan, Webster, Clay, Choate?

In sculpture whose hand most cunningly held the chisel, that of Phidias or of Praxiteles?

In painting whose brush had the most expressive touch, that of Raphael or of Rubens or of Titian?

In literature to whom has the palm of excellence been awarded—to Homer or to Shakspeare?

In dramatic art, if we acknowledge Shakspeare's superior *comprehensiveness*, we shall be compelled to allow that in *tragedy* Æschylus is as deep as he.

There are *masters* in eloquence, in art, in literature, but in morals there is but one master.

In morals we appeal not to a school for our regulative canons, but to one individual.

Practically, by such appeal you settle matters more absolutely than you do by appeal in any other department to the masters therein. To say that a thing is Christian or not Christian in morals is a more radical and satisfactory settlement of it than to say that it is Demosthenean or Choatean in eloquence, Phidian or Raphaelian in art, Homeric or even Shakspearean in literature.

It is amazing that in morals one should

"So get the start of the majestic world
And bear the palm alone."

Another remarkable thing is that Jesus sprang to this unique leadership in morals at once and has held it unchallenged through the centuries.

In many instances it has taken time to put the masters in other departments into their places. The right to

supremacy has been contested and it is only as time has tried their work that the masters have slowly emerged from the trial to which they have been subjected and their rank allowed.

But from the first Jesus was acknowledged as the best morally by the morally best.

Then leaderships pass away. Masters hold sway for a time and then their influence declines. Michelangelo had a leadership, but no one would now build or paint as did he.

But to imitate Christ, to be inspirited by Christ still satisfies every moral ambition. "We have heard that Christ abideth forever," some said in his day. Better spoken than they knew. He abides; he bids fair to abide.

The objection falls, that Jesus as he comes to us is the creation of the glamour that time throws about a hero.

"Distance" does "lend enchantment to the view" usually. "No man is a hero to his own valet." These canons of judgment are violated in the case of Jesus. Time has only *widened* the moral estimate that was formed of Jesus by the men most intimate with him in his own day. There is significance enough in this fact to warrant some elaboration of it.

I accept for my uses the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament canon. This acceptance is subject, of course, to such modification as is necessitated by healthy criticism. But there is no need as yet to throw everything away at the whim of mere destruction. From a point of view that would be sustained by fair-minded critics, I want to make an ethical study of some characters in the New Testament. Let us take Peter as he appears in the first Epistle which bears his name. It is of no consequence how much or how little science, or law, or history Peter knew. There is an ethical stamp on that letter. From it one can make up an opinion whether or not Peter was a man who tried to be true to the power not himself which makes for righteousness. I want to hold attention to *that* point. If one has not read that letter of Peter with that end in view, I want to insist that he shall read it for this one sole purpose—to determine therefrom what kind of a man

Peter seems to be morally. Let us try some of Peter's utterances: "Dearly beloved, I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul; having your conversation honest among the Gentiles, that whereas they speak against you as evil doers, they may by your good works which they shall behold glorify God in the day of visitation. Honor all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honor the king. Finally be ye all of one mind, having compassion one of another. Love as brethren. Be pitiful. Be courteous: not rendering evil for evil, but contrariwise blessing. For he that will love life and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil and his lips that they speak no guile. Let him eschew evil and do good; let him seek peace, and ensue it."

As one reads he can but feel that Peter had a very high ethical ideal and purpose, and that if the principles he set forth were wrought into conduct we should have a very satisfactory adjustment of moral relations, individual, social, theistic.

Now having read Peter once with the design of determining his own attitude in morals, read him again and read the gospel history of him, with the design of finding out the ethical estimate he seems to put upon Christ—the moral excellence he attributes to him as compared with himself or all mankind else.

"Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord;" "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth"—there you have the resulting estimate in Peter's mind as he made the comparison, and you have the witness of his career in attestation of his conclusion. Bear in mind that Peter was a contemporary of Jesus and his intimate companion through his active life. Peter must have had a general consciousness of right adjustment in the forum of ethics. But will you mark what an interval Peter places between Jesus and himself? Remember it is morals passing upon morals—ethics upon ethics. The like upon no other foundation was ever known among the children of men. No disciple in any other department ever so estimated his master. Plato never so gave the moral or any other supremacy to Socrates. Nor did Faraday in

any respect so estimate Davy. Here in fact the master bore witness to the pupil as his greatest discovery, and expressed a consciousness so many men have felt—"He that cometh after me is preferred before me."

In the matter at issue we do not care about Peter's scientific attainments. It is a question upon which all sciences may stand aside. It is the question of the conclusions of a certain moral consciousness upon the value, rank and meaning of a certain moral demonstration which had taken place before it.

Peter was of equal years with Jesus, or of greater age than he. We do not easily acknowledge the superiority of one of less age than ourselves. It is a marvel of marvels when one looks at another of equal years and asserts that there has been nothing beyond him and can be nothing greater.

Now try John in the same way. But first, though we do not care much about the fact, it is to be borne in mind that in John we are dealing with one who had looked deeply into philosophy. Philo has the rank of a philosopher. Yet one of the questions vexed is, whether Philo borrowed from John or John from Philo. The probability is that neither borrowed from the other, but that both took their hue of thought from the philosophical atmosphere about them. As a philosopher John trained himself to search for what was ultimate—what could stand investigation. John was the most intimate companion of Jesus.

Now read his letters and the Gospel which bears his name (I think we may regard letters and Gospel as proceeding from the mint of one mind), for the purpose of determining his ethical condition—his insight into the right, and his practical relations to the right. Then read him again for the purpose of getting at his estimate of the morality expressed in Jesus.

The same phenomenon comes before you as in the case of Peter.

There is one vision that hovers over the mind of John—a state of sinlessness which he calls "eternal life." But it did not yet appear to him what he might become in that realm as time rolled away. But John has another attitude in respect to Jesus.

John's personal knowledge of Jesus probably compassed his whole life, for there is good reason to suppose there were ties of kinship between them. At any rate he had been the familiar friend of Jesus during all the activities of his career.

Now just what John did assert was that in this kinsman—this familiar friend—there had been realized exactly that “eternal life”—that longed-for sinlessness—that perfect ethical adjustment in every relation. Here is a fact or combination of facts which we ought to take time to look at steadily. There is meaning here—marvel whose bottom has not been touched.

If ever a man could be said to be ethically inspired, that man is Paul.

The secret of Paul's influence is not usually proclaimed if even discerned. Paul is commonly taken as the systematic, metaphysical theologian of the Christian system, and the secret of his leadership is attributed to his theology. But Paul would have had no such influence as he has had in history, had his letters been divided in two and only the first part, where his philosophical theology is elaborated, retained.

You have not come upon Paul till you have struck that never failing—that omnipresent “therefore,” which separates the philosophical from the ethical in his writings. It is what comes after that “therefore” which has given Paul wing over time, the head and heart of humanity. The worn and soiled pages in the letter to the Romans in the family Bible begin with: “I beseech you *therefore*, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.”

Probably to no other man was it ever given, probably to no other man will it ever be given to sweep over so wide a realm of the common sense of ethics—to give so many directions for the moral adjustments of life that will live forever. Now this man was not deceived in his estimate of the meaning of moral demonstrations; if he was, then human judgment is good for nothing.

Paul was not a personal acquaintance of Jesus. But there came to him from out the common atmosphere of

representation concerning Jesus, and from his own ethical experiences, precisely the same convictions respecting Jesus as reigned in the bosoms of Peter and John. Paul regarded himself as a pupil in ethics where Jesus was the master. The sole ambition of this man Paul was to be called an "Apostle" of Jesus Christ—was to be understood as *sent* to men not with a message of his own, but with one from Jesus. Again, it is to be said that men do not so divest *themselves* of significance in other departments, and that the case of Jesus is the one lone anomaly in this. Masters elsewhere do not so revere a master.

I know we are cited to the implicit following which Confucius, and Gautama the Buddha obtained. I have no time to enter here into detailed examination of these cases. I must content myself with saying that in my judgment they are not parallel with that of Jesus. I have studied these leaders, their history, movement and results somewhat. I think that as the dry light of historic fact is more and more turned upon Confucius and Gautama the divergence will be seen to grow wider and wider between them, their systems and the character of their following, and Jesus and what pertains to him.

If "By their fruits ye shall know them," is to be regarded as any guide in testing the value of systems, then one has only to look over the nations of the earth to-day, to see the claim that Buddha and Confucius shall be ranked with Jesus as moral teachers brought to absurdity.

Do you say that the new Japan is still Buddhistic and Shintoist? But Japan has touched the hem of Christ's garment mechanically if not spiritually, *therefore* she is the Japan of to-day and not the one of former years.

Now pass to Jesus himself. The crowning marvel is that he never for one moment seems to have a thought but that this attitude of Peter and John and Paul, and of any one else of similar position, is a true attitude toward himself. His moral supremacy is not so much asserted as assumed. It lies behind the motion of every function of his being. Dying at the age of thirty-three, he yet asserted himself as a moral guide to men hoary with years. He stood up before all men and said as against all: "I am the way, the truth and the life."

You expect from good men expressions of conscious moral defect—and you get them.

The Psalmist in his contrition for sin throws himself away as utterly vile:—"Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." You expect self-indictments like that in the black moments of the consciousness of moral delinquency that come upon good men, and they are drawn up.

The grand old prophet of Israel, whose mission, more than that of any other one, perhaps, bears the ethical stamp, says: "Woe is me, for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips."

Peter prayed before Jesus out of this same consciousness of ill desert: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."

Paul, looking at the wrong in his past life, could only express himself by saying that he was the chief of sinners; and, describing a state of unsatisfaction in which he had lived, if it did not still in some degree subsist, cried out: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" John says: "If we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us."

Now these all confess to conditions of which we know. We believe they spoke the truth.

Yet Jesus of Nazareth, standing before the Eternal that makes for righteousness, says, as man never dared say before or since: "I do always those things which please him;" "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" This is not the maintenance of integrity in reference to some special matter, it is the assertion of life unbroken by exception. Before such expression, taken with its whole setting, there is to me but just one issue—insanity, or consciousness of identity with the power not ourselves making for righteousness. I accept the latter. If sanity was ever exhibited it seems to me set forth in Jesus.

The history of the connection of Jesus with nature—his evident mastery and control of it—comes in, of course, as adjuvant to this conclusion. But I think this judgment of identity may be satisfactorily reached entirely from a moral base. Bear in mind that these two attitudes,

that of prophet and apostle on the one hand and that of Christ on the other, have borne their own weight before the moral inspection of man for well-nigh two thousand years—for a third of human history. If there is any meaning at all in history, that is duration sufficient for the matter to settle to proper adjustment. And it has so settled.

There is nothing to compare this demonstration of Jesus with. There is no law governing it—if by law you mean a principle deduced by comparison of instances.

There are no instances with which to make comparison in this matter. A secular paper lying before me (the New York Tribune), speaking of Christmas, says: "It is the only anniversary which has been kept by different nations unbroken through time. The world perpetually gives itself up to one bruit or blaze of splendor after another. Now it is this imperial conqueror who is to live forever, now that. Now it is a revolution in dynasties or in science which is to work a permanent change in all things. Yet one by one each drops into its own place and becomes insignificant. But the Immortal Babe in its manger lives on and the kings from the east bring their offerings to him, and the poor Hebrew herders are sent from their dreary watch on the hillside to find heaven in his face; and, as age follows age, the world goes with them to worship at his feet and there find rest and comfort." That is but apt description of the absolute uniqueness of Jesus on the moral plane—a position awarded him by the natural selection of two thousand years in moral concerns. It is of no use to try to break the force of this reversion of all good to Jesus for its moral type. Men are seekers of moral adjustment. But they turn with the promptness of instinct to Jesus as an example of moral adjustment made. Christ persists as moral type. You cannot prevent men from turning to Jesus when they want to find an expression of what the power not ourselves making for righteousness seems to demand of man.

What is the meaning of this tug upon the soul by the Eternal making for righteousness? Men point to Jesus and say *that* is the meaning. To borrow language from Paul, they see "the light of the knowledge of the glory of

God in the face of Jesus Christ." It is a matter of indifference to men whether they speak of the moral force operant on their souls or of the moral demonstration they see made in Christ. They both conspire together. They mean one and the same thing, they are one and the same. *The nisus on the soul of man is the same as the expression in the person of Jesus.* That position works in practice. It stands the test of experience. Who shall deny this? Science? What have the retorts and crucibles of science to say about it? The moral nature of man is the only alembic in which the matter can be resolved. In *that* the Eternal that makes for righteousness and Jesus the Christ are declared to be one and the same moral element—both answering the same moral tests—both incapable of further resolution—neither giving signs of composition. The moral estimate of the world finds its expression only in the "ἐξ" of the Nicene Creed—"of"—"out of"—"from." The moral estimate of the world assentingly meets that "ἐξ" as it is uttered by Jesus:—"I proceeded forth and came from [ἐξ] God."

The moral estimate of the world coincides with the assertion of Jesus, "I am the way, the truth and the life."

Men find the equivalence of the moral expression made in Christ to the truth the Eternal bids them seek—to the way in which he would have them go—to the life he would have them live, as in daily experience he inspires to righteousness. This equation is a personal matter. The significant thing about it is that it is personal and that mind after mind makes it from its moral exercises.

What think ye, then, of Jesus? We think of him as identical with the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness; we think of him as a *manifestation* unto us of that eternal life which was with the Father and which the Father is. A humanitarian, a Buddhist, a Christian scientist, will tell you, "Oh, yes, we all are manifestations of God." That is easily said and it is even theoretically a thinkable proposition. But in my judgment it flies in the face of universal human consciousness and does not comport with the teaching in the matter given us by Christ and his apostles.

And now some one arises and says: "But you remove

Jesus from my sympathies by thus making him a sole theophany—a solitary manifestation on our human plane from out the dominant ‘Eternal Goodness’; I cannot love him as I could if he were only the best of good men.” That is perhaps true, and yet it may be of very little consequence. Perhaps there is nothing which this soft, gelatinous, lackadaisical age needs to learn quite so much as that the satisfaction of its fancies is not the sole principle by which the Great God manages the Universe.

I was up the other day where I could see and hear Arapahoe assert his stern, forbidding grandeur. The clenched fist and the set teeth of nature were evident. The gentle slopes of Lover’s Hill are very much more to my liking. Yet Arapahoe is there. We have taught Jesus to “babes and sucklings” so long that we have made him seem as if there were nothing else about him except that which children can understand.

But no one reads the New Testament aright till he sees that the terrific came out in Jesus of Nazareth, that about him

“There hung the shadow of a fear,
A sense of mystery the spirit daunted,”

and feels the awe of a mighty majesty that is not of man.

In answering our interrogatory, *Who* is Jesus? we have already answered the inquiry, What is his relation to morals? We have already identified him with the power not ourselves making for righteousness. But the matter needs further elaboration.

That Jesus is here in aid of the moral demonstration God makes upon souls is a truth of experience. He is the answering standard toward which the moral nissus in the soul of man is struggling. This conclusion lies in his own definition of the influence he would perpetually have in the moral exercises of man after his demonstration in the flesh should cease. Men were to be convinced of sin, inspired to righteousness and helped in moral discrimination as reference was made to him.

To prove that this has been done I think it is only necessary to appeal to the moral consciousness of man, as that consciousness finds its expression in the individual

soul, and as it has left its impress in religious history.

The unsatisfactoriness to man of his condition before the moral power operant upon him was always a marked feature in his moral exercises. That unsatisfactoriness comes out in bolder relief as Jesus Christ is projected before the moral vision. So it has been that when there was an indescribable unrest before under the influences of the operant power, now, when what the power means is defined in Jesus, men can simply say that they "abhor themselves in dust and ashes." Men are convinced of sin because they are not true to Jesus as they never were convinced before his manifestation to them, as they never can be without his presentation to them.

"Convinced of sin because they believe not on me," or are not morally loyal to me, is a statement of the effect, not of a new force, but of the highest form the old and universal power can assume. A parallel statement of the advance in power of the moral demonstration made in Christ over that made before he was manifested, though identical in character with the former forth-showing, is Paul's declaration that Christ had condemned sin in the flesh as the law could not do. Any individual can verify this position of Christ and of Paul by his own moral experience, and by the practice he sees in operation about him.

It is only necessary to set up Christ before a wrong moral action to condemn it. When one is querying whence comes his uneasiness before the power making for righteousness, what the maladjustment is, a flash of moral vision upon Jesus will disclose the wrong element in himself as nothing else does. It is not necessary to enter into arguments with men to prove to them that they are sinners. Set up Christ before them and they see it themselves. Men are convinced of sin because they are not true to Jesus. That common contact of God with the soul, which Paul calls "The Law," is weak as a condemnatory force before the concrete revelation of the Divine repugnance to sin set forth in Jesus Christ.

If Christ shows what is to be morally avoided, he also shows that which is to be morally chosen and becomes an inspiration to such choice. He who furnishes the

standard of condemnation to sin furnishes also the standard of approval to righteousness. The desirableness of righteousness—the possibilities of righteousness were never pressed upon man as by the demonstration of Christ.

The power making for righteousness has always said: "There *is* a way. Seek and ye shall find it." Christ says: "*This* is the way, walk ye in it." And men see the way and are filled with irrepressible desire to walk in it as they see the success of Christ therein and realize that they too may stretch forward in hope of securing the same moral victory—if not at once, then by degrees, and at some time. But the end projected is there. Somehow out of their struggles and discipline men are to become like him.

It is a blind call men receive in their moral nature when Christ is not discerned. It tends somewhere, and the invitation is right and to the right. But to what we go under the solicitation of our moral nature is made perfectly plain when Christ is seen. Then the sun arises and the landscape is clear and lies in its beauty before us.

Christ was right when he said that the spiritual influence he would exert on the world would be not only a condemnation of sin, but an inspiration to righteousness. The moral ambitions of men are stirred by him as by no other agency. It is an art the church has not yet properly acquired, to use Christ as inspiration to righteousness. It has learned somewhat how to use him as condemnation to sin, but how to give the forward moral spring—how to secure the normal action of the moral nature by the force of his inspiration, ah, there is the failure! But there lies the possibility of illimitable success.

Approximation greater than we actually realize might be made if we remembered that Christ comes in aid of all other moral demonstrations—comes "to fulfill" them all—comes to make clear what is otherwise only dimly hinted—comes to remove moral limitation—comes as moral dynamism—comes to make moral struggle a triumph.

We hear none too much, perhaps, in the moral teaching of the day about conviction of sin. But certainly we hear all too little about conviction of righteousness—a convic-

tion which Christ declares he came to secure and which comes out of moral sympathy with him. I believe if we had as much effort put forth to convince men that they could be successful in their moral struggles, if they came on the foundation of Christ—that on that foundation they could enact righteousness, just such righteousness as he exemplified—as we do to convict men of sin because they have *not* wrought on that foundation, the world might wear a new moral face—might make a forward movement of incalculable power and velocity toward redemption—toward the millennium—"the New Jerusalem to come down from God out of heaven." The difficulty often is that while we depress the stock of man's actual moral possessions in order to convince him of sin, we forget to operate for a rise in his estimate of the possibilities of righteousness.

There is one other method in which Christ comes in aid of such other demonstration as God makes in our moral nature. We found the voice within us to say: "Seek and ye shall find." But *what* to find is not primarily revealed. We must satisfy our souls that we have sought the right. Primarily this is as far as the voice within us goes. Under the tuition of this guide men by experience have come to certain moral conclusions. Some of those conclusions we may take as indisputable—as the family relation, the right of private property, the right "to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

But just here in practice comes the greatest need of man—the power to make discriminations and proper applications—the power of "judgment" under his chosen principle of righteousness.

To do right may be the inspiration, but *what* to do may surpass the powers of judgment.

Now Christ is not only an inspiration to the *ought* in life, he is actually light on what the *ought is*.

The attempt to realize what is *Christian* in any matter is attended usually with a success in execution which satisfies the judgment—which satisfies "judgment" by whomsoever exercised. This enlightening power seems to extend to all the possibilities of the human situation.

Remarkably enough, it is not only to the situations

which Christ illustrated by his own personal action as recorded in the history of his life that this clarity as to means and modes of right action extends.

He is light for the practical judgment in circumstances beyond the range of the example of the historic Christ. For instance, Christ was never married and we have no record of what his action might be in the family relation. But there is no father nor mother, sister nor brother, husband nor wife, parent nor child, but that draws a conclusion with unwavering confidence as to what Christ's action would be in his or her circumstances.

The question of the relations of labor and capital, in our forms, in Christ's earthly day was not raised. What is the right division of the products of capital and industry is one of our most vexed questions.

But do you suppose that a capitalist and a laborer, sitting down in the presence of Christ, breathing such moral atmosphere as he can throw around them, would have any difficulty in coming to a conclusion which would satisfy the moral judgment of each separately, and also the moral judgment of the on-looking race? Christ thus becomes not only an inspiration to correct moral practice, but a light on its methods.

It is in these discriminations that we meet our greatest need. For it is here that each soul is absolutely alone.

There is an element of newness in every moral problem of every human soul. Just *that* adjustment no other soul was ever called upon to make or ever will be. Just *that* adjustment the individual soul was never called upon to make before and never will be again. Just here all former revelations fail. Admit all that were ever made and they can only have at best the force of analogy for this element of moral exigency. In every correct moral judgment there is an element of newness of moral revelation. Here the soul must find the living light of a living Christ or walk in darkness.

We have now a view of the office of Christ in keeping with what we might suppose from his identity with the power not ourselves making for righteousness—a view which finds support in our own moral experience. We have no difficulty in seeing that the primary effort of the

Eternal making for righteousness upon ourselves is to lead us to execute righteousness. We ought not to have any difficulty in seeing that the embodied expression of this power had, and, regarded as still in spirit in action, has primarily the same end in view, to wit, the execution of normal moral function.

Moral experiment infallibly confirms this proposition. No man can ever say that Christ is not a condemnation to wrong—that he is not an inspiration to right—and that, when he has kept an eye single to the light of Christ upon his problem, he has failed to satisfy his moral nature that he has “judged righteous judgment.”

Let us hold fast this position, then, that Christ is here in aid of such moral demonstration as God is already making in the soul of man.

It is experience, however, that turning from wrong to right does not repair all damages. Something from the wrong survives. Some of the consequences of wrong action, physical, psychical, and even moral, remain. No power has yet been found to turn them wholly aside. The broken physical or mental constitution is not repaired by repentance. Liability to moral lapse in the groove of old sins is universally recognized as hanging over all reformation. There is even then a moral weakness that abides.

“Full seldom does a man repent, or use
Both grace and will to pick the vicious quitch
Of blood and custom wholly out of him,
And make all clean and plant himself afresh.”

That is because of the difficulty of recovering after sin the pristine moral tone and strength. The *vis medicatrix* of resumption of normal function never quite repairs these old damages. Certainly it never restores lost opportunities.

We are obliged to adjust ourselves to this state of things, to acknowledge its justice and to make what headway we can with such powers as remain. But when we have considered retributive elements of this class and have settled our philosophy respecting them, that does not make an arrangement satisfactory to ourselves.

There is an unrest still brooding in our moral consciousness.

So far as regards our attitude to the laws we have violated we may have made our adjustment in the determination to submit to their inevitable penalties and to bear their pains.

But something more troublesome than the pains of penalty haunts us. An indefinable maladjustment still persists. We find it plainly enough in moral sensation. But what is it? Whence proceeds it? Whereto does it tend? We are in the presence of an element that may be defined as the unknown quantity—the X, in the moral equation. There is probably no one thing in religion upon which man has put more thought than the effort to find the value of this X. All the wild work that has been done in the world by way of sacrifices for expiation of sin, running through offerings compassing vegetable and animal life, including that of man himself, has come from the unsatisfactoriness of the attempts made to meet this inexplicable factor of moral sensation. The race of man has groaned and travailed in pain together, seeking a solution of this problem.

I believe there is one answer and but one to this painful querying of the soul. This moral X is *the disturbance of personal relation between ourselves and the Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness considered as a person*. Whether we construct that conclusion from philosophy or receive it out of revelation, the suggestion of it is light, and practice pertinent to it is peace. Such value assigned to X satisfies all known conditions of the moral problem.

Let us go back to our starting point in this whole discussion. The sense of moral obligation is the personal contact and influence of God as the Spirit of Righteousness upon our spirits. In our wrong we have done violence to the kindly offices of this Spirit. A friendship has been sundered. The one surviving longing of the soul, after all else has been adjusted, is to know if this personal relation can be restored to its former condition notwithstanding the intervention of the wrong that has been done. Now if there is anything that is clear it is that the

answer to such a question must be entirely in the hands of the Being wronged. We want it there. *We* have nothing to say and no desire to say anything. The last unrest in the soul of man is its inquisition into the attitude of the Divine mind toward the man himself in reference to the sundered personal relation. Nothing can satisfy except a voice from God declarative of his attitude on that matter.

If we are right in identifying the being of Jesus with the moral power operant upon ourselves, then we may look to him for the voice which we desire. He is Word-expression—and we shall find in him what we seek.

Now there is no mistaking what he reveals. If he brings to us the gospel of eternal life, i. e., of the possibility of securing normal moral function, he also brings to us the gospel of forgiveness of sins. We do not need much explanation of what forgiveness of sins is. The soul troubled about that sad break in relationship with the Eternal making for righteousness puts its own interpretation to the forgiveness of sins. It says: "I am not hated, cast out, regarded as an outlaw, for the evil I have done; but that evil is covered, it is hid, it is remembered no more against me; I am received as if it had not been."

Now this is not so very great a mystery when the key of *personal relation* with the Divine Spirit is preserved. But whether men have preserved this key or not, there has been the hope of the forgiveness of sins in every human heart. That hope has sought a great many means for the justification of its existence. But of course the only trustworthy answer to the hope is the Divine voice.

There were prophets of old whose spirits lay so coincident with the Divine Righteousness that they heard the voice. "I, even I, am he that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and will not remember thy sins."

"Return, thou backsliding Israel, saith the Lord; and I will not cause mine anger to fall upon you; for I am merciful, saith the Lord, and I will not keep anger forever. Only acknowledge thine iniquity, that thou hast transgressed against the Lord thy God."

"O Israel, return unto the Lord thy God, for thou hast fallen by thine iniquity. I will heal their backsliding, I will love them freely."

"Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord and he will have mercy upon him, and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon."

As Christ is a clearer exposition of duty and so enlarges the field of moral obligation, so he is a clearer exposition of the Divine Compassion toward repentant error. Christ *fulfills* everything—brings everything out into the light. The word of the old prophets respecting forgiveness of sins Christ endorsed and enforced not only by his declarations, but by his whole intercourse with and bearing toward the sinful. What was voice and promise with the prophet was deed with Christ.

"Thy sins be forgiven thee."

"Her sins, which are many, are forgiven her."

"Go and sin no more, lest a worse thing befall thee."

"If ye forgive men their trespasses, your Heavenly Father will also forgive you."

This is Christ's voice and attitude.

Here, I think, ends the testimony as to the relation of Christ to morals which we can draw from moral sensation.

The wants of our moral nature are fully met in the securing of normal moral function and in the assurance of forgiveness for aberrant moral action, and we have peace. Christ's salvation is made up of just these two factors, if we may rely on the evidence of our moral nature.

In *practice* we never have any difficulty in satisfying men of their saved condition if we can bring out in their convictions clear conceptions that they mean henceforth to put in execution the moral function of Christ, and that they really trust his word of forgiveness for past wrong.

If there are any difficulties about salvation lying beyond this point, they are intellectual in their nature.

When the Ultimate with whom we have to do has said, "I will not remember thy sins," it is simply an *intellectual* puzzle to go on and ask, "How can that be? How can God forgive sins?" The moral nature has already received a perfect answer to all its difficulties—all its cravings.

If religion is an attempt at moral adjustment, then if it does not dismiss these intellectual speculations to the

realm of philosophy it ought to recognize them as philosophical in their character and treat them with a philosophical spirit.

If I were asked in philosophy the question, how God can forgive sins, I think I should begin an answer by saying that for good and wise reasons known to himself God *chooses* to forgive sins. If God is satisfied in any given case to forgive sins, the universe ought to be content.

There may be shadows of truth in penal and governmental views of atonement. But you cannot go very far on them before you see that your position may be destructive of something else which you want to maintain.

Is it right to be dogmatic on points on which the mind of man has not yet thought itself into satisfactory position? The very fact that men are not agreed here ought to make us cautious and kindly. Just see the range minds have taken in their philosophies of this subject. Men have held that God could not forgive sin till Christ had paid the devil what was due him on some contract we were supposed to enter into with the devil by our wrong doing. This theory can have no standing anywhere now.

Then there was brought out the theory of penal satisfaction, that is, that God inflicted upon Christ the very punishment due to our sins. This view runs full tilt against our convictions of the untransferability of moral desert.

If it is unjust and impossible to transfer guilt it is unjust and nugatory to transfer penalty. I bring no "railing accusation" against those who have held or hold this theory. To my mind the objections against it are insuperable.

The objections to a governmental theory are not so formidable. In fact, if you take law as the ultimate principle in the universe, it is hard to see why some governmental mode of adjustment is not necessitated. But is law the ultimate principle in morals? Behind law in that domain have we not the revelation of a free Personality, whose potency is infinitely high above and beyond all law?

An appeal should lie from law to Personality. An adjustment made with a supreme personal being ought to

supersede all the demands and necessities that appear when we confine our vision to a legal plane far below. This objection lies to a governmental view when law is treated as the ultimate fact—it puts a power behind the throne greater than the throne, and God becomes the representative and agent of that power. The question is, where does the ultimate absolutism lie,—in God or in law? If it is in God, then the necessities and helplessnesses that appear in law may pass into easy solution before the supreme reason and love. We are in this matter as to how God can forgive sins—as to the reasons operant in his mind why he forgives sins, at the verge of the compass of the human mind, possibly beyond the limits of its proper business.

But it may not be presumption to ask why the platform of salvation in Christ may not be its own sufficient justification. The system does the work God wants it to, and that is a highly probable reason why it was chosen. Christ as salvation in one aspect certainly is moral dynamism—is protest against sin and inspiration and power to righteousness. Why should not God forgive sins on that platform? It is a restoration of things, as nearly as we can conceive it to be done, *in statu quo ante bellum*. We may argue that the system is satisfactory to God because in it he is actually working the redemption of the race. Over the work of his hands he said, "Very good"; why may he not say it over the work of his heart? It is not easy to see how you can get much further in inquisition upon the reasons of God's moral ways and means.

I may be charged with having obscured sin in this discussion. If I have done so it is only because I would illumine righteousness. The theme of theology has been, too predominantly, abnormal moral function, whereas it should be normal moral function.

Much has been forgotten before its doctrines and deductions respecting sin. Much has been contorted to meet its conclusions respecting sin. The prime elements of moral sensation have been neglected. It has worked at the problem presented by past committed sin, and has forgotten often the problem of exigent duty or given it only

incidental consideration. God seems to pursue a different method, if we may trust the testimony of our own moral experience. We have a teaching that a man must settle for his sins before he can enact any righteousness, or do anything acceptable to God. It is even broadly stated that God is not a father to a soul in sin. This teaching is directly contradicted by moral consciousness. Sin does not make the least difference with God in respect to his attentions to the soul of man. No man escapes duty by sin, and duty is God treating with man. If a man has been wrong all his life, God moves him along the next moment to a new moral possibility which he seeks to have him cover with righteousness. There is no remission in the pressure of the sense of duty. It comes to saint and sinner alike. Cases of non-adjustment may be as they may, God says at every new opportunity: "Make right adjustment now and here; *this* it is agreeable to me to have you do." The pressure of the sense of duty is everlastingly the same, and the sense of ability to meet the duty abides. These things are with one whether or not he can stop to work out a scheme satisfactory to God or himself by which God can overlook his former moral defects or alienated condition. There is one voice which is never silent. Its call is: "Right action here"—"Right action here"—"Right action *here*." No sin cuts off the hearing of that call. It is as persistent as gravitation. Christ utters this call in clearer tones than it was ever before expressed, and then proffers his own moral omnipotence to help all souls to meet its demands.

If what is called the atonement has relation only to abnormal function, then the atonement is not the greatest element in the demonstration of Christ and it ought to be relegated to a subordinate position as a factor in his salvation.

The prime element of his salvation is his endowment of men with his own moral power.

We shall hold this, then, respecting Jesus Christ. We find him to be nothing less than a manifestation or embodiment of the Power not ourselves making for righteousness. As he appears here we interpret his demonstration

to be in aid of the moral processes which he as part and parcel of the Power aforesaid had always been carrying on in the soul of man. This demonstration is such that, when right moral function is resumed on its basis, man may believe that God is willing to overlook past wrong moral action or state; and that there are no known governmental hindrances to prevent him from so doing.

And now again some one arises and says: "Well, I don't see what difference it makes who Jesus was; if we do about as he tells us we shall come out all right." However true that may be within a certain range, there come times when it does make a difference where the voice comes from that speaks to us.

When we are troubled about our sins, does it answer our needs to have a man step up before us and say, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest"? A man there would be an impertinence of whom we would be rid. He is not the party with whom we wish to deal.

When we are broken in anguish over our dead, do we want a man to come to us and say, "I am the resurrection and the life"? It is intolerable mockery. But if the voice that comes to us is of, out of, from the eternal life itself, if it is a manifestation of that life, then the universe and time and eternity wear a new face.

CHAPTER IV.

MORALS AND THE HOLY SPIRIT.

It will be necessary to make a somewhat extensive theological detour before we can approach the subject proper of this lecture.

Before we attempt to determine the function of the Holy Spirit in morals it is desirable that we have some apprehension of the Being about whom we speak.

The great creeds of the Reformation will tell you that the Holy Spirit is the "third person of the Trinity." So also will the Athanasian creed. The Nicene creed and the Apostles' creed will leave you to make out your philosophy of the being of the Holy Spirit from the scriptures as you can. These latter creeds have no deliverance upon the subject. The creeds of the Reformation are, however, on all tongues and dominate in thought, and they tell us that the Holy Spirit is a Person.

But what is a "Person"? Take Webster's Dictionary and under the word "Person" you read:—

"Person . . . from Latin *persona*, a mask, a personage, part, a person, from *personare*, to sound through, from prefix *per*, through, and *sonare*, to sound."

Then definitions are given numbered as follows:—

"1. The exhibition or representation of a character in a dialogue, fiction or on the stage. Example: 'These tables (which?), Cicero pronounced under the *person* of Crassus, were of more use and authority than all the books of the philosophers.' *Baker*."

"2. The part or character which any one sustains, either by office or in the ordinary relations of human life."

"Example:

"And her gifts

Were such as under government well seemed,
Unseemly to bear rule, which was thy part
And *person*, hadst thou known thyself aright.'

Milton.

“Example: ‘How different is the same man from himself, as he sustains the *person* of a magistrate and that of a friend!’ *South*.

“4. A living soul; a self-conscious being; a moral agent; especially a living human being; a man, woman or child; an individual of the human race; also among Trinitarians, one of the three subjects or agents constituting the godhead, that is, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

“Example: ‘We must consider what *person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.’

Locke.

“Example: ‘The whole three *persons* are co-eternal together and co-equal.’ *Athanasian Creed*.

“5. A human being spoken of indefinitely; one; a man.”

Now I want to call attention to the fact that under definitions 1, and 2, the *same* being can be *different persons*, but that under definitions 4, and 5, he cannot.

The same man may represent different characters, may perform distinct offices. But the same man cannot be three men, each “an individual,” each “a thinking, intelligent being, having reason and reflection, considering himself as himself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.”

I also want to call attention to the fact that in the speech of the people *now* the word *person* *always* has the signification given it by the 4th and 5th definitions of the dictionary, never that contained in the 1st and 2nd. Men mean by the term person, an *individual* separate and distinct from any and every other individual. The term carries in common use the notion of entire distinctness, discreteness of existence.

The common law—which *is* common law simply because it expresses the existing understanding—uses the term *person* in this sense of individuality. By “persons and property” you mean individual men and their belongings.

The term person, as can be seen from its derivation, did not, however, come into use with that signification.

In the primitive use of the term the same man could be as many persons as he could find masks for his face—as many persons as the characters he could contrive to play. That was its use in the old civil law contemporary with our early theology. The Greek equivalent of *persona* was *πρόσωπον*, which is precisely—"before the face"—or a mask.

For convenience in this discussion let us call the content of meaning included under definitions 1 and 2 the *primitive* signification of the term person; the content of meaning included under definitions 4 and 5 the *acquired* meaning.

Whoever will study the matter historically, I think, will come to the conclusion that the word *person* came into theology, in the connection in which we are considering it, under its *primitive* signification; but that it lingers in theology now under its *acquired* signification.

This term, person, affords a remarkable example of a fact which we ought to bear in mind in theology, as well as elsewhere, to wit, change in the signification of words.

The term person has executed a right about face. It covered the notion of plurality once. It carries no notion now but that of unity.

I want to call the attention of those who are anxious always to keep the same terms in theology and to hear the same terms in religious discourse to this phenomenon. We are exhorted to hold fast the faith of the Fathers. But if we hold fast their faith we are often obliged to discard the language in which they stated it, simply because the *words* they used have ceased to convey their idea.

If you quote the scripture expression, "Hold fast the form of sound words," please remember that the stress is on the term "hygienic"—"hold fast the form of hygienic words," and that if the hygienic or health-giving signification should be lixiviated from them in the course of usage you might have a dry, empty, inert substance in the *form* of the word which has been left in your hands.

The phenomenon of pseudo-morphism in crystallography is precisely paralleled in language. Some crystal is dissolved from its matrix and the old form is filled with some other substance. So it is with words. They

are forms or moulds of thought. But old meanings dissolve out of them—new meanings crystallize in the old forms.

Person, with its *acquired* signification, is a pseudo-morph of its *primitive* signification. Change here is, however, like all change—its beginning is hid, its increments are hid. Here was an old thing and, lo! here is one new. When the signification of *person* began to slide from its primitive to its acquired condition, cannot be exactly told. I think it susceptible of easy demonstration that when the word person made its appearance in the creeds of the early church it came in under its primitive signification. It meant then part, character, mode or form of demonstration. It appears in no creed until the Athanasian, which is of uncertain date and cannot be placed earlier than the latter part of the fourth century, and may be even a century later than that.

Nothing equivalent to it, as has been said, appears in the Apostles' and the Nicene creeds, which were in Greek. The first appearance of anything equivalent in the Greek creeds was in a deliverance of the council of Constantinople, A. D. 381 (fifty-six years after the date of the Nicene creed), in which both *πρόσωπον* and *ὁπόστασις* are used. Concerning these terms there is evidence enough, beside that from derivation and composition, that they were used in the Greek creeds not to express the notion of separate individuality, but that of part, character, office or mode of action of one and the same being.

I know of no instance in the whole history of human thought where more evil has been wrought than by the refusal or failure to recognize that in practical use—in the speech of the people—this term has changed its signification. There is new wine in the old bottle. The zeal of theologians has largely been conspicuous in care for the bottle. Save the bottle, they have said, no matter what is in it.

Now two courses are possible. We may use the term in its acquired sense, and so assert tritheism—the existence of three Gods—or we may use the term in its primitive sense and so assert modalism. No middle

ground is tenable. I am aware of the painful endeavor that has been made to assert such middle ground. But it is a failure. Dr. Schaff, in his "Creeds of Christendom," commenting on the term *persona* in the Athanasian Creed, says: "It is taken neither in the old sense of a mere personation or form of manifestation, (*πρόσωπον*, face mask,)" —(please bear in mind that that term is used by Dr. Schaff as the Greek equivalent of *persona*, and please bear in mind that that is the term inserted in the Greek creeds of date contemporary with the Athanasian creed)—"nor in the modern sense of an independent, separate being or individual, but in a sense which *lies between these two conceptions*, and thus avoids Sabellianism on the one hand and tritheism on the other."

Very good; what *is* this *tertium quid*—this intervening signification? It is quite important to find it; for the creed in which this term, person, first occurs, and whose terminology prescribed the language of the creeds of the Reformation, is the "Quicumque Vult," i. e., it is the creed which says: "Whoever wishes to be saved must think *thus* of the Trinity."

There is nothing less than salvation depending upon finding this middle signification for this term *persona*, lying between mode of manifestation of the same being on the one hand, and three beings on the other.

I confess myself intellectually unable to conceive this third something. It may be there, but my mind is not acute enough to grasp it. The mathematical physicists say a fourth dimension in space is possible. It may be so. I am at present unable to perceive it. If my salvation depends upon my ability to conceive of the fourth dimension of space I am a doomed man. If my salvation depends upon my ability to grasp this discrimination between the characters, parts or offices of one being, and a plurality of beings, I am equally foredoomed to perdition. If that is the road to destruction, many do go in thereat—so many of our race kin that they have left their stamp on its language.

The dictionary, which is as accurate a compend of the thought of the race as we have, discloses no such intervening discrimination made yet by the mind of man—at

any rate it has not made itself apparent in the thought of the people. If such discrimination exists it stands side by side with the fourth dimension of space; some solitary genius may be able to compass it, the rest of the people must be content to measure length, breadth and thickness, and think either unity or plurality.

It will be seen from Dr. Schaff's statement concerning the word person that it has been deemed desirable to avoid a definition which would convey the idea that the so-called persons of the Trinity were forms of manifestation of the Deity. Do you not wonder why that should be so?

Make an original question out of that matter and raise the enquiry, What harm can arise if we take the view that the term person, if used at all in this connection, be used in its plain primitive sense of form or mode of manifestation?

The orthodox from his point of view wishes to preserve the recognition of the Divinity of Christ. Why? Simply because he wants men impressed with the idea that when they come to Christ they are in contact with ultimate truth, authority, power and love—that God is right there, and that in dealing with Christ they are dealing with God. The one longing, yearning desire of the heart of orthodoxy is to impress that fact upon humanity.

Is not that fact sufficiently asserted when we set forth Christ as "God manifest in flesh"?

So with reference to the Holy Spirit—tell me what danger there is if I instruct the people that there is a Spirit whispering to them of duty and privilege in "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, self-control," and that they are to be careful how they treat those whispered suggestions, for in them they are in contact with God so manifesting himself to their souls.

What is the harm in such teaching? Is not that a proclamation one who is orthodox would like to have heralded? Yet I suppose theologically we might be compelled to acknowledge that that is heresy. I suppose that would hardly pass muster before those who assume the defense of the "Quicunque Vult" or of the great creeds of the Reformation.

Now how is it that such a result has been brought about? The statement by Dr. Schaff of what it was desired to avoid on the one hand and then on the other shows. Tritheism, i. e., that there are three Gods, is to be avoided and—Sabellianism. Sabellianism! That is what has put under ban the kind of teaching I have set forth above. Now I purposely refrain from explaining what Sabellianism was, beyond saying that it was *a* (please bear in mind that I say *a*) form of modalism. The doctrine of Sabellius was condemned by a Council—in the gentle language of that day called, a pest. *That* is what has driven men to make the attempt to find this impossible “tertium quid” of which I have spoken. It has been sufficient from that day to this to cry, “Sabellianism!” over any attempt to look in the direction of modalism for relief in the difficulties of thought upon the Divine Being and his revelations of himself. So it has come about that the church has found its rest—such rest as it has found—in a position which is represented neither in the speech nor the thought of man.

Looking at the matter from our own point of view, in a way approaching as nearly to common sense as we may, without this long historic terrorism before our minds, it would seem possible that the modalism of Sabellius might have been an imperfect, crude affair, and that a modalism might be possible which should be free from his errors.

I have only to say that it seems to me Sabellius erred by excess of definition—that he would have done better had he confined himself to the assertion of the *fact* of *Divine manifestations*, and let their *hows*—their metes and bounds alone.

But because Sabellianism was modalism, therefore that modalism is only co-extensive with Sabellianism, is one of the most glaring of *non-sequiturs*.

A bird is an air-breathing animal, therefore all air-breathing animals are birds, is the logic of it.

Sabellianism is modalism, therefore modalism is Sabellianism—not quite. It is curious to see the hair-splitting to which constant resort is made to avoid modalism and the consequent identification with Sabellianism.

Joseph Cook expressly rejects modalism. He says the distinction between Father, Son and Spirit is not that of a mode of manifestation, but that of "subsistence in a substance." Now if "subsistence in a substance" is not the very modalism which he rejects, it is unthinkable. If the *substance* remains the same, a *subsistence* in it can be but a variant form of the substance, i. e., a mode of it. If there is anything else there, the man that can see it can see the fourth dimension of space. There is one thing quite certain, the mass of the people will not see it. Mr. Cook may go before the people and try to impress his distinction of a "subsistence in a substance"; they will still think of the Holy Spirit as God spiritually manifesting himself, and if they are true to that spiritual manifestation, will doubtless find salvation notwithstanding the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian creed.

The utter untenableness of this attempt to avoid modalism—the break-down of it as soon as one comes to practical ground, is seen in Mr. Cook's own case. He treats the present operations of the Holy Spirit as "Christ's continued life." Nothing could be better. That which was manifest in flesh is still operant in Spirit. The mode of operation alone is altered. The sphere of demonstration has changed from the visible to the invisible realm, from the sensuous to the psychic—pneumatic if you prefer. The truth is: however much conjuring there may be with "Quicunque Vults" and the iron-clads of the Reformation, the people think *modalism* and will judge that they have good reason to think modalism so long as they can read in the Scripture: "For the life was *manifested* and we have seen it, and bear witness and show unto you that eternal life which was with the Father and was *manifested* unto us."

If religion is for the people, then its language ought to conform to the language of the people. We ought not to be carrying along terms, even if we can explain them, whose explanation costs more breath than the terms are worth after they are explained. If the word person has a definite meaning in the language of the people, then religion ought to adapt itself to that meaning and use language that would not convey an incorrect impression

to the humblest intellect. If the word person now means a separate and distinct individual, the church should discard its use unless it intends to teach tritheism. Nor is attempt to retain and explain, the highest wisdom.

In ordinary communication it would not be well to say: "I use the word 'black,' but I want you to understand that I mean 'white.'" If you mean white, it is better to say white. If you mean three persons, say three persons. But do not say, "I do not mean persons exactly, I mean 'hypostases' or 'subsistences in a substance'—I mean 'extrinsic' or 'economical' persons as distinguished from 'immanent' or 'ontological' persons"; that is to "darken counsel by words without knowledge."

We read that the Parsees in India preserve as sacred books, and listen reverently to their reading, poems which were written thousands of years ago when their ancestors dwelt in Iran, the meaning of not one word of which is known either to people or priest. There are Armenians who read the *Bible* in a dialect so old that the meaning of the words is lost.

The Catholic priest reads the scripture in a tongue to the people unknown, though it was once the "vulgate." We have a survival of this state of affairs among ourselves, in the use of the term person in theology. Its theological sense is not the sense in which it is used in law or in the speech of common life. Mr. Cook, seeing this, has discarded the expression, "three persons and one God," saying it is a "relict of paganism." He should also have said that in the language of common life it is exact mathematical nonsense.

Notwithstanding the maledictions of the Athanasian creed upon that process, it *is* necessary to *confound* the persons, i. e., to have them flow together.

There is no reason why criticism in this matter should not be made with a free hand. Our difficulty is one not made by the scripture. Neither the term Trinity nor Person in connection with the Deity is used in the Bible. Neither they nor their equivalents appear in the two primitive creeds of the church—the Apostles' creed and the Nicene creed. Christianity conquered the Roman Empire without their help or confusion. These terms are

not inherently necessary to the successful working of Christianity—not necessary to the operations of the Holy Spirit in the conversion and sanctification of men. The difficulty which they create is one not *born* of anything—it is only *MADE*. They came to the surface only when men forgot to attend to what God was attempting to accomplish in this world and proceeded to speculation on his mode of existence in some other. Men have tried to make a philosophy of the *unrevealed* God, when their proper business was to make use of the manifestations of himself he has made. They have tried to settle what “metes and bounds should stand” to mark off Father, Son and Spirit in the Divine existence, when they should have looked to the personal relations they were establishing with God as he had been pleased to reveal himself on earth, in these modes.

Instead of attending to what Christ brought, men have set themselves to determine his exact position in the Deity before he made his appearance here. Running back over the measureless years of God, they have fixed on “eternal generation” to express the originless origin of part of Deity from itself—words which are absolutely without meaning to the human mind, or if they have any meaning, are mutually contradictory.

This matter is not to be covered up by that dexterous appeal to ignorance, to which resort is so often made, to wit, this is a matter that is revealed to faith, and reason must not expect to treat of it. It is not a matter revealed to faith. The phrase in question was made by man and is subject to the same analysis as anything else made by man. Yet the attempts to treat of it rationally have been very few. The *odium theologicum* has usually been brought to bear upon any one who attempted to handle it.

Do ministers often explain to the people the plain facts which are here set forth? Yet every minister whose denomination stands on any of the creeds of the era of the Reformation has been under obligation to explain to his people that the term person in the creed could not be used in its ordinary sense, unless he was willing to have them understand that the church teaches tritheism.

Moses Stuart in his controversy with Channing made a manly attempt to clear his decks of this out-worn mediæval phraseology. But Stuart's attempt has been kept in the background, till it would surprise most people to know that he wrote thus: "If I might be permitted freely to speak my own opinion, I would further say that I should regard the omission of the word *person* in all our church creeds as quite desirable, in order to avoid fruitless and endless controversy and misunderstanding. If any one is startled at this, I take shelter under a name, which, although once cast out and abhorred by many and often covered with reproach, now commands among nearly all parties of the intelligent, unaffected reverence and admiration—I mean the name of Calvin. In his institutes he says: 'My wish is that all *names* might be buried, provided this article of faith might be agreed upon by all—The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God.'" Both Calvin, it seems, and Moses Stuart were willing to sacrifice the terms Trinity and Person.

There has been in some quarters a tendency to accept the advice of Moses Stuart and discard these terms. One of the peculiarities of Congregationalists is that each church has the privilege of making its own creed. So do all associations and bodies for conference and counsel in the denomination. No Christians have more care for an unequivocal standing in orthodoxy than Congregationalists. But the terms Trinity and Person are dropped from the Burial Hill Confession of Faith put forth by the representative Council of Congregational Churches which met at Boston in 1865. The terms Trinity and Person are not in the Andover Chapel Creed. They are not in the creed which forms part of the constitution of the Chicago Theological Seminary. Nor are they in either of the forms given, as specimens of Congregational articles of faith, in Roy's Manual, by which hundreds of Congregational churches have been organized in the last twenty-five years. They are not in the creed of the so-called Creed Commission of 1883.*

*These terms are not in the schedule of articles of faith put forth by the late National Council of Congregational Churches, held at Syracuse, 1895, as a basis for the union of all Christians.

I suppose that a liberty which appears on its face in Congregational churches in fact exists in those churches which are organically bound to the creeds of the Reformation—as the Presbyterian to the Westminster Confession, the Episcopalian to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, and the Methodist Episcopal Church to the Twenty-Five Articles, drawn by Wesley substantially from the Thirty-Nine of the Church of England. For subscription to those creeds may be, in the common phrase, only to “substance of doctrine.” But whoever, standing in a denomination with one of those creeds behind it, does not explain to the people the sense in which the word person is there used, allows himself to stand as a tacit sponsor for tritheism; since, unexplained, that is the sense the people must put upon the term from its common use.

How widely this duty has been done I leave others to judge. I think this is work usually left undone by the pulpit of all denominations. There is no escape from the responsibility of teaching polytheism unless explanation is given that the word person is used in the creed in its primitive and not in its acquired sense—polytheism or nonsense.

We have our hieratic and demotic knowledges in religion. Half of the religious unrest of the day comes from the attempt of the masses to make what is hieratic, demotic, or to compass a rational theology. Why is it that it has always been easier to cast suspicion or to shy anathemas on this subject than to give a plain philological explanation?

Of course if the Catholic and Episcopal and Presbyterian and Methodist Churches desire to teach tritheism, that is their privilege.

According to Manuscript D., Jesus, seeing a man at work on the Sabbath day, said to him: “If you know what you are about it is all right, but if you do not you are a sinner and a transgressor of the law.” Very much depends upon knowing what one is about. Perhaps it may be thought that at this point I shall take opportunity to rail against the notion of tritheism. I hope I have “mental hospitality” enough not to do that. Tritheism

would explain much. It is far from being unthinkable. Most Christians are tritheists. They believe in a corporation or college of gods—*tres faciunt collegium*. Nevertheless they live righteously and make a fairly good end of it. But on the whole we shall set tritheism aside for the philosophy of Unity. Tritheism is not entirely an unnatural outcome of the representations of the Bible respecting the Divinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The difficulty so presented is, however, best met by the position that the particular view of Deity at any one time under observation in the scripture absorbs everything into itself. To that view personality glides and attaches. Then the great manifestations will be grouped. This could hardly be otherwise with a subject of apprehension so unlimited.

If I posit modalism, as I do, please to understand that I assert it not as a final, exhaustive philosophy, not as dogma, but provisionally, as a working hypothesis. Modalism will meet to the common apprehension nine-tenths of the difficulties of the case. Tritheism might do the same work.

Unitarianism, shading sheer to humanitarianism, would cover a fraction of the difficulties. But modalism will work explanation of the theistic problem in most instances, and is easily apprehensible by the people, and contains all that in practice we wish to assert; since our business is not with the discussion of the question, how God consists in himself, but to recognize his manifestations and give them diligent attention.

Popularly and even theologically a generation or two ago Trinitarianism stood for Tritheism. The dictionary is right in putting the extract from the Athanasian Creed, in its translation into our tongue, among the examples of the acquired sense of the word person.

It is useless to try to redeem to an ordinary comprehension the recently published views of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity from tritheism. The persons of the Trinity make contracts and compacts with each other and accept appointments from each other just as three men would do. The whole mental attitude of Edwards as disclosed in that production is tritheistic. Is it any

wonder that there arose schisms in New England?

It was desirable that they should arise. It is not strange that the Unitarianism of Channing arose on the one hand and the Pantheism of Parker and Emerson on the other, of such Trinitarianism. In many respects they were a relief from the conception of a corporation of three Deities necessitated by the term person, as it was used in the speech of the people, and by the teaching of the orthodox theologians.

The Unitarian revolt could never have made the headway it did if it had not had the vantage ground of professed war against tritheism.

It is becoming clear that orthodoxy now means by its Trinity a Trinity of modalism and not of Tritheism. Notably in proof of this we have the rejoicing over the espousal of Trinitarianism by Bronson Alcott. But Mr. Alcott illustrated his notion of Trinity in the Deity by the trinity of mental functions in man—intellect, sensibility and will. Such a trinity, if anything, is only a trinity of modes of operation of one and the same mind. Such a Trinity, however, ought to be satisfactory to one whose intent is to maintain *the Divinity of any one of the modes of manifestation when it is under consideration*. It would not probably satisfy a Trinitarian connoisseur, and it is not a Trinity to which the term person could be applied with its acquired signification. "God is Spirit," and "One is the Good." There are not three individuals in the "Spirit" or the "Good." But here comes a large question—Why limit "hypostases" or "subsistences" or modes in God to three?

Why may not such hypostases or subsistences or modes of being or manifestation be infinite in number? Why may not God be more than Father, Son and Holy Ghost? Those terms may interpret prominent phenomena in religion, but are they exhaustive even there? The altars that have smoked on countless hills to its propitiation are witness that men have known of "consuming fire," as well as of fatherly love or of solicitation to righteousness. To sin God is retribution or destruction. The terms Father, Son and Holy Spirit represent, primarily, *characters borne or offices performed by God in and about the*

system of salvation. But outside that system even in morals God seems to be something besides Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Outside morals, God is something else still.

Out in the realm of matter, force and life God seems to be directing power. The great power against which or with which he strove in nature seems earliest to have attracted the attention of man. The Semite has preserved to us this earliest conception under the term "El Shaddai"—God Almighty.

To obtain a physical reconciliation with this aspect of the Deity has been the object of man in the whole of his course in the struggle for existence.

So to fall in with El Shaddai as to bring benign results out of his forces, remorseless when opposing, has been the object of the physical invention and art of man.

Still further outside morals, God is design. The secret of the success of modern science has been the ability to leap from point to point in God's great system of fore-casted design.

Even if professing atheism, science has been following methods which are only rational on the hypothesis of the arrangement of matter and guidance of force in the universe by an Infinite mind.

More than this, I feel sure that beauty is an end pursued in nature—that there is a Divine *nisus* everywhere visible toward the production of the beautiful. God works toward æsthetic as well as ethical ends.

I do not think, however, the baptismal formula was ever meant to cover this revelation of God in nature's æsthetics, but only such prominent revelations of him as pertain to the matter in hand—such as pertain to the moral needs of souls then and there under those circumstances. An ascending scale of prominent lines of Divine manifestation might run—power, design, beauty, providence, righteousness in moral relation, incarnated exhibition of such righteousness, perpetual solicitation to the type exhibited, consuming fire for alienation from the type, communication of love, joy and peace for conformity to the type. That is not an exhaustive catalogue of modes of the Divine manifestation. I believe, however, so far as it goes it is verifiable.

As to what may yet be discovered or revealed, or how

manifestations already made may divide, subdivide or interpenetrate each other, it will be prudent to say little.

At present the incubus of tritheism is on us. You will hear on every hand from devout souls lament of the impossibility to realize the separate personality of the Holy Spirit, and the presence of such personality with the soul.

The attempt to erect the power which God exerts upon the soul into the shadowy nimbus of a person distinct from the Being who exerts it, seems to me bad in philosophy and productive of no good in religion.

Why is the following conception unwholesome?

Thus and so, as Holy Spirit, in aid of righteousness, upon the soul of man, hath wrought the Ancient of Days, which was, and is, and is to come, the Lord Almighty.

The Holy Spirit descending on the day of Pentecost is best regarded as the same old moral energy that had ever brooded over human souls, but now and forever more working by the new standard set up by the manifestation in humanity of Christ. To take a method of the Divine manifestation and erect it into a separate personality is a start on the road to polytheism. It is a road that has been traveled. That is just the way in which our old Aryan fathers went from their original monotheism to polytheism. They took an aspect of nature which they originally regarded as a mode of Divine manifestation, as the dawn, or the night, or the clouds of the sky, and erected it into a separate divinity. By this process the conception of unity was lost and they were tangled in the wilderness of polytheistic conceptions. It is precisely that mode of thought which some modern science uses against us in the interest of infidelity and atheism. A function of God is taken, called a law, and then it is said there is nothing beside.

There is a superstition against confounding the Holy Spirit with Divine influence. Even Moses Stuart is a little nervous lest he shall be accused of lack of fealty to this superstition. Now if we look steadily at this matter for a moment, we shall see that we are trying to make a difficulty where there is none—trying to find a knot in a bulrush.

What can God do for you except to influence you?

Given the separate and individual personality of the Holy Spirit, and it is hard to conceive what he could do beyond just this very thing which is rejected.

But what is the necessity of erecting a third individuality in the Deity to exert this influence? *If God is exerting an influence on man, the man is in the presence of God—what more is wanted?* If I could feel sure that God was influencing me I should be satisfied. I do not expect to be ethically nearer to God, either in this world or the world to come, than to be under his influence. When you are influenced by God you are heart to heart with the Infinite Spirit—you are in contact with God influencing. Look at the absurdity of this fear. It would satisfy any one to think of being *inspired*. He would be pretty sure he was in contact with God then. But to inspire is to breathe into—to influence is to flow into. If God breathes into a man the man is satisfied—if he flows into him he is not. If you take your metaphor by which to express the action of God from the air it is all right—if you take it from water it is all wrong.

The difference between *inspiro* and *influo*, in the estimation of some, makes up the difference between sound faith and heresy. So possible is it for even intelligent men to be guilty of absurdity. Why not take the term Providence, and erect it into a separate entity in the Divine Being as well as the term Holy Spirit?

Instead of attempting to realize chasms of individualization in the Divine Being, it would be better for us to attend solely to the *one* voice which is forever communing with our moral nature. The difficulty is, we have degraded influence till it signifies an intervening agency, whereas it testifies a personal presence—it involves a personal presence.

The Holy Spirit is not given in moral consciousness as other than God acting upon the moral capacity.

No man ever distinguished between a moral sensation born of a first person, and one born of a second or of a third person of the Deity.

To that statement of fact I want to fasten attention. The unity of the force operant in all man's moral sensation is always recognized. There is but one "Categorical Imperative," and one there is.

The chaos we are in is seen from the fact that the greater part of man's moral sensation is not referred to God as cause at all. A few of man's moral experiences are picked out and are hesitatingly thought to be referable to the Holy Spirit. The rest of his moral experiences are tossed off as occasioned by some *Æon*—some Demiurge—some lessee—some sublessee of God called the moral law. Perhaps we ought to add, as Oliver Wendell Holmes suggests, the moral law as a fourth person in the Deity and make a *Quadrinity*.

A little boy is requested by his mother not to go out of the house during her absence. He does go out and comes in before her return. She knows nothing of his disobedience. He wrestles a while with his uncomfortable sensations and then breaks down and says: "Mother, I did go out." That moral experience is supposed to show the workings of the *moral law* in his being.

When this boy becomes a man, having learned the art of stifling his moral sensations, he finally brings up in a revival meeting and there the question comes up whether he ought to go forward to the anxious seat. He does; and then everybody is quite certain that the Holy Spirit has visited that revival meeting. There is very fair evidence of it, that is true, but not a whit better than there was that the Holy Spirit was with the little boy when he confessed to his mother. The analysis of the moral experience is the same in both cases. Ultimately the simple issue in each case is what is right to be done, and of willingness to do what is right. There is no meaning in the one that is not in the other—no power disclosed in the one that is not disclosed in the other. There is no accounting for the sensations in either case except you regard the soul in the grasp of that *one* power not ourselves that makes for righteousness.

It is one and the same presence, one and the same influence that leads a little child to confess its fault to its mother, and that brings the hoary sinner to the anxious seat.

That is a fearfully narrow conception of the presence and power of the Holy Spirit that sees him only in a revival or in the conversion of adult sinners.

That is a wonderful revival in the heart of a child which leads it repentingly to say to its mother, "I did not do as you told me"—one over which there is joy among the angels of God as well as over the return of the sin-scarred prodigal.

I believe we may transfer with profit to the moral realm an idea we have in the science of life, to wit, the origin of species by variation. It is just as possible to be born anew—to be born from above by a process as it is by a stroke. The life that is from above may be gained as by John the Baptist, by right moral adjustment from his mother's womb, as well as by Paul out of lightning and blindness on his mad journey to Damascus. God uses lightning and blindness as a last resort in hardened cases, but we have looked upon them as the first resort and perhaps think of them as the only gates of the kingdom of heaven.

Add up the increments of regeneration wrought by the Holy Spirit upon the soul of the growing child, and you will have just as radical a result of new being as can be wrung out of an adult sinner by the throes of the revival.

Instead of being in doubt whether the Holy Spirit is operating on the heart of a child—of painfully looking for some signs of his presence, we want to see him in every moral issue raised from the cradle to the grave, and to realize that out of the settlement of such issues as there arise, spring the great antipodal relations and fates of time and eternity. The nîsus within us of adjustment to right is always and everywhere evidence of the presence of God as Holy Spirit.

What think you of the religious rejection of the constant presence of God with man as tending to *mere morality*—rubbish—filthy rags?

There is no one lesson which the church so much needs to learn as the absolute sameness of all moral phenomena and the sole unity of their origin—the absolute identification of the operation of God as Holy Spirit with the workings of the sense of moral obligation in the soul of man.

When the forces of nature were viewed as separate entities polytheism prevailed. Now that the unity of force is

established, monotheism must be forever regnant in physics. When several sources of morals are assumed, no wonder that we are confused. When religion consists in, or is largely concerned with, a scheme of personalities and of adjustment of offices of personalities in the Deity, no wonder that morality is regarded as a foe to religion. No wonder that the bright upleaping of the moral ambition, like the dayspring from on high, and the lone, sullen, everlasting pressure of moral duty lose their significance. No wonder that there is among the people difficulty in finding God, when we have broken up his being and dissipated his demonstration as the heathen did when they put a separate spirit behind every wind.


This unfailing, perpetual nisus over the whole moral nature of man is the potency of God. We throw away the force of the argument for the existence of God by parcelling out the origin of moral sensation among persons, subsistences, hypostases, moral laws. While we haggle about hypostases in the Deity, multitudes are asking if there is a God at all. We make no impression because we do not mass our evidence.

We distract attention from a presence and a power as single, as universal, as prominent, as irresistible, as undeniable as gravitation.

Atheism! Atheism! I do not care how it may buttress itself in knowledge derived from external nature, it melts like wax in the brightness of this presence revealed to the soul of every man.

The spires of the churches tower over homes—the places of business—the haunts of sin. That ought to symbolize an interest in and a watch over all the moral phenomena that transpire in the hearts which pace the streets at their base—not merely attention to such moral exercises as take place within their walls in audience room or vestry.

That ought to symbolize an assertion that all moral sensation—that experienced in the church, the street, the market, the bank, the office, the factory, the field, the school, the home—that of childhood, of middle life, of old age—bears witness to the ever present God, as Holy Spirit in converse with the soul of man.



Perhaps a clear statement of the matter at issue is the best thing that can now be done. We are reduced to this—either to think three Gods or three modes of manifestation of one and the same God.

It has not been my intention to prove that any of the demonstrations covered by the words Father, Son and Holy Spirit are Divine. That would be too large a matter to be handled here. With regard to the Father, I think that term was intended to cover a demand of the soul arising out of religion. If you want to extend that term so that it shall cover all the arrangements of nature that seem to betoken a fatherly care, i. e., make it equivalent to Providence, that may be done. But the term is meant in preponderant degree in the New Testament, I am convinced, to designate a spiritual relationship to the soul of man.

Whether there has been a manifestation of God in Jesus Christ is the question of the ages.

The Arian, Socinian, Unitarian, Humanitarian controversies along the centuries bear witness to the zeal and closeness of scrutiny which has been brought to bear upon this question.

Over that long history you may wish to look, but we cannot do it here.

The question is perhaps as new and fresh to-day as it ever was—"What think ye of Christ?"

But here again a clear statement of what is to be solved may be of the highest value.

The question properly put I conceive to be this: Did we have, in Christ, in human conditions and limitations, a manifestation out from the Divine?

The answer to that will depend upon the judgment one makes up from reading the New Testament and from observation upon the influence which Christ has had and is evidently to have in human history. I can only say that, for myself, I answer the question in the affirmative.

The evidence to me is such that I am compelled to say—I think that in Christ we had in human conditions and limitations a manifestation out from the Divine.

If you ask me—The Divine what? I say, anything you choose—the Divine life—that is John's term—the Divine

light, truth, wisdom, love, power, intelligence, all this and infinitely more beside—whatever there is at the heart of things guiding and directing. You may make out your own list of the qualities and potencies there subsisting and substanting, and I will sign it. Out from them I think Christ came. The Divine noumenon in him became phenomenon.

An easy way to turn the point at which I have arrived is to say: "Oh yes, we are all derived from that same fountain, and Christ is only one of us." I am not satisfied with that view, albeit it has in its support the Buddhist, the humanitarian, the Christian Scientist, and I may add, perhaps, the scientific monist.

Psychology from foundation to turret seems to me to lie heavily against it. I do not conceive myself to be God or part of him. I am I, and you are you, and God is neither of us. No man becomes God by being good. No man abolishes God *pro tanto* by being bad. Whatever his conduct, John Smith is John Smith still, and God is the same as before.

If there is anything that is verifiable to the mind of man I think it is Matthew Arnold's formula—God is the power *not ourselves* that makes for righteousness. I am no synthesis of God. I do not know where I came from, but I know that when I came up to consciousness here, I came up in antithesis to God and you. So I remain. So I expect to remain, however good I may become. That fact is fundamental with me and forbids my identification of myself with Deity, or the identification of Christ with humanity, since the evidence seems to me to show that in origin he *does* belong to another, to wit, the Divine category. He may have been in here on our plane, but he was not of our plane, he was from *above* it.

Again, not arguing the question, but simply stating it, it seems to me the hypothesis of manifestation will furnish a clue to resolution of most difficulties.

I have uttered the word monism. Let me say that seems to me only old pantheism writ another way. It may be the adumbration, or adillumination, of a truth if you choose, but it is not the whole truth. A Buddhist who sits with his nose to the wall trying to think himself back into non-existence is a good monist.

One danger of the sciences to-day is their obliviousness to everything but origins. They ought to right about face half of the time and attend to the matter of differentiation—try to see what we have on hand—what it looks like and what it portends. There is a pawl or ratchet arrangement in differentiation by which all things are prevented from turning back and becoming that from which they came. It is not a process indicating the highest philosophy to throw off all differences and work back to the nothing from whence they came.

In religion I wish to say that if I was once God I've got so far out from that condition that I don't intend to play that role. I will try to learn the mind of God and conform myself thereto.

I am not a monist; I am a differentiationist.

"All nature widens upward; evermore
The simpler essence lower lies;
More complex is more perfect; owning more
Discourse, more widely wise."

TENNYSON.

That is supreme wisdom for science and for man.

"All nature's difference makes all nature's peace."

POPE.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL DISCERNMENT.

THROUGHOUT this discussion I use the terms ethical, moral, spiritual and religious as co-ordinate, interchangeable.

Spirituality is the flower or fruit of religion—its last and highest product. But spirituality is but morality sharpened. It is the genius of morality, and rests as solidly in elementary morality as intellectual genius, like that of Goethe or Webster, rests in common sense and hard work.

When relation is adjusted with all beings and things in obedience to the moral nîsus wrought by the Divine Spirit upon the soul of man according to the type exhibited in Christ, we shall have a working religion, or religion in action.

Given such religion, and certain things ought to follow.

Such religion ought to have its own vision—its own horizon.

Such religion ought to have a part in making up a philosophy comprehensive of all departments of human thought and action.

Sir Humphry Davy demonstrated that the alkalies, potash and soda, were the oxyds of metallic bases. His discovery was not accidental. To his mind, versed in chemistry, these alkalies seemed to act with chemical re-agents like a metallic oxyd, and after long experimenting he caught and fixed their bases, potassium and sodium, freed from oxygen, in pure metallic form.

He saw, too, that the earth's alumina and magnesia, under the action of chemical re-agents, gave testimony in the same way that they were metallic oxyds. So reluctant, however, were they under the processes of reduction known to him, that he never quite succeeded in fixing their bases. But when treated they exhibited such affections that he deemed the evidence of their character sufficiently conclusive to warrant him in assigning

names to their bases—aluminum and magnesium—and in reckoning those metals among the elements, while as yet no eye had seen and no hand had handled them. To the chemist they already existed. They were separated from him by imperfection of process, but to his apprehension they were.

Suppose that at this point Davy should attempt to impart to an ignorant laborer an idea of the character and possibilities of a clay bank as *he* saw them revealed in the sullen sputterings and hissings of retort and crucible. Suppose that he should tell him that the clay bank into which he toilsomely drove his pick and shovel day by day was a compound of a metal and a gas, that the gas was one of the component parts of the air he breathed and through which he swung his pick with so much freedom, and yet that in the clay it was fixed and solid; that a large part of the dark, heavy clod was a metal light as glass, tough as iron, and whose sheen was that of polished silver; that a clay bank was merely a bed of metallic ore which might one day be worked for its metal as are now the ores of iron and copper; that the abundance of this ore foretokened a day in which aluminum might be the chief of metals, as clay is now the chief of earths; that there might yet be a day in which there should be no more hard bondage in brick and mortar, no more hod-carrying, but glistening metal should take the place of lusterless brick.

Suppose Davy should tell the laborer all this and many more facts and possibilities which *he* could discern in the clay bank, would he be understood? Would he be believed? Would the spirit of pickax and hod comprehend the spirit of retort and crucible? Yet Sir Humphry Davy's supposed prognostication in the darkness of his imperfect processes is beginning to be realized. Aluminum is a common metal, to be yet more common.

The laborer could not see the truths which Davy saw, because they are *chemically discerned*.

The truths of chemistry cannot be comprehended by smiting into a clay bank with a pickax.

They are not to be grasped by muscle nor by any process except its own. There must be mastery of the rudi-

ments, patient investigation, zeal in searching out its methods, concentration of thought that the mind may be single to the apprehension of chemical truth, a complete merging of the spirit into the spirit of the science, and then one can know how there can be such a thing as chemical discernment, and the force and value of its grasp upon the things of its department.

The astronomer Leverrier observed certain perturbations in the orbit of the planet Uranus. These irregularities indicated to him attraction from a planet then unknown. He knew the regular path of Uranus, and he noticed its deviations from that path. To account for these deviations there was needed, he thought, not only the influence of the planets then known, but another planet, whose orbit should be outside that of Uranus, which was then supposed to be the outer member of the solar system.

With no other data than those afforded by such perturbations of the planet Uranus, he set himself to compute the elements of such unknown planet.

He undertook to ascertain its weight, the form and direction of its orbit, the rate at which it traveled around the sun, the time in which it accomplished its revolutions, and its distance beyond Uranus, itself a billion and eight hundred million miles from the sun.

To those not specially versed in astronomy—even to people well educated—such computations seem incomprehensible, their accomplishment incredible.

We are tempted to say that statements of the weights and distances of the heavenly bodies must be fanciful, and only pass for correct because no one can demonstrate their incorrectness.

However, Leverrier made his computations, and when they were completed he wrote to Galle of Berlin to direct his telescope on such a night to such a point in the heavens. Galle did so, and lo! a pale atom! which had

"Walked alone
Around the utmost verge of heaven,"

hitherto unseen by mortal eye, or whose planetary character had never been recognized. There it was—a fact—a great world, compared with which our own is a small affair.

Now suppose that before communicating with Galle, Leverrier had gone with his data and his speculations to seek the opinion of some peasant who knew nothing of astronomy; of what value would his judgment have been in the matter? What could he know about it?

Perturbations of Uranus! He would know neither Uranus nor its perturbations, and how could he enter into the merits of calculations based on them and pertaining to Neptune rolling in its orbit a billion miles beyond. Year after year of patient mastery of rudiments, night after night spent in observation till the paths of the planets in the heavens are as readily traced as his own paths in the fields, such familiarity with the laws which regulate their motions that deviation from the track they would pursue under known forces would suggest their own causes, absorption of soul in the science till it was lost in the spirit of astronomical investigation and computation—all these would be prime essentials to the formation of any opinion worthy of respect upon such a question.

When *thus* the peasant had *mastered* astronomy, he might be competent to pronounce upon the things of astronomy, for they are *astronomically discerned*.

But suppose, again, that instead of submitting the matter to Galle, Leverrier had written to Sir Humphry Davy to verify his computations by applying to them his chemical tests; would this have brought him any nearer to the discovery of Neptune than he would come by submitting the case to the peasant? A hod is just as good as a crucible for astronomic discovery; muscle just as good as brains versed only in chemistry. The only advantage that the chemist would possess in the matter over the unlettered, untaught peasant would be, that, being wiser, he would be apt to be more modest and so defer more readily to an astronomer's opinion in a question of astronomy.

But suppose that Sir Humphry Davy, being thus applied to on an astronomic question and finding that his science took no cognizance of it, should have oracularly decided that there was no such planet as that whose existence Leverrier suggested, no perturbations in the orbit of Uranus—that in fact the pretended science of astron-

omy was no science at all, because, forsooth, he knew chemistry to be a real science and chemistry revealed no way to measure the distances of the stars and "to call them by their names"—what would be thought of that wisdom?

I might pursue this method of illustration to any length. The fairy tales of science are the accounts of prophecies springing up before the scientific vision, which prophecies, in the progress of experiment, have been fulfilled.

There is one of these which I must not pass, since it is so in keeping with the one already narrated about the discovery of Neptune—only this is at the other end of the scale of matter—this deals with atoms as that with masses—this is mathematico-chemical, while that was mathematico-astronomical in nature. It differs from Davy's case because the prognosticator had no matter whatever in hand. The mathematical situation disclosed by the relations of the elements to each other, to the vision of the Russian chemist Mendeléeff, fell into shape in what he called a periodic law. Looking along this mathematical adjustment, he discerned gaps therein and said there would probably be found elements which would fit these gaps. He went so far as to fill these vacancies hypothetically, even predicting the qualities of the unknown elements, and in due time Scandium Gallium and Germanium were discovered, with mathematical relations and physical qualities as he had predicted.

There can, then, be chemical discernment—even chemical prediscernment, or prophecy.

More, these scientific discernments will divide and subdivide to any degree of subtle refinement in any department.

Here is Mr. Tyndall complaining that his co-scientists, in his own department, cannot understand him on radiant heat because they do not have under their vision the elements which lie in his.

"None of these investigators appear to me to have realized the true strength of my position. Occupied for the most part with details, they have failed to recognize the stringency of my work as a whole, and have not taken into account the independent support rendered by the

various parts of the investigation to each other. They thus ignore verifications both general and special which are to me of conclusive force."

Mr. Tyndall would, with even more spirit, brush away criticisms upon his work from those engaged in other departments of science, though they might be well versed in the things pertaining to their own scientific home. No science can pass upon the things of another science. Each is concerned with the things of itself, has its own formulæ, pursues its own methods, is comprehended by its own spirit.

Nor can one science interpret another. Sometimes, indeed, one science takes cognizance of some outlying fact belonging to another—sometimes there is a partial blending of domains. But neither of the two sciences thus incidentally brought together is entitled to pronounce the other a delusion in all things except those which happen to be common to them both.

Perhaps we are now where we can pass directly to the point we desire to make.

Moral facts, moral necessities, moral probabilities, moral possibilities, moral adjustments, are apprehended by moral perception and are to be passed upon by moral judgment. Of such matters no man is capable of judging unless he has the vision and the horizon of morals. *The moral alphabet is a spirit coincident with the Holy Spirit.* Whoso has mastered that may read in morals—in religion.

There is a department here that stands by itself—a department that comes under the inquisition of no other science. It is the department of attitude before the eternally operant power not ourselves that makes for righteousness—attitude considered not merely as personal adjustment with that power as a person, but on all lines where that power accompanies us, inspiring us to make right adjustment.

If this department is the heart of religion, it is at once apparent how independent religion is—how past the possibility of criticism from any other quarter.

The talk about the overthrow of religion by science is the supremest nonsense, since their forces can never meet. Scientific difficulties with religion! How about astronom-

ical or chemical or nautical difficulties with law!

Law may have its difficulties; but they are not the subject of criticism by the skill of laboratories and observatories, or by that skill which meets the winds and waves of the sea.

Religion may have its difficulties, its uncertainties as to what is right attitude, as to what will tend to secure such attitude, as to who has been or who is in such attitude; but they are *its* difficulties, and it is presumption in any of the sciences to intrude upon this realm or to attempt to apply its canons of criticism to anything that is legitimately included within this horizon.

Mr. Marsh and Mr. Huxley discovered a fossil three-toed horse. Yes, they discovered a four-toed horse, and Mr. Huxley threatened to find a five-toed horse, and we are so far on the road to the fulfillment of that prognostication that we have found the splint bone from which the fifth toe in a former era or æon was projected. Hence what? Very much, certainly, that has bearing on the genealogy of the horse—very much that gives meaning to splint bones, but its bearing on moral obligation is past perception; its bearing on the history of man under the sense of moral obligation is incapable of being discerned.

A fossil conscience has not yet been exhumed. Till it is, the experts in fossils, as such, need not be swift to testify in religion.

There is a possibility of scientific discernment along the line over which Mr. Marsh and Mr. Huxley looked to which recognition should be given. The horizon opened by the discovery of the four-toed horse gives a perspective reaching farther than the mere matter of the genealogy of the horse. Taken in connection with analogous facts in other departments of life, animal and vegetable, it lays the foundation for a rational and credible hypothesis of the development of life on this globe.

I do not care if the discernment which springs from the contemplation of the four-toed horse and its correlated facts is not satisfied till it sweeps into its field of view the physical frame of man and sees that to be a differentiation out of preëxisting life. I do not care if all that breathe and all that have breathed, and what has not breathed but

has had life, is connected by a common protoplasmic bond—if all living creatures “groan and travail in pain” and rejoice “*together*” because they are the many-sided expression of one animating principle and of one material substance. To the discernment that claims such a horizon as the field of its vision let us render due reverence. But I shall persist in saying that that is not the only discernment possible to man, and that other fields of vision can be swept by a discernment equally trustworthy from other bases.

If the discernment that comes from the contemplation of the four-toed horse and kindred facts has posited any conclusion, it is that there has been an upward tendency in the differentiation of life. That is a conclusion posited in Mr. Darwin’s expression, “the survival of the fittest,” and in Mr. Spencer’s theorem that evolution has been from “an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.”

“From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began;
From harmony to harmony,
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in man.”

The possible field of vision is not shut down to the discernment that springs from contemplation of the four-toed horse. It must take in man. He is the last and the highest result, as far as evolution has gone. It is not worth while to waste breath with those who maintain that the rudiments of man’s intellectual and moral powers can be discerned in the animals. The promise and potency of all these powers may exist in the protoplasm of the nettle. The psychologists may prove the gradual acquisition by man of his mental and moral powers—better, the coming in upon man of his mental and moral capacities.

It may well be that the *race* has had its infancy as well as the individual. No man can tell when and where intellectual and moral discriminations begin to be made by the child, but by and by we see the child making such

discriminations. Let science prove what it can in regard to these matters—I mean in regard to the gradualness of the appearance of the faculties.

The attempt to account for the origin of even the intellectual faculties by transmutation from physical functions is, however, I think, a failure. Intellectual life has not been shown to spring from the vegetative life of the animal system, however inseparable they may be in manifestation.

And it is in vain that you try to transmute any intellectual operation, as such, into the sense of moral obligation. The germs of intellectual and moral capacity may be as infinitesimal, may date back in the history of the world as far as you please, they spring up on independent lines, constitute independent departments, and are incapable of resolution or transmutation. Thought is thought and morals are morals in man—if they exist in the dog they are the same—they are the same if they exist in the nettle. Some scientists are fond of attempting to show the rudiments of a moral nature in the dog. Very good, that only traces the rift between intellectual perception and conscious moral obligation back through and beyond humanity. I shall be rather glad to see this work done.

It is a fact, however, that the moral capacity is one of late development in the life of man, and one that normally increases in power in his life. The intellectual faculties must be developed to perceive a relation before the moral faculty can attach a sense of moral obligation thereto.

On the principles of evolution the moral faculty is the highest of human functions. The work of all sorts of scientists—even much that has seemed materialistic and destructive—has tended to exalt this faculty in man, really to install it in regal position.

Whatever be the origin of the moral faculty, here it is—the last, highest expression in the ascending scale—*the faculty regulative of all other faculties. It has some right to see.* Here it has been for thousands of years—as far back as you can peer into historic humanity, and into whatever lies beyond that on the human line—no one knows how far. *It has some right to be heard.* It has a warrant behind it that is known by no other faculty—

an *imperative* of which no meaning can be made but that it is the voice of THE ABSOLUTE.

If we have in the moral faculty the highest differentiation and the most ultimate known in this system, it ought not to be a strange conclusion that it will have a *discernment and a field of vision of its own*. It ought not to be difficult for us to assent to the position that discernment from this point must be comprehensive—that it must exert a modifying influence over other departments of thought and perception, i. e., that conclusions which might be adopted from what is seen in other departments might seem untenable when light is flashed on them from this.

There is an umbration and an adumbration, or better, perhaps, a dawn flush of moral truth extending over all departments of human action.

As all man's action has a moral quality, moral discernment can run wherever human activity is put forth.

What *must* come in the train of certain moral courses may be seen by moral seers as plainly as Davy saw the silver sheen of aluminum in clay, or Leverrier in the perturbations of Uranus the solemn lonesomeness of Neptune. Isaiah is only a Davy or Mendeléeff, with a spirit coincident with the Divine Spirit in his passion for righteousness, looking along the line of the inevitable outcome of the moral action of men and nations.

Promises and potencies from this point of view are of higher rank than those seen from any other position. An expert in physics who sets up as a critic on what takes place in the moral realm, or on what has taken place there, or on what is the normal subject matter and action of the realm, or on what is only collaterally pertinent thereto, is from a lower plane attempting to pass judgment on things that belong to a higher.

It is quite true that moral discernment does not give one authority to pass on the details of matters on the lower plane, whether they be intellectual or physical in import; but upon a *philosophy* which might be wrought out there it would have right to pass judgment as to whether it were broad enough or not broad enough to consist with what is disclosed to itself.

The physicist may say he finds nothing supernatural in his search of natural phenomena, and sees no need or necessity for it in his philosophy. Very good, we should expect to find little of it in the conditions which are before the physicist. There is little reason for it, little ground laid for expectation of it, when you have only matter and its forces under view. Indeed all biological phenomena escape observation from that outlook. But the case is bravely altered when your point of observation is taken from the moral nature of man. A problem will not be solved when you take into consideration only the most inconsequential matters pertaining to it. There may be reason why we should expect the lame to walk, the leper to be cleansed, the dead to be raised, when you have in view the moral exigencies of the Divine and human situation.

The denial of the physicist in such case is an *a priori* denial upon a primitive and low base in the scale of evolution.

The physicist's denial of a supernatural above his base falls into the same category with the famous argument against steam navigation. Things *are* done though somebody says they cannot be and *proves* it. Here is life, which itself is supernatural to the physicist. Atheism may perhaps be reared as a philosophy from a physical base, though I think it not tenable even on that ground. But the moral nature of man will reject atheism as a sufficient philosophy *because it cannot by atheism account for what transpires in its department*. Holding to the unity of the system, the moral nature of man will insist on putting over the physical realm the God which it finds in itself. I believe that is a legitimate transaction in the mind of man.

Whatever has been done in the universe, I feel sure that man from the discernment of his moral nature has a right to say that God did it, as against any atheism reared from other bases. The moral nature occupies the highest ground on the question and has the most comprehensive vision. It cannot suffer anything to contradict itself. To do so would be as absurd as to say that the less could be equal or superior to the greater.

I think this is the reason why the Bible—a book so markedly concerned with the moral nature and moral history of man—begins with such bold theism in nature.

Whoever wrote the pentateuch, by parts or in whole, had found God in his or their moral nature and hesitated not to put him over the whole universe. What has any science to say against that transaction—or all sciences combined? If they should not find God in their field of vision, that does not foreclose the case. Something else may find him in its field of vision. The laborer did not see aluminum in his hod, nor did Davy see Neptune in his crucible.

Monotheism looks as though it might be a conclusion of philosophy from the facts of nature. The truth is that historically it has been a tenet of religion. It was a discovery to or of the ethical nature. But discovered, realized, the positive possession sets at naught the negative testimony, if such should be, from all other sources.

“I found him not in world or sun,
Nor eagle’s wing or insect’s eye,
Nor through the questions men may try,
The petty cobwebs we have spun.

“If e’er when faith had fallen asleep
I heard a voice—‘Believe no more,’
And heard an ever breaking shore
That tumbled in the godless deep,

“A warmth within the breast would melt
The freezing reason’s colder part,
And like a man in wrath, the heart
Stood up and answered, ‘I have felt.’”

I gladly accept the criticism that that is not entirely true—that men *do* find God in “world” and “sun,” in “eagle’s wing” and “insect’s eye,” that he may be found in “the questions” men try, even in “the petty cobwebs” they “spin,” but is not such finding pretty largely a reflection back over such matters from the higher ground and from the brighter light of the moral nature?

Jupiter may shine by its own light, but would not the gleam we get from it be rather mild were it not reinforced

by the effulgence of the sun? The knowledge of God is practically the gift of ethics.

If men were minus a moral nature I do not think from the facts of physics and biology they would have found God even until this day.

Theism was primarily, historically, the product of moral discernment—the answer to moral needs—the explanation of moral experiences.

It was this long before it became the answer to intellectual inquisition upon nature—the sufficient reason of its processes.

It would be pathetic, were it not so astounding as to take one's breath away, to hear Romanes say that when he wrote an antitheistic book he had not studied psychology, metaphysics and ethics, or kindred departments. Pray, what is a man to do except, when he writes on a subject, to work up the main lines pertinent to it?

The legitimacy of the theistic deliverance of the moral nature I think no man is in position to question who has contributed by his conduct to the demonstration that the moral nature is the last and highest point of development in the system of things subject to human cognizance. This was a deliverance given early in human history—so early that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.

The theism of the Bible we well understand to be no invention of Moses. Moses was only one link in a chain of theistic belief, far, very far removed from its beginning, and there were other chains beside that in which he was connected.

Out of whatsoever low germ the moral function of man may have sprung, however rudimentary it may have been over long ages of time, it had risen to such commanding power long before Moses that it put God on the throne of the universe. And it will continue to find him there, and to challenge all opposers of its process, so long as it is pressed to make the distinction between right and wrong.

And here, it seems to me, we can see the line of defense of the Pentateuch which is alone essential to religion. The morals and the theism are all in which religion has vital interest—the theism because it is a prime factor in ethical consciousness.

Attempts to prove the harmony of Genesis and geology are supererogatory, and usually—"love's labor lost." Religion has nothing at stake in the matter. It is just as well to put God behind Moses' idea of creation, whatever that may be, as it is behind Mr. Huxley's. Mr. Huxley's ideas of the origin of things will hardly be ultimate. When three thousand years have passed judgment upon them, little of them may abide. The scientists of to-day may say, "As for this Moses, we wot not what has become of him"; and three thousand years may say, "As for the scientists of the year of grace 1897, we wot not what has become of them."

Whatever the universe was, in whatever forms it was conceived of, Moses or his predecessors in theistic conviction put God at the head of it and that is enough.

Moses probably knew nothing about a four-toed horse, either by private interpretation or by inspiration. He was probably never inspired with the hope of finding a five-toed horse. Of such cattle as roamed the fields in his day he conceived God to be the generator. His conception will remain valid for "every beast," and "creeping thing," and "fowl of the air," and for "whatever passeth through the paths of the seas," from the ancient reign of "chaos and old night" to the final consummation of all things. "Let knowledge grow from more to more," it but enlarges the realm to which the theistic conception of Moses applies. This is all that religion needs to assert and defend.

Suppose Moses thought that the world was made in six days of twenty-four hours' duration—though there is nothing in my judgment which fastens that conception upon him—everything is against that view; suppose he, or the old philosophers and moralists whose summary of thought he may have adopted, conceived of the heaven as an inverted dish,—though everything indicates that Moses was master of his metaphors and not their bond-slave. Yet GOD sat on that dish and ruled such world as there was beneath it, and ruled it in the interest of righteousness. The mental concept of the universe is nothing to religion. It cares neither for one childlike nor one scientific. In either case it finds a God over it

whose connection with man is displayed in unintermitting care to secure rightness in moral relation.

The correctness of scientific conceptions is something which stands by itself. The intellectual conception, for that matter, which posits the earth as the center of the system, with sun, moon and stars as attendant lights, yet all organized and controlled by *mind*, is more grand and noble than an infinite universe of matter moving from "an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity" in a *mindless* way. Is religion on the defense as to the scientific truth of the first chapter of Genesis? It ought to take the field offensively with its philosophy.

The thousand and one attempts at minute harmony, each of which proves unsatisfactory, ought to teach us to look for agreement not in a microscopic but in a telescopic way, not scientifically but philosophically.

Of what manner of consequence can it be in religion what Moses or any one else thought the *order* or *circumstance* of creation to be?

To turn attention in that direction is to quit the ground of religion. Let the cosmogony of Moses be as crude as you please—if his physical philosophy be scientifically absurd—look at his moral philosophy and see what vision it had and how in clearness of perception it has led the subsequent thought of the world.

God created the heavens and the earth and all that in them is.

God is so spiritual that he is unrepresentable.

The speech which refers to him shall be reverential.

You shall cease from the struggle for material existence one day in seven, that you may honor Him and cultivate friendly attitudes toward your fellow toilers on the earth.

There shall be reverence of parents.

Human life is sacred.

The family is sacred.

Property is sacred.

The truth shall be spoken.

The desire for what belongs to another shall be restrained.

I do not see how the discovery of a five-toed horse can

weaken the conviction of the essential truth of those principles, or detach their hold upon the moral nature of man.

I do not see how the failure to know that there were five-toed horses before there were four-toed, and four-toed before there were three, and one, can detract from the value of such moral principles.

Religion has postulated these principles, religion will postulate them as regulative canons for the moral nature of man till that moral nature becomes atrophied to extinction.

We are sometimes promised a new religion—a scientific religion. What this will be I do not know.

Suppose you correct Moses' cosmogony by modern scientific deductions—will you have done anything for religion? Nothing at all. I mean inherently, essentially. We shall be as far from the base of religion as ever. The new will be no better than the old, will serve the purposes of religion no better.

Here let me point out an error which I think is to be seen—sometimes to be felt where it is not seen—in many scientists, notably in the late Mr. Clifford, in Mr. Huxley and in Mr. Tyndall; I mean the error of confounding intellectual accuracy with rightness of moral relation. Those men seem sometimes to make a religion out of what they see in science, and out of their courage to state what they see. Possibly in the latter element there may inhere something of morals. But as exhibited in them it is of an imperfect and crude quality, since it puts an inferior estimate on morals in a higher relation compared with morals in a lower.

That is not the highest development in moral adjustment which leads one ruthlessly to stalk over the feelings, even over the prejudices of his fellows to set forth a proposition which he regards as true.

No man has such relation to any scientific perception or facts as to release him from the obligation of kind instruction of those who are ignorant of his truth.

Flirts and flings at ignorance and prejudice do not exhaust—they do not recognize one's moral duty as an instructor of his fellow men.

Whatever a man knows, his relations to that knowledge are not such as to release him from kindness in trying to remove the obstacles in the way of his fellow men having the same knowledge and enjoying such conclusions as are pertinent to it. There has never been any such wholesale rejection of the truths of modern science by those interested in securing the right moral relations of all men as to warrant Messrs. Tyndall, Huxley and Clifford in their oft unlovely references to religion, or to call for the brutal jests of Ingersoll.

Courage in stating intellectual conclusions may lose all its morality if it stands only for bull-dog gruffness or unfeeling willfulness or wit.

To preserve its moral quality, all utterance must have its inspiration in helpfulness to the ignorance of man and in a *kindly* attempt to remove obstructing prejudices. The love of truth, which some scientists parade as their religion, seems not at all love of right in moral relation, but simply fondness of accuracy in intellectual perception and statement of scientific facts.

But extremes meet. That same mistake is made by many nominally inside religion, as well as by those outside of it.

Creeds are put forth as testing similarity of intellectual view in religion. The scientist puts forth his creed to which he demands intellectual assent. The departments may be different in which the creeds are put forth. But the processes called for are the same, whether the creed be a statement of science or of religion. They are processes of intellectual perception. Whereas religion calls for a process unknown to science, a process over and above any of its intellectual scrutinies, a process of moral adjustment which is unique of its kind. That process is the heart of religion. While it may be of some interest to know what the intellectual conceptions of people may be in matters collateral to this process, yet it should never be forgotten that the inspiration of this adjustment—the ambition for this adjustment is, and alone is, the essential thing in religion. Given that process in operation in the soul of man—given a soul under the tuition of God as expressed in Jesus Christ,

and you may trust it to work out its salvation with him, and to come to such conclusions respecting matters pertinent to religion as a spirit can attain that is willing to be taught of God.

Moral discernment posits its results not as a syllogism but as a proposition—not as an argument but as a testimony.

I may state conclusions at which I have arrived in religion; I may state something of the processes by which I have arrived at them.

But there my function with religious truth ends. I cannot give another my moral adjustment nor my vision resulting therefrom. I cannot compel another to my conclusions, for though I may give him my propositions, I cannot give him my horizon. The propositions take hue from the horizon in which they are set, and derive their value therefrom.

I commend to careful thought the attitude of Giordano Bruno on certain principles in his philosophy. It will be seen that in the estimation of that free-thinker other departments, as well as religion, demand trial on their own base. I quote from the "Philosophy" of Maurice.

"But what am I to do," asks Gervasio, "if I am talking with a person who will not admit this to be so?" Simply wish him good morning, and make him no answer, was the solution of this difficulty. "And if he should still be importunate?" rejoins the querist. "Then," said Teofilo, "you must address him thus: 'Most illustrious Signor, or sacred Majesty, as the case may be, as there are certain things which cannot be evident except to the hand and to the touch, other things except to the hearing, other things except to the taste, other things except to the eyes, so this material of natural things can only be evident to the intellect.'"

"But," suggests the modest Gervasio, "my friend may reply that he has much more intellect than I have." "There is that danger, no doubt," is the answer, "just as a blind man may assure you that it is you who have lost your sight. You may believe him or not as you like."

One of the profoundest truths ever uttered is Paul's state-

ment that the things of the spirit are spiritually discerned. That statement is not to be treated as a revelation, and so perhaps an insoluble mystery; it is a fact of psychology, witnessed in every department of action possible to man. The utterances of the sciences posit the same principle.

Professor Gray, in referring to the argument for the existence of God, says: "When you ask for more than this, namely, for that which will compel belief in a personal Divine being, you ask for that which he has not been pleased to provide."

That is very true. God has not been pleased to provide foundation for that process of compulsion in anything to which moral adjustment furnishes the key. Belief there can come only from the personal horizon.

A scrupulous life adjustment with the power not ourselves making for righteousness may bring out the conviction that God is and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.

It may be that our hope of immortality resting on a horizon of moral adjustment may be as valid—may have as large an induction behind it as Mr. Huxley's hope of finding a five-toed horse, or Davy's conviction of a metallic base in alumina, or Leverrier's of the existence of Neptune, or Mendeléeff's of the existence of eka-boron. A faith "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen" may be as legitimate here as there.

Professor Gray finds such a horizon before himself that he posits God according to the Nicene creed. That is a fact to which I wish to call attention.

I suppose Professor Gray's horizon was worth something in the realm of botany, his judgment valuable in reference to anything pertaining to vegetable life. Why is not his judgment in religion equally worthy of respect? He seems equally cautious and conservative in religion as in science. He seems to have paid some attention to religion beyond the Queensbury rules of fighting it. There is a line of scientists from Gray and Dana and Pierce and Agassiz back through Faraday and Davy and Newton to Roger Bacon. Why are their conclusions to be accepted in science and rejected in religion? They testify that their conclusions are supported by their horizon

in the one case as well as in the other. Yet how unhesitatingly we adopt their scientific judgments and perhaps reject or hold under suspicion their testimony to religion!

It is a little curious that this should be so, for the means of verifying what they say from their scientific horizon are very much further removed from us than the means of verifying what they have seen from their moral adjustment.

There is no superstition nor credulity in religion that is more lofty or bathic than the blind incapability which appropriates every utterance of men in reference to science.

The number is great of those who suppose themselves scientific in their habits of thought who are simply following *traditions* in science. Whether the leaders are blind or not, the following may be and often is. Faraday walked, our own Benjamin Pierce walked, in an intellectual realm where they could have company only from a gifted score of the children of men. Yet men accept without question the intellectual conclusions of Faraday and Pierce. But Faraday walked with God, and nothing delighted Pierce more than to give utterance to his conviction of the existence of God and of the wisdom of his government.

The horizon of these men in religion is open to acquisition by every being who ever felt the thrill of attachment to the right and revulsion from the wrong. Yet men blindly adopt what they cannot know, and suspect or reject testimony which they might verify.

When we come to make up a philosophy of the universe we shall insist that the *religion* of Faraday and Pierce shall give in its testimony as well as their science. I think we may wisely pause on words of Mr. Huxley:—"Here are critics, persons who not only have not attempted to go through the discipline necessary to enable them to be judges, but who have not even reached that stage of emergence from ignorance in which the knowledge that such discipline is necessary dawns upon the mind."

We have too much forgotten the functions of the "Kerux" and the "Martur"—the herald and the witness—in religion. We have overestimated the power of argument

and underestimated the power of testimony, rendered not only on subjects of moral but also of intellectual import. It was an evil day for Christianity when the apologist supplanted the herald. It is an evil day for it now when men forget the privileges of confessors and cease from proclamation, to become tangled in disputation.

The kingdom of heaven cometh not by the observation of argument any more than by any other kind of ostentation. It has its victories, but they are never the victories of one man over another in argument about anything.

The Mohammedans were right when they rejected the proposition of Raymond Lully to try an argument on them which in thirty minutes would make them Christians. That was no way to come at the affair.

That was true psychological perception which laid down this rule of moral action:

“When ye come into a house salute it. And if the house be worthy let your peace come upon it, but if it be not worthy let your peace return to you.” State your business; if there is a moral horizon in which it can find place, it is well—if not, be on your way. Testify, but do not dispute. The evil of the day is that we are trying to argue the kingdom of God as an intellectual conclusion into minds that have not the ambition for its moral rudiments.

Since the foundation of religion is a personal, moral experience, it follows that its experts have a right to testify, and the testimony of such experts should excite to the appropriate personal verification. If Davy may testify to me of chemistry, and Leverrier of astronomy, and Faraday of magnetism, and Maxwell of physics, and Pierce of mathematics, then, to say nothing of the Master of Righteousness, John and Paul and Luther and Knox and Chalmers and Channing and Maurice and Binney and Martineaux and Phillips Brooks and David Swing and Beecher and Storrs may give their testimony to religion—may tell me what is to be seen on the moral horizon, and I am in duty bound to hold my peace, unless, subjecting myself to their moral training, I find nothing of which they testify on the plane of my moral vision.

Do you say I have made a strange medley in my enu-

meration of masters in religion—that they had abysmal differences? Will you look at their unities? Their differences came from the plane of their intellectual perceptions—their unities, which have given them the ear and heart of the world, from the plane of their moral life. They had more in common than that in which they were divided. What they had in common was joint possession of the moral kingdom of God.

Let the moral experts testify. But let them be experts. Shall we call in Voltaire? What right has *he* to testify? Of him Mr. Carlyle says: “It is a much more serious ground of offence that he intermeddled in Religion, *without being himself in any measure religious*; that he entered the Temple and continued there with a levity which, in any Temple where men worship, can beseeem no brother man; that, in a word, he ardently and with long continued effort warred against Christianity, without understanding beyond the mere superficies what Christianity was.” Let the experts be experts. Let them be men who have found God in righteousness and man in love—not men who observe a few moral principles which good society enforces, while they are blank to a moral universe else.

The commandment is exceeding broad—very much broader than not to commit adultery, lie, swear, steal nor get drunk. The adjustments to be made are illimitable. Look at the outcome—the grand totality of the man—and you can see whether he has a right to speak as a master in morals. It is said that John Stuart Mill and Harriet Martineau were moral and yet they could find no hope of immortality on their horizon. If morality is adjustment, then I deny their morality except on a very narrow line. They were uneasy, unrestful spirits. Their adjustment was neither pleasant to themselves nor widely comfortable to others. Of John Stuart Mill, James Martineau writes: “The tone of his writings leaves a singular impression of melancholy and unrest. He seems rather to be making the best of the human lot as it is than to find it worthy of a wise man’s welcome. With a firm hand he draws the prohibitory circle which limits our knowledge to the field of experience, and concentrates a steady eye on his survey

within it; yet not without glances of thought—pathetic in their very anger—toward the dark horizon of necessity and nescience around. Balanced and courteous as he is, it is always with a certain sharpness and irritation that he turns in that direction and says, ‘Why look there? there is nothing to be seen.’ And his moral discontent with the world is still more marked and more depressing than the speculative; his admirations spending themselves, and with fastidious scantiness, on what is wholly out of reach—on Greek politics that have passed out of reality, and on socialistic, that are doubtfully destined to arrive at it; and his dislikes increasing as the objects are nearer home—England being more stupid than France and the decorous middle class the meanest of all. Out of sympathy with society as it is, and with languid hopes of what it is to be, our author seems to sit apart, with genial pity for the multitudes below him, with disdain of whatever is around him, and in silence of anything above him. No one would believe beforehand that a writer so serene, not to say cold, could affect the reader with so much sadness. You fall into it, without knowing whence it comes. All the lights upon his page are intellectual, breaking from a deep reserve of moral gloom.”

There is maladjustment, patent, palpable maladjustment discernible. It is no wonder that those who are maladjusted to what is, get into darkness as to hope of what is to be.

The value of the judgment of the masters in religion is as high as that of the masters in science.

Who are the masters in religion? The poor in spirit and the pure in heart.

There are things that are incommunicable in religion. That fact the seer in the Apocalypse has graphically put. “I will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new name written which no man knoweth saving he which receiveth it.”

That stone cannot be clutched by the insolence of intellectual power. There is another road to the possession of that gem. It is a way that “no fowl knoweth; the vulture’s eye hath not seen it, nor the lion’s whelp thereon trod.” It is a way known only to him that overcometh

in moral struggle. But that is an open way and there is an eternal presence inviting to walk in it. "I dwell with the humble and contrite heart."

The persistence of force! What persists like this Presence with those who live to moral issues—for that matter, with those who do not?

What visions are opened along any line like those which lie open to the glance of righteousness?

Those that have *not seen believe*, and their process is legitimate.

There is illumination and ad-illumination cast over upon other matters, beside the strictly religious, when one has come under the dominance of the Holy Spirit.

That is what makes the Bible so sensible a book in matters collateral to religion. Its philosophy is never puerile, its history, to the latest scrutiny, in the mass correct.

The result is just exactly what you might expect when there was dominant in prophet or chronicler the spirit to be always right.

How far that spirit may be traced and trusted in collateral matters I do not know.

That you can go with it a great way I think you may infer from the result of criticism upon the Bible. Not much has been done to alter its philosophy or remove stated fact out of its accustomed place.

We read history still in the Bible as our fathers read it.

You will catch this dayspring gleam of revelation from the sun of righteousness lighting up subsidiary matters as you read. The conviction will come that righteousness and fact are inseparably blended in the same statement.

Read the gospels. If you are in love with righteousness you will say, "Yes, here is moral truth essential, everlasting."

But there will come in on you also the conviction that you are reading no historic fraud, concocted for a purpose morally awry, but that you are reading after some one who had in very deed, in the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, caught up and set together the unmistakable moral rhythms of that one, lone Master of righteousness, and the

true facts of the forth-putting of power by that one, lone Master of force. There is evidence in the gospels to their historic truth that comes in by way of the moral nature that no logic of the intellect on other grounds, however artfully marshaled, can gainsay.

“At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and intellectual and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.”

CHAPTER VI.

MORALS AND IMMORTALITY.

PART I. MOSES AND IMMORTALITY.

IN endeavoring to find the relation of morals to the belief in immortality it seems to be necessary to make an excursion, somewhat at length, to find, if possible, the attitude of Moses, actual or probable, on immortality. Christ is received as giving satisfactory light on the question of a future existence. Christ pledges Moses to belief in immortality. But the text of Moses is reluctant on this subject.

How can it be that Christ was warranted in attributing this belief to Moses?

What is the philosophical value of belief in immortality as derived from the attitudes and teachings of Moses and of Christ?

On what basis does that belief ultimately rest?

Toward light upon questions of such kind we shall hope to thread our way in this discussion.

I shall not attempt to spell out the doctrine of immortality from the text of Moses. To do that would be a *scientific* procedure.

All sciences are in exegetical moods and are attempting to impose the creeds of their special letter upon all knowledge. I do not want in form to add another instance to a process which is already in bad eminence. I prefer to submit a variety of considerations pertaining to the subject in hand and to let such conclusions arise upon them as may seem legitimate.

The lack of clear assertion of immortality in the text of Moses is regarded as remarkable, and it is argued that he did not hold the doctrine, and that as a constituent of religion, or of the Hebrew religion, it is of later date than the exodus.

Such argument is a very grave *non-sequitur*. Its inconclusiveness can be shown from a parallel case.

Take down the first volume of Palfrey's History of New England. You will read its 630 pages from beginning to end and, unless your eyes are sharper than mine, not find an allusion in it to the doctrine of immortality; at any rate it is not prominently elaborated. Now do we realize what kind of a problem we have in hand when we take up this volume of Palfrey's History? It is in great measure the Mosaic problem over again, to wit, the double project of the reformation of religion and the institution of a state. Would you argue that the idea of immortality has come in since the landing of the Pilgrims, because it does not appear in the fullest general history we have of their times?—that the Pilgrims did not hold belief in immortality and were not under its influence?

The antecedent possibilities are all in favor of the appearance of this doctrine in this history. Just think what some of these probabilities are. The author of the history was a clergyman devoutly attached to the idea. His work took him over ground, it would seem, that would challenge him to give some clue to the possession of this staple idea of religious belief by the people whose history he wrote. The record runs over the original formation by the dissenters of their church in Scrooby—their persecution in England—their flight therefrom—their residence in Holland—their projection of the enterprise of emigration to America—over the annals of that first sad winter in Plymouth, when one-half their numbers were buried—and then over thirty years of the development of a colony whose inspiration was as religious in nature as that of the migrating Hebrews. These are some of the elements raising a probability that an idea, toughly held by a people of tough grasp, would come to the front in a history of their acts and inspirations written by no “un-lineal hand”; but it does not. History is sometimes a very imperfect “counterfeit presentment” of the convictions and mental and moral forces operant with a people.

Put now these two cases together. The schemes of Moses and the Pilgrims alike, though religious in their inspiration, were so directed to the establishment of a

state, in this world, that considerations drawn from *the next* fell into subsidiary position and have failed to make a mark in the text of history.

Again, it is to be remembered that it is only a *special kind* of literature that has survived to us from the hand of Moses. Moses' fame rests on his character as a *lawgiver*, and his works of undisputed genuineness are all of *legal stamp*.

Now law may not be the narrowest, but it is a very narrow base from which to project a structure representative of the intellectual furnishing of a people. Put into a man's hands the Revised Statutes of the State of Illinois and tell him to construct therefrom a scheme of the intellectual and moral forces that are plying in our daily life. Would you be likely to be satisfied with the draft that would be made? Would you like to have it said of us by coming generations, that what our Revised Statutes indicated, was the gauge of our possessions? Take this very doctrine of immortality—do you find any indication of it in the Revised Statutes?

Yet the doctrine is here among us, we are talking about it, and you may go out and discuss it with every one of the millions of the inhabitants of this state and they will all know what you are talking about, and an overwhelming majority of them will tell you that with greater or less firmness of conviction they hold the doctrine.

Our literature nearest in character to the undoubted work of Moses is the Revised Statutes of the State. That Moses' statutes cover some grounds in morals and religion which our statutes do not cover, does not make against the justness of this comparison. Such subjects are still treated by Moses in a statutory way. They are treated of only in his capacity as a lawgiver to a people who are to become a nation in this world.

We are really from Exodus through Deuteronomy dealing with Moses as a *statesman*—a statesman animated by high moral and religious motives, it is true, but a *statesman* still.

There is one other species of literature to which we may compare these enactments of Moses.

Dean Stanley suggests that the laws of Moses are

stamped with the character of the field orders of a general on the march. Many of them were given forth from time to time in the wanderings in the wilderness, as necessity might demand. Hence modifications here and there that often amount to repeal of former regulations. The higher criticism would of course prolong this period of modification. Given this characteristic, and the fact which it indicates, and we have a further reason why the doctrine of immortality would not be likely to be found in the text of Moses.

If there is anything which might be supposed to have relation to this world it would be the orders of a general on the march.

The doctrine of immortality is pretty firmly held by the people of the United States, and war is concerned with mortality, yet you will search a long while before you will find allusion to immortality in the army orders of the national generals in the war of the Rebellion. It does not even appear in the famous Sunday order of General McClellan. Whether you account for the peculiar character and condition of the legal part of the Pentateuch by the theory of Dean Stanley or by that of the higher criticism, to wit, compilation in the course of the national history, the result for our purpose here is the same—the material is still legal and statutory if its composition was distributed through the ages.

The idea of immortality is not of late arrival in the field of human thought. It is one of the oldest of human beliefs and has had its day of domination over all other thought in the mind of man.

We are nervously apprehensive in these days lest the belief be losing its power, and we clutch at anything which may be supposed to support it.

It is quite possible that we might have before us enough of thought on this subject.

Suppose the idea were with us at our "downsitting and at our uprising"—suppose we dined it—wined it—suppose it furnished theme for gossip in society and for politics to the state—suppose it levied taxes—we might possibly conclude that we had enough of attention to a future life.

It is claimed that the Hebrews of the Exodus did not have this idea because it does not appear in clear relief in the writings of Moses.

But if the Hebrews did not carry this idea as part of their mental furnishing out of Egypt, they were dull scholars while they were there. If Moses did not have it he could not have been very thoroughly learned in the wisdom of the Egyptians, notwithstanding the tradition to which the martyr Stephen gave voice.

The writer of the Acts says the Athenians and the strangers which were at Athens spent their whole time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing. For Athenians substitute Egyptians and for the theme "some new thing" substitute immortality, and you have a photograph of ancient Egyptian life—you have caught the salient feature of the religion and the politics of Egypt from the days of Moses back to the mergeance of Egyptian history into "darkness and old night."

The religion of the Egyptians was little more than an elaboration of the idea of immortality. Anything else, usually associated with religion and assigned the leading place therein—theism or ethics—in their scheme was relegated to a subordinate position.

It is safe to say that so far as the process of restoration of the literature of the Egyptians has gone it has revealed more pertaining to Egyptian thought and conviction upon immortality than upon any other subject—than, perhaps, upon all other subjects combined.

One of the more important developments made by archæologists has been the reproduction of a work pertaining to immortality which the Egyptians called "The Book of the Manifestation to Light." But the happiest description of this work from our modern point of view is the appellation the Germans have given—"The Book of the Dead." That is precisely what it is. Copies of it, partial or complete, were buried with the mummy—steeped in gums and embalmed as thoroughly as the dead for whom it formed an accompaniment.

Texts or passages from it were painted on the walls of temples and chambered monuments. Old Egypt was as full of it as we are of the Bible. It had a wonder-

ful hold upon the people. You can trace its existence from the day of Moses back through the centuries to a time prior to the building of any of the pyramids.

There is in the British Museum an extract from the text of this book on the mummy case of Menkara, the builder of the third pyramid. The Book was then so old that the traditions run that Menkara revised it.

We shall get some idea of this book in its totality if we call it a Pilgrim's Progress. But, you will remember, the scene of Bunyan's pilgrim's progress was in this life. Bunyan takes leave of *his* pilgrim as he enters the gates of the life that is to come. But there is just where the Egyptian *began* with the progress of his pilgrim. We may say that these two works, Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress and The Book of the Dead, as to the realms of existence, are complementary to each other. We must have before us something of the Egyptian conception as set forth in this Book.

Osiris, identified with the sun, is the chief divinity. He goes to some happy realm at each setting. He has his resurrection at each rising. The soul at death goes to this unknown realm into which the sun disappears. The pilgrimage of the soul seems to be in this unknown realm toward Osiris or toward his abode. The ultimate happiness seems to be a pantheistic unity with or mergence in Osiris; though beyond all that, as the sun reappears, so the soul is finally to reappear to reclaim the body of which it has been divested in its progress to Osiris.

Now the Book of the Dead is a guide book for the pilgrimage in this nether world. Men committed it to memory in this life, for it gave directions what to do and what to say at all stages of the soul's journey. The soul, if it forgot the directions at any stage, had the privilege of coming back to consult the roll buried with the embalmed body. There were chapters which, if committed, secured the privilege of this return to the body daily, for this purpose or for any other.

One of the most heinous of crimes by Egyptian law was stealing the rolls of the dead; because by that crime a soul might be unable to complete its pilgrimage to Osiris.

The "Book of the Manifestation to Light" is no drivel. It contains hymns of surpassing power. You will search long through your knowledge of literature to find their superior. Their authors swept a bold lyre. These hymns come to the imagination with something of the impressive and solemn grandeur which we may suppose clothes the pyramids or the temple of Karnak.

Here is a paraphrase of a hymn by which a soul was dismissed at death and commended to its journey:

"O Companions of souls made in the house of Osiris, accompany ye the soul of the deceased to Osiris. Let him see as ye see, let him hear as ye hear, let him stand as ye stand, let him sit as ye sit.

"O Givers of food and drink to the Spirits, give ye food and drink in due season to the departed with yourselves.

"O Openers of roads, O guides of the paths to the souls in the abode of Osiris, open ye the roads—level ye the paths to Osiris. He enters the gates of Osiris—he goes in with exultation—he comes out with peace."

You are reminded of Isaiah's "Go through, go through the gates, prepare ye the way. . . ."

Then the deceased takes up the strain.

"Hail, Dweller in the West—Osiris—Lord of the region of the great winds. Let me stand in peace at the west. The Lords of the hills receive me. They say to me, 'Come—come in peace.' They give me a place where is the chief of the great gods."

Not far from Pope's—

"Vital spark of heavenly flame.

* * * * *

Hark! They whisper. Angels say,
'Sister spirit, come away!'

There are examinations here and there on the way before judging gods. After a successful termination of one of these examinations the soul exults in triumphant song:

"I am Lord of the crown. My enemies injure me not nor overthrow me. A path has been made for me. Glory! Glory to Osiris!"

There are dark and terrible lands, Stygian waters, valleys of the shadow of death to be crossed, and then comes a bright realm which undoubtedly suggested to the Greeks the Elysian Fields, and reminds us of Bunyan's land of Beulah. Into this the soul bursts with song whose imagery is doubtless derived from Nile scenery in its most hopeful and attractive state.

"I have come from the scalding pools, from the flaming fields, alive from the great pool. I stand in the boat. I have weighed anchor in peace. I have brought the boat. I have loosed the rope so that I have come out in it from the wretched place.

". . . I know the pools and the lands of the fields of Peace. I am in it, I prevail in it, hoeing and plowing in it, mowing in it, sowing in it, rowing in its pools, approaching its lands.

"I know where to plow and to mow the corn, to collect the harvest daily. I am in it like the god who is in it, filled with its waters, eating its bread, resting in its land."

The successful and justified pilgrim sings his final triumph song:

"The heaven is open—he walks not in the valley of darkness, he goes not to the pool of the damned. His soul lives forever. He dies not again in Hades. His food is off the altar of the Sun every day. He lives as a god."

These are mere snatches out of a vast ritual covering the experiences and fates of the evil and the good according to the conception of the ancient Egyptians.

It must have been a "dread and awful thing to die" in Egypt if to ensure salvation one had to commit this whole ritual, for I find references running up as high as Book 169. How many more books or chapters there were in the treatise I do not know. It certainly is a very much less laborious procedure to bow assent to the Thirty-nine Articles or the Westminster Catechism. The privilege of consulting the roll preserved with the mummy could not practically have been of wide service, for the cost of writing so much, even when the most comprehensive mnemonic symbols were employed, must have been great.

We find that in most cases only a few key texts or the headings of important chapters were used. Sometimes only the names of the gods one would meet on his pilgrimage were written—it being regarded a valuable help to be able to address these gods by name.

It is apparent enough that this was a religion for the upper classes—consequently a hieratic religion. To the mass of the people—the laborers, farmers and artisans, slaves—the outlook for the future must have been doleful indeed. It took *learning* to compass salvation in the other world. They were not *learned* in this post mortem wisdom while they lived, and they were too poor to buy a copy of it for their direction when they were dead.

The Egyptians in the most literal sense of the term believed in the resurrection of the dead. All success in the journey to Osiris depended on the preservation of the body. A final end in view, even beyond absorption in Osiris, was re-appearance here and re-habilitation with the former body. Hence arose all that effort by embalming and by rock-hewn tomb to preserve the body from dissolution and destruction. Here again to the mass of the people the outlook for the future must have been dark and gloomy.

The process of embalming was expensive, and the safe place for the body could not be dug out of the rock with unarmed hands. Tools and workmen were required, and stone work *cost* in that day as well as in this. The problem of *life* with the Egyptian was how to get embalmed and how to secure undisturbed rest for his embalmed body in an indestructible tomb.

All modern research is confirmatory of the fact and philosophy covered by that oft-repeated quotation from Diodorus Siculus: "The Egyptians called the dwellings of the living lodgings, because they were only occupied for a short time. The tombs, on the contrary, they called *eternal* houses, because their occupants never left them. This is why"—please remember what he says—" *This is why they took so little pains to decorate their houses, whilst they neglected nothing which could enhance the splendor of their tombs.*"

The private rock tombs which line the valley of the

Nile are almost innumerable, and they are decorated with all that wealth and industry could compass of the art of the time.

Mud and dust possessed the houses of sun-dried brick while every energy was consumed on the garniture of tombs of stone.

The idea of immortality furnished a *public policy* for the Egyptian state. Monumental Egypt, as it is seen to-day, is the remains of state work, and the inspiration of the most of this work as expressed in pyramid, temple, grotto, labyrinth, was sepulchral in cast. The tomb was no by-play in public policy, it was its main end in view. Those in power will seek to give the reigning idea the highest effect for their own benefit.

It was an awful race the rulers of Egypt led the people under the prevalent inspiration. No other people ever put as much of effort into any kind of public works whatever as the people of Egypt put into tombs.

The pyramids that lift their huge forms so high above the desert sands—that vie with the everlasting hills in strength—that seem fairly capable of remaining till “the heavens depart as a scroll and the elements melt with fervent heat,” are attesting witnesses of the power of the idea of immortality over the Egyptian *state*. They were built out of the revenues of the state and by the forced labor of the people, to afford an eternal habitation to the bodies of kings while their souls made pilgrimage to the abode of Osiris. Whatever other wisdom the pyramids were intended to embody, it is idle to deny that their prime object was of a sepulchral nature. If there is any astronomical wisdom about them, much or little as it may be—more probably, little—it is simply incidental. No sooner did a king come to his throne than all the power of his state was bent to the erection of his tomb, which might be pyramid or temple, or grotto cut in solid rock.

These things remain and we speak of the splendor of the ancient Egyptian civilization. The immense work done in this mortuary system was for the gratification of the fancies and superstitions of kings, princes and nobles. How about the people—the rank and file of Egyptian humanity?

We call the pyramids the crowning expression of human power, and of a certain kind of art; but it is certain that they are monuments also of human degradation, ineffable.

In the erection, and under the shadow, of piles whose inspiration was of immortality, human life was of least account.

The pyramids are representative of more human misery than the spear of Tamerlane or the scimiter of Bajazet. Herodotus says that one hundred thousand men were "used up"—"finished," he says—every three months in the erection of the great pyramid. If you translate "worked by relays," the mortuary result was the same. The traditions of the reigns of the pyramid builders are all of frightful oppression and wrong. Their dynasties ended in disorder and national exhaustion.

Brugsch Bey writes: "The people suffered and endured under the blows of their oppressors, and the stick settled the dispatch of business between the peasant and the tax-gatherer. We need but glance at the gigantic masses of the pyramids; they tell more emphatically than living speech or written words of the tears and the pains, the sufferings and the miseries of a whole population which was condemned to erect these everlasting monuments of Pharaonic vanity. Three thousand years were not able to efface the curse resting on their memory. When Herodotus, about the middle of the fifth century before Christ, visited the field of the great pyramids of Gizeh, the Egyptians told him of the imprecations wrung from their unhappy forefathers, and they would not, from abhorrence, so much as utter the names of the kings who constructed the two highest pyramids, whom we now know to have been the Pharaohs Khufu and Khafra."

Before the times of Moses the kings had indeed begun to build splendid palaces which were decorated under the historic idea. Yet the tomb was not neglected, and it was still ornamented with the scenes and acts, mythical and imaginary, of the future life. The state had merely acquired an inspiration for palaces in addition to its passion for tombs. But this only added to the exactions upon the people. The quaint language of our old scrip-

ture graphically expresses what must have been heard throughout the land: "Ye are idle! Ye are idle! Go therefore now and work. No straw shall be given you, yet ye shall deliver the tale of bricks."

We can add a touch even to the coloring of that picture. There survives a letter written earlier than the time of Moses—in the reign of Rameses the Great. "Have you ever," writes the librarian of Rameses to a friend, "conceived what sort of a life the peasant leads who cultivates the soil? Even before it is ripe, insects destroy part of his harvest. Multitudes of rats are in the fields; next come invasions of locusts, cattle ravage his harvests, sparrows alight in flocks on his sheaves. If he delays to get in his harvest, robbers come to carry it off from him; his horse dies of fatigue in drawing the plow; the tax-collector arrives in the district and has with him men armed with sticks, negroes with palm branches. All say, 'Give us of your corn,' and he has no means of escaping their exactions. Next the unfortunate wretch is seized, bound and carried off by force to work on the canals; his wife is bound, his children are stripped."

Given that as a description of a *native* peasant in the department of agriculture, and you may imagine what must have been the condition of a *slave* on the public works. Indeed the toilers in every department of industry were held in low estimation in ancient Egypt.

Agriculturists in all branches, sailors, fishermen, workers in metals, glass, stone, spinners, weavers, potters, even sculptors and painters, and merchants, were all classed together, says Brugsch, as "the mob," and despised as part and parcel of the low estate of labor.

Let us return to the more religious feature. One cannot easily break away now from the influence of the thought embodied in the Book of the Dead. You can see that old pilgrim to Osiris as easily as you can see Christian on his way to the celestial city. You can hear his lamentations in his dark valleys, and his songs of triumph as he emerges into fields of light. This is the power of the fossil system. What must it have been to have been in contact with the living system as it ruled over judgment and imagination? What must it have been to have

been born under it—to have been bred under it—to have felt its influence in religion, politics, social life? There is enchantment in that old Book of the Dead now—what must it have been to listen to some choral recitative of the priests rolling up from the cavernous depths of the old temples, simulating the lamentations of the rejected and tormented wicked, or the exultations of justified souls as they swept on toward the glories of Osiris? Yet it was with such living institution that Moses came in contact.

The art of Egypt appealed to him not mummified, as it does to us, but still instinct with the life that gave it birth. The pyramids were already hallowed with a hoary age. Antiquity from their summits looked down upon him probably over a greater reach of time than makes up our Christian era.

The pyramids stood in his day, much as the cathedrals of Europe among the people who swarm about their bases, still enshrined in their faiths and convictions, still holding captive their imaginations.

Immortality did “brood like a master o’er a slave.” It was “a presence not to be put by.”

How did the man Moses break away from this system of thought and life, fortified as it was by everything tending to crush out inquisition upon it or rebellion against it?

Break away he did and shiver the system from turret to foundation. How did he do it?

If you will go to a director of the nearest myth foundry he will turn you out a very neat sun myth from the story of Moses killing an Egyptian and hiding his body in the sand. Praise this artist for his ingenuity, dismiss him kindly, but tell him firmly you have no use for his wares. Then, as now and ever, it was necessary for effects to have antecedents if not causes. One of the most marked changes in the history of human thought and human activity had to have certain antecedents, and there is nothing quite so natural as laying the foundation for this change, as the killing of an Egyptian by Moses and a consequent flight from the country and long and solitary residence in the desert. If you want an original study, with original conclusions, send a man of reflective disposition (that

Moses seems to have been), in the ripeness of his powers into the wilderness. Moses went there in the prime of his years, under conditions exciting him to challenge the thought of Egypt and sit in judgment on its realized fruits.

When in contact with it the power of the Egyptian system brooded like a pall over the imagination and judgment, but away from it a man might once more reflect.

Art may be great, but nature is greater, and the great man realizes this.

The pyramids were grand, but Sinai was grander. The weird chants of the priests in the underground temples might thrill with awe, but what were they to the trumpet of God as the thunders rolled and shivered in reverberations from the granite pinnacles of Sinai?

There might be a future life, but it was quite certain that there is a *present* life.

Why throw so much interest forward? Why not attempt to make the most out of what is here?

If this life be worth something for one man, why not for another? The kings had done something with men; could not something better than *that* be done?

These are some of the questions with which Moses certainly wrestled as antecedent to the conclusions he adopted and which have been incorporated into history.

Do you say Moses met God and acted under his illumination and authority? Certainly. God meets such men under such circumstances—meets them in their life and its exercises.

"What bard,
At the height of his vision, can deem
Of God, of the world, of the soul,
With a plainness as near,
As flashing as Moses felt,
When he lay in the night by his flock
On the star-lit Arabian waste?
Can rise and obey
The beck of the Spirit like him?"

MATTHEW ARNOLD.

Do you wonder at the silence of Moses on the subject

of immortality? Do you not see that it is a silence of the "Dum tacent, cum clamant" order?

You do not do justice to Moses until you see in his work uncompromising protest against the idea of immortality as it had found expression in Egypt. He cut up that idea root and branch. He did not do this so much by direct attack on the system as by setting up another whose realization would be the doom of this. Some of the outworks of the Egyptian system, as it found expression in necromancy—a branch of the system, be it said, which longest survived on its native ground, continuing down to be one of the toughest opponents of Christianity—he met by special statute. And, mark, this statute is among the very first of the Sinai statutes.

But the main system he met by the philosophy, rather than the statute, of his own system.

With reference to the statutes against witchcraft, usually supposed to be gratuitously cruel, it must be remembered against what background in Egyptian history they were projected.

It is easy enough, with our altered horizon, to bring a "railing accusation" against Moses for the severity of these laws.

But take his problem and they seem at once benign.

Necromancy was return to the system which had made a tomb so dear and human life so cheap.

It was treason to a state which was to sit squarely in the principle that this life should have its full development first and that every man should have an equal chance in it, so far as human government could determine.

Here, perhaps, it may pay us to take one glance at the witchcraft tragedy in this country two hundred years ago. Moses had an original question before him. There was no one thing which represented more to which his state must be in antagonism than necromancy. That was equivalent to the religion and politics of Egypt. That had made slaves of the people, and of the people he meant to make free men.

But they put witches to death in Massachusetts not because witchcraft had a background with *them*, but because Moses was supposed to have done so upwards of three

thousand years before. The fault in Massachusetts was simply imitation, and imitation is always out of place. It was a crime by way of being a blunder.

Thinking that God was the same yesterday, to-day and forever, in that excitement at Salem and vicinity they forgot that man is not—that he never has the same horizon two days in succession.

“For humanity sweeps onward.” The problems that have been are not the problems which are. The problems which have been are never more to be.

However, if that sad experience had an influence to make men mind their business pretty closely in this world, it was not unmixed evil.

The fatal fault of the Egyptian system is evident. It overdid immortality. It inverted existence. It made an actual life secondary in importance to one problematical.

Its great work in literature was a Book of the Dead. Its crowning use of human energy was in the construction of a tomb.

Its thought pertaining to this life was mean and meager. It elaborated an infinite series of details respecting a future life without the knowledge of a single fact thereto. It despised fact and worshiped fancy.

It gave to kings the last, worst inspiration to selfishness, under which they wrecked the happiness and squandered the lives of the people.

Out of that dwelling in the wilderness there came upon Moses a majesty of power that successfully wrestled with the mightiest tyranny that ever bruised and crushed the bodies and darkly brooded over the souls of men. The world has no similar exhibition of the overthrow of superstition, enthronement of sense, respect for facts and the order of existence, regard for the rights and welfare of man, established through the force of one individual.

This life came to the front in Moses' system and not that other. His religion had this world for its theater. Did he take something of his ethical principles, as well as ritual forms, from the Egyptians? They were principles that were to be realized in this life, while with the Egyptian their value lay in the purchase of privileges in the world to come—a perversion of ethics which survives in religions other than Egyptian.

The present absoluteness of the ten commandments is something which impresses the mind.

Blessing for observance and guilt for infraction attaches instantly. There is no suggestion of the possibility of turning their edge. The Egyptian had the substance of these commandments, but he had ways of cutting across lots in his pilgrimage to Osiris when examination in reference to them was likely to be severe.

With the Egyptians ethics had relation almost entirely to the future life. Let me reinforce what I have said by the opinion of Reginald Stuart Poole.

"The contrast between the two religions is in nothing more remarkable than in the doctrine of the future state. *Upon that doctrine*, which does not appear in the Mosaic law, *rests the whole Egyptian teaching as to man's moral and religious duties*. With its failure *as the motive of life*, arose in its stead the performance of magical rites and routine acts of worship under the power of an ever growing priesthood, who held the terrors of purgatory over the heads of the laity.

"The practical value of the doctrine thus vanished entirely.

"In the Hebrew system the rewards and punishments are of this life, and the future state—the greatest subject of thought in Egypt—is not once alluded to. Yet as the whole Hebrew settlement must have been aware of a great truth, which, be it remembered, is *ignored* in the Hebrew law, *not denied*, it may be supposed to have remained in the background, ultimately fading from the consciousness of the people, to reappear when the prophets gradually taught it to them. *Had this doctrine been taught by Moses to the Hebrews dogmatically, they would probably have returned to the worship of Osiris.*"

It is easy enough to ask why Moses did not teach immortality. It takes some judiciousness of mind to hold one to the contemplation of the composite, complex nature of Moses' problem. *Pace* the radical Higher Criticism—we hold that there was a Moses and that he had a problem.

Getting moral leverage over men in this life and for this life is the distinguishing feature of the Mosaic as against

the Egyptian system of ethics. *That* is an *institution* of Moses and is probably his greatest original contribution to religion. When you think of what Egypt was and then think that Moses established a state without a palace or a tax-gatherer, and a religion without a temple or a tomb, you begin to realize what is the service of Moses to humanity.

The man who could get the conviction that the place whereon he stood was "holy ground" would not be likely to fail to reach the conclusion that any man who happened to stand there was a being worthy of reverence also. That democratic idea Moses did attain, and to that he gave full effect.

No man ever did more to make the sum of human energies tell upon the mass of human happiness. Instead of giving men by myriads over to one man to be consumed in working out his "vain imaginations" with reference to a future life, he put every man to his own problem here—gave to each man's energy the spur of his own ambition.

I believe it is usual to style the period of the Judges in Israel a time of barbarism.

But there is one little picture in the Book of the Judges which I want to set up against the picture which Herodotus gives of a king of Egypt using up one hundred thousand men every three months building a tomb for himself. The age of Khufu and Khafra is called an age of splendid civilization—the era of the Judges barbarism.

But here is the picture from the last verse of the Book of Judges. Here is the painting of Moses as against the painting of the Pharaohs.

"In those days there was no king in Israel. Every man did that which was right in his own eyes."

Just that result was what Moses burst the shackles of Egyptian religion and law to obtain. Except from external foe the Hebrew had nothing to fear.

His energies went untaxed, to the nurture of his family, to the development of his own problem.

Not even in New England, before the factory system was developed, did individual life have a more free and independent base and career. Arcadia itself gives us no

more charming suggestions of the happiness of individual life.

Those were halcyon, bucolic days, in which the Hebrew blood was gathering strength and wine, to burst, in David and Solomon, into empire, philosophy and song. They are the days of the emigrant wagon on the Western Reserve, whence shall come—Ohio, mother of generals, statesmen and Presidents; the days of Daniel Boone on "The Dark and Bloody Ground," whence in half a century shall come the eloquence of Henry Clay and Tom Marshall; the days of the frontier cabin in New Hampshire, out of whose meager resources and envioning hardships shall come Daniel Webster, orator, statesman, diplomat; days of democracy, forethought and work. The passage from the condition of the laborer in Egypt to this condition is the passage from perdition to paradise, and the first step toward this conclusion was the casting out of the Egyptian system of thought in reference to immortality.

Moses made clean work of the Egyptian system. He carried out his revolt to the last, and the last protest has the eloquence of pathos about it.

They will show you tombs of sacred cats in Egypt, every one of whose hewn stones represents an incomputable wreck of human happiness and human life.

But of Moses—"no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day." Though Moses was a leader of the people, yet we understand that that was a position forced upon him by sense of duty—it was never congenial to his own feelings. He was a man who loved his solitudes. In them he found his great inspirations—revelations—his richest experiences.

Child of the Egyptian civilization as he was, he had been born again to the genius of the desert.

He got adjustments in law and in morals—which have survived to this day—some of which will survive for all time—by wandering away from the people and meeting with—what a man can only meet when he is alone.

"On some fond breast the parting soul relies,
Some pious drops the closing eye requires."

But over and above this, as the shadow of the shade, infolding but never unfolding, came creeping up to his consciousness, did the mighty hunger for the old solitudes and for what he had there found come upon him?

Had he found a stay and a staff out there which more than any human support he wanted to grasp in his hand? It would so seem. Then too did he want to *seal* a protest against a system which he had strained every fiber of his being to overthrow? There are several things which indicate this. He built no tomb for his brother, who had been his own right hand in his great demonstration, nor for the sister who had watched over him from the time when he lay an infant, hidden in the flags of the Nile, to old age. They were buried, but where? Beyond a general designation in a mountain range, the sons of Israel were never able to tell.

Their deaths cost the people nothing more than simple burial and the tribute of tears.

Might not Egypt triumph over his body if it had lost the empire of his soul? Might not his tomb undo his work?

Answer as you may, there is probably no one of those events which you call accidents to which the race owes more than to what is covered by that simple statement, "No man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day."

Moses reduced immortality to its proper terms—set it in proper order—opened to men the proper paths to conviction upon it. He subordinated it to monotheism and ethics—let it acquire such power as it could behind those principles as vital convictions of the soul.

Jesus read immortality in the revelation of God to Moses at the burning bush.

We must view that revelation not merely as conviction on the part of Moses that the universe had a ruler, but as including a consciousness of personal relation with such ruler—as including a covenant relation with him—a covenant on the part of Moses to walk with the revealed God in "all his ways known and to be made known." That covenant included—in fact was—moral adjustment. That is what a covenant with God always meant. The covenant with Israel was the law of Sinai.

A covenant with God is exactly the soul's adoption of what you call the moral law, or the principle of right adjustment with all beings and things.

The ark of the covenant, the most sacred thing in Israel's worship, was the receptacle of the ten commandments. When Solomon dedicated the temple it is said that the priests brought the ark of the covenant of the Lord "unto his place, to the most holy place," and that "there was nothing in the ark save the two tables of stone which Moses put there at Horeb when the Lord made a covenant with Israel, when they came out of the land of Egypt."

That covenant of the commandments lay patent to the consciousness of Moses at the bush. It must have been there or God would never have appeared to him. It is only the pure in heart that see God and get revelations from him at burning bushes or anywhere else. The bush was but the culmination of an adjustment with God whose details were afterward elaborated for the guidance of men.

What Christ says is that there was such moral adjustment with God in Moses at the bush as that you can predicate the existence of belief in immortality upon it. A man who has made adjustment with God can see what that adjustment portends. Granted the adjustment of a covenant relation with God, represented by the living morality of the ten commandments, and belief in immortality will follow. As from Mount Nebo the eye of Moses swept out over the promised land, Jesus says, even from the date of the burning bush in his career his vision took in not only the life that now is but that which is to come.

This is laying the foundation of the belief in immortality in morals. Immortality is in the horizon of morals and can be descried nowhere else.

They are the headlight shooting beams across the dark river and lighting up the eternal hills beyond. Daniel Webster said over Jeremiah Mason: "Real goodness does not attach itself merely to this life; it points to another world. Religion is the tie which connects man with his Creator and holds him to his throne. If that tie be all sundered, all broken, he floats away a worthless atom in the universe; its proper attractions all gone, its destiny

thwarted, and its whole future nothing but darkness, desolation and death. A man with no sense of religious duty is he whom the scriptures describe in such terse but terrific language as living 'without God in the world.' Such a man is out of his proper being, out of the circle of all his duties, out of the circle of all his happiness and away, far, far away, from the purposes of his creation." We may add that out of such maladjustment will spring no conviction of eternal life.

But ethics will catch "foregleams of immortality" even out of æsthetics.

Hear Whittier:—

" But beauty seen is never lost,
God's colors all are fast;
The glory of this sunset heaven
Into my soul has passed,—
A sense of gladness unconfined
To mortal date or clime;
As the soul liveth, it shall live
Beyond the years of time."

But morality to see immortality must be a *whole* morality—vital throughout—not a mere skeleton through whose dry bones the winds of skepticism hiss their scoffing, or moan their desolation. It must be a living morality, walking by the Spirit in the likeness of Christ.

The *resurrection* of Christ apart—his relation to Moses in respect to immortality seems no other than his relation to him on all other matters.

"I came not to destroy the law or the prophets, but to enlarge them." We should not read that Christ brought life and immortality to light through his gospel, as though they were discoveries of his, which no one else ever saw or made known. What is said is that Christ *lighted up* life and incorruption—cast light upon them. What is dim apart from him, *in him* becomes clear.

The thing to keep in mind is this—precisely the best moral adjustment the world has ever seen is the one that was clearest upon immortality. Christ has lighted up immortality more than Moses, as he has enlarged his morality.

The consciousness of Christ seems to lie equally at home in that other life as in this. Sometimes you can hardly tell where he is, whether here or there. He seems an exhibition of what is meant by that expression, "mortality swallowed up of life." Artificial systems built upon the adumbrations of immortality in the human soul, like that of the Egyptians, will disappear.

Many of the views we have had in reference to immortality will one after another be relegated to the dark limbo of superstition, i. e., treated as something added without warrant over and above the fact.

But moral adjustment in being will give conviction of the significance of being, of its reality and its continuity. There is the bed rock of the belief in immortality, and the gates of hell cannot prevail against it. If ever the time shall come when men shall have lost faith in immortality it will be when they have lost faith in God and lost regard for morals.

The conviction of immortality is the prolepsis of being resultant from the quantity and quality of life.

PART II. THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT.

I am far from undervaluing what might be called the intellectual, i. e., the scientific or legal proof of the resurrection of Jesus. I think, if the accounts of the resurrection be read, even apart from their connection with the rest of the New Testament, and the supposition be allowed that the witnesses in the affair were as honest as people usually are, that a case is made out, which, on fair rules of historic criticism, if the matter were one of ordinary probability, would be entitled to an affirmative verdict.

If, as indeed we must, we regard the matter as transcending ordinary probability, I still think a case is made out which is entitled at least to suspension of judgment, till it is either overborne by countervailing testimony, or helped forward by other evidence, if such exists, to assenting conviction.

There is no countervailing historic testimony. Let us examine the question, whether there is any matter which comes in to aid the New Testament statement of facts, and if so, what that matter is and what is its character.

A careful examination of the record will show profound carelessness, on the part of the apostles and others who testify to the resurrection, to what may be called the scientific aspect of the matter—most marked indifference to the details of proof. That is a fact I want to emphasize at the outset.

I want to be understood as herein using the terms intellectual and scientific in a narrow sense—as about equivalent to that which comes to us out of sense perception and inferences therewith closely connected.

Peter in his argument on the day of Pentecost states the great fact of the resurrection. But he supports his statement not by a rehearsal of the facts of evidence, but—do not fail to mark it—by an appeal to *antecedent probability*.

Peter is speaking to an auditory of unbelievers. Doubtless he could assume that many facts were known to them to which he need not allude. That does not affect the strength or weakness of Peter's argument as it comes to us; for, whatever those facts might be, immediate knowledge of them died with the generation possessing them.

Peter meant the force of his argument to lie in just what has come to us as an abstract of it. It is easy to trace the working of his mind from his language:—"Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death,—*because it was not possible that he should be holden of it.*" That is to say, "Given the Messiah as he has been forecast by bards and prophets or, what is equivalent, given Christ, as he has made his demonstration in Galilee and here in Judea, and you ought to know that death could have no power over him."

Peter goes on with his argument, not giving items of proof, but showing the consistency of the resurrection, *assumed to be a fact*, with the Old Testament teachings concerning Christ.

Whatever the reason may be, here is the fact that one of the most notable of the speeches of the apostles in de-

fense of the resurrection has little or nothing in it that in any scientific sense can be called evidence.

Peter is not alone in this attitude.

His great co-laborateur, John, in his old age, writing his account of Jesus, gives some few details respecting the resurrection—as what was seen in the empty sepulcher—and then cuts himself off as if apologizing for mentioning such matters, by saying, “For as yet he knew not the scripture, *that he must rise again from the dead.*”

The implication is plain enough that some higher evidence superseded in his mind the force of these details, and he gladly quit their enumeration. Yes, he even seems to blame himself for having at the time given them so much attention.

“The rest remaineth unrevealed;
He told it not.”

Something did seal “the lips of that evangelist.” Can we not tell what it was?

Take another great typical example—that of the apostle Paul. An enemy of Jesus—disbelieving in him and in the facts asserted in reference to him—on a mission of persecution against Christian converts—just see how he treats the matter of the legal or scientific proof of the resurrection of Jesus when he is brought face to face with the assertion of the fact.

“As he journeyed he came near Damascus, and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven, and he fell to the earth and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?

“And he said,” (Paul had not lost his wits—he was keen in scrutiny), “Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest.” Now, according to the theory upon which Paul had been acting, Jesus was “crucified, dead and buried.” For some reason this keen man, always master of himself, his resources and the situation, did not turn back to Jerusalem, but went on to Damascus. The lawyers and the scientists may say that a man under his circumstances should have gone to Jerusalem, found a notary public or justice of the peace, and

taken testimony in regard to the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. But Paul exhibited utter indifference to Jerusalem and to all the possibilities of there harvesting facts pertaining to the resurrection. It was three years before he went to Jerusalem at all; then he stayed but fifteen days, saw only Peter and James, went away and went not up to Jerusalem again for fourteen years from that date. He says he gathered nothing at Jerusalem that was of any importance to him. And though he seems at some time and somewhere to have been told of evidence from many parties sustaining the resurrection, he made little use of it.

Something superseded its importance as evidence in his mind.

The *fact* of the resurrection he certainly did not underestimate. Everything in his system rested on it. "If Christ be not raised your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished."

It had better be said here, though, that Paul was a contemporary of Christ and knew the story of the resurrection from the first, and that by going back to Jerusalem he *could* only get a *repetition* of the story he had so constantly heard.

Nay, more, does not the account we have of the risen Christ himself—of his actions and his utterances, show that he took little pains to convince any one, by intellectual, scientific proofs, of the fact of his resurrection? You find him, as he walks with the two disciples to Emmaus, when they plainly tell him that they were made astonished by the statement of certain women that they found not his body in the sepulcher and had been told of angels that he was alive, not at all anxious to press recognition of his personality upon them, but going over a scripture argument to raise in their minds a *presumption* that what they had heard was true. And when they come to the point where, in the breaking of bread, intellectual proof by way of sense perception begins to open upon them, he vanishes.

In the last interview with the disciples, according to the record of Luke, Jesus pursues the same course. Instead of being anxious to impress the fact of his resurrection

by scientific proof, it is said: "Then opened he their understanding that they might understand *the scriptures*, and said unto them, Thus it *is written* and thus it *behoved* Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day."

That interview with Thomas has the same remarkable bearing. Thomas succeeded in getting scientific proof to his satisfaction. Thereon came this wonderful statement: "Thomas, because thou has *seen* me thou has believed. Blessed are they that have *not seen* and yet have believed."

The plain implication is that there is some other line than the scientific over which conviction in this matter is to come, and that the higher blessedness is for those who come to conviction over this other line, whatever it may be.

Now here is a notable fact which meets you at the outset in the discussion of the resurrection of Christ. If you call for strict scientific proof you find a carelessness, an almost utter ignoring, of that method of proof both by Christ and his apostles.

This may make the resurrection on an intellectual basis less credible, but here is the fact. If you raise a scientific issue it is evident that you are raising an issue that the New Testament record was not, in main intent, designed to meet, at most to meet but partially.

If this result is unsatisfactory, bear in mind that your issue is unfair to the New Testament, for its dominant force was never put on the basis you seek.

Is there any explanation of this phenomenon, and, if so, what is it? I believe the key to the matter is this. In reference to the resurrection and continued existence of Jesus the appeal is made primarily to *the moral*, not—scientific-wise—to the intellectual nature. I use the word *moral* in its full philosophic sense, indicative of *right* relation with all beings and things. Thus used, it includes religion in its signification.

The appeal to the moral nature marks the life-conduct of Christ.

The sign, the wonder, the power always had with him a place secondary to the moral condition and impression.

There were a great many in Christ's day who wanted

to work this scientific line, and to them the answer always came: "No sign shall be given you,"—"No sign shall be given you."

"He did not many mighty works there because of their unbelief." Not that that unbelief affected his power; it was simply a moral condition alien to the main scope of his mission—which was redemption from sin and inspiration with righteousness—and he had no mind for side issues, nothing for by-play, nothing for gaping wonder. But the record shows that where there was a receptive moral spirit, there he walked distributing divine energies broadcast as a sower scatters grain. It was when he met a funeral procession going out of the gates of a city—an occasion when the moral nature springs to the front, if ever, in our being—that he approached and touched the bier and gave back alive the only son to the widowed mother. In that other case of resurrection,—so spiritual was the atmosphere about that home in Bethany that it comes up before the mind now as a home on the confines of the New Jerusalem—the Jerusalem which is from above—rather than the Jerusalem which then was and was in bondage with her children. Jesus never meant at any time the sign and the wonder should stand alone to make up a system to be judged of by the intellectual faculties alone. He took every precaution to guard against that state of affairs. The physical and the moral might indent each other in Christ's action. But without the moral Jesus never said, "This indenture witnesseth."

There was *system* about Jesus in this matter. And the apostles were true to the spirit of the system of Jesus. To me one of the profoundest indications of the unity of the New Testament is the unity of attitude of all the actors therein in this important—this crucial test.

The Spirit of Jesus, as he promised, certainly did flow over on his disciples, for they pursued the same course he always did—holding all intellectual, scientific matters in subordination to moral impressions and moral conditions and convictions.

Here is the groundwork of the antecedent probability to which Peter appealed on the day of Pentecost. Here is the secret of John's apology in his old age for noticing

such few items of fact respecting the resurrection as he does record. It is error to regard John as writing to set forth the facts of the resurrection. He did no such thing. He attempted no such thing. He has simply set forth a few facts to show his own and the moral blindness of others at the time of the resurrection.

Here is the reason why Paul, taking no counsel of flesh and blood, went forward to Damascus and not back to Jerusalem.

It is error to regard Paul as getting all his revelation when suddenly the light shone round about him as he came near to Damascus—or afterward. The process had been going on a long time before this critical event. "Saul, Saul, it *is* hard for thee to kick against the pricks." Paul had been carrying on a moral contest, no one knows how long. The iron had entered his soul. It *is* hard, the voice said. It had been hard. Paul knew it. Paul's conversion was not a bolt from a clear sky. It was the crowning act in a series of manifestations he had already had in his moral being, that had burnt their way to his heart and thereon branded their meaning.

These courses of action taken by these apostles sprang out of the intensities, the insights and convictions of the moral nature. There is no possible array of physical proof that cannot be quibbled over by the intellect of man. Says a friend of mine whose scientific and spiritual perceptions are alike clear: "There is nothing so elusive as a physical fact."

Only an alert moral power can sweep over a tangle of ordinary facts and make a stable, convincing synthesis.

The appeal for merely scientific proof of the resurrection bisects the nature of man. It attempts to approach the profoundest event of the universe, the meeting point of two systems of administration, and judge of its evidence with a fraction of his powers devoted to a fraction of the field. The moral nature has a perceptive power far exceeding the intellectual. There are antecedent probabilities which carry a case before the moral nature of which mere intellectuality, on a physical base, can take no cognizance. Happily I can reinforce myself here by opinion from a scientific source which is worthy of attention.

George J. Romanes writes thus:

"Purely intellectual belief may indicate nothing but sheer credulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the case is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity to an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the additional evidence supplied by the moral facts."

In this connection just one further word from Romanes:

"The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by *man without* a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done by *God with* an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great; the latter is only equal to that of the theory of theism, i. e., nil."

Perhaps I can illustrate one difficult subject by another. The Divinity of Christ—from what quarter do you get proof of that? From Matt. i. 18? That is about all the proof of a scientific character there is—about all that is offered to the mere intellectual apprehension. Why, no man in his senses would accept as fact a matter of such kind having no other support. Yet the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ is here, and here to stay.

What is it supported by? It is supported by the moral convictions of man turned to the contemplation of Christ's character and truth. It is supported by observation of the moral influence that came out of Nazareth and has even now shot up to supremacy among the civilized nations of the earth. It is supported by observation of the fact that all good takes the name of Christian—returns to its own source. His own does receive him. But this is a case made out in the court of the moral instincts of the soul; and you cannot make it out elsewhere nor out of anything except moral material. And of that material a case will be made out which will carry the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, and the 18th verse of the 1st chapter of Matthew along with it, to the "last syllable of recorded time."

To a soul hungering and thirsting after righteousness the Sermon on the Mount takes its place in the system of proof of Christ's resurrection from the dead.

The master of truth *must be* the master of life. From him the pains of death will be loosed because it is not

possible that he should be holden of it. When one sees that omnipotent and omniscient march of Jesus through the truth, and has appropriated to himself its living results, he would be ashamed to be seen fumbling around the tomb for a mortuary list of facts to support the resurrection. Wherever and however that master of truth went out of sight—behind what screens soever he may be—HE LIVES; it is not possible that he should do otherwise. He lives, and the moral nature stretches forward to catch the impulse from the unseen life, in serene indifference to sights and sounds and appearances of forgotten ages.

To annul these moral convictions is to put out the brightest light of the soul—is to refuse to carry an appeal to the soul's court of last resort. The one sole commanding imperative in man is the moral nature.

Carlyle has well said that "man has not so much a moral nature as a moral nature has *him*." It does have him and it makes its case for him.

This question of the resurrection of Jesus is no mere intellectual inquisition upon a handful of facts in an old record; it is a question as well of judgment of the moral being, when the height and depth and length and breadth of all moral significances are weighed in the balance.

This is not to narrow the issue. It is not to take it away from the inquisition of the intellectual faculty. It is only to cause the intellectual faculty to approach the question under the illumination of the regal faculty of the being.

It is not to override the scientific facts by a blind credulity, but to shed light upon them by a whole universe of new matter.

It *is*, not to approach the question with half our faculties, but with all—not to decide on a fraction of the evidence, but to take into account the whole.

What is a doubt of the mind may be an instinct of the soul.

When we stand in poise before facts of which physical perception only takes cognizance, we may be swept to irresistible conclusions by evidence brought in by moral testimonies. F. D. Maurice says: "Faith itself is a

higher evidence. Things not seen present themselves to it with a force and demonstration as great as that with which the things seen present themselves to the eye." The same facts make a different case according as one is born from above or not.

F. W. Robertson says: "There are men in whom the resurrection begun makes the resurrection credible. They believe in a resurrection because they have the resurrection in themselves. The resurrection in all its heavenliness and unearthly elevation has begun in their souls and they know that it must be developed in an eternal life."

James Martineau says: "If you will believe only in the perceptions of sense, and distrust the intimations of the spirit, it is a question how low you will descend for your test of certainty. Will you depend upon your own faculties in proportion as they are simply animal, and deny them in proportion as they are divine? confide in your eyesight and give the lie to conscience and affections?"

We have moral senses superadded to those which take cognizance of material things—senses that can touch, taste, hear and see moral meanings, forces and issues—can divine whence they come and whereto they tend—senses that know as a primary cognition that moral ends dominate all others—senses that can discern moral meanings in physical facts—senses that declare that the crowning testimony respecting a physical fact may not be taken till it is set in order in a moral system. These senses enter their protest against trying this question on a low plane—by the lower powers—against pinning a matter whose sweep is as wide as space and as far-reaching as time—weighty as the philosophy of the government of the Great God—down to rules of evidence so narrow that they are felt to be injustice in many of the paltry concerns of secular life. We are only fit to judge of the problem of the resurrection of Christ when we can turn on it the perceptive power of the highest and truest moral sympathies and culture, taking in view all rational moral probabilities and exigencies.

Now let us turn to the subject of our own immortality.

Our moral nature has not only judicial capacity to try a question of existing fact, it has prophetic power to judge of one still problematical.

Whether we are to rest or not in a conviction of our own personal immortality will depend upon the perspective we can get along a line projected by our moral being.

The world's *seers* have always been its prophets of righteousness. The old prophet of Israel who begins, "Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well," ends with the sublime optimism, "Behold, I create a new heavens and a new earth. Be ye glad and rejoice in that which I create. The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, and the lion shall eat straw like the bullock. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord."

We can see the fulfilling of that prophetic optimism—see enough of God in history to attain conviction that it is to be fulfilled.

It is sympathy with righteousness which gives clarity of vision to discern what are the forces which are mighty and will prevail.

It is another seer whose sympathies were with a city "into which there shall in no wise enter anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie," who sees all sin involved in the doom of "the wreck of matter and the crush of worlds"—all sin irrevocably cast into "the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone."

Do we not know that these seers saw correctly—that righteousness hastens to victory—that there is victory in it; that the power of sin is to be broken—that it is broken—that it is a "*barren* scepter" in the hand that grasps it—that it *has* gone, *does* go, and *will* go to the lake of fire?

In the moral and spiritual attitudes of such seers we may approach the problem of immortality. We shall then *see* as well as they—see with a vision far more convincing than that of sense—see what sense cannot reveal. "*The meek* will he guide in judgment and *the meek* will he teach his way." The meek will be able to judge whether that way leads down to death and nothingness or through death up to the eternal hills of life. One of the offices of the Holy Spirit is to give light on this

very problem. "When the Spirit of Truth is come he will guide you into all truth, *and he will show you things to come.*"

It is only out of holiness that you come to conviction that anything is to come and what it shall be. Sin has never seen anything but chaos in the universe. It is righteousness that sees the kosmos, and, from the order that is, has confidence to draw an inference as to the order that shall be.

Says F. D. Maurice: "The Holy Spirit will always be showing us things that are coming—giving us an apprehension of truths that we have not yet reached, though they be truths which are the same yesterday, to-day and forever. The phrase may intimate that *foresight* which is given to those who study principles, meditating on the past and believing in God."

The scientists are driving the philosophy of force back till it finds no resting place for the sole of its foot except in the Divine Will.

Are we to expect a nearer halting place for the philosophy of being? Being is as important as force. Who knows how far they may be identical? If being depends upon the Divine Will, our conviction of its continuance ought to depend on our ability to interpret the Divine Will.

The moral aspect of Deity is the one openest to man.

So true is this that Matthew Arnold says all we can know about Deity is as "a power not ourselves making for righteousness."

Matthew Arnold may err by limitation in his analysis of the Divine Being, but he does not err in his selection of *moral* phenomena as the most salient and significant expression of Deity. There is where God is most readily apprehensible, most readily interpretable.

If our being, like force, depends upon the Divine Will, what God *means* by our being should be most readily apprehensible from the moral outlook.

To this complexion will it come at last, that our conviction of the continuance of our being will depend upon our trust in God, and that trust will be increased in

direct ratio as we assimilate our moral being to his.

It was on this foundation that Jesus Christ placed the argument for immortality when questioned by the Sadducees. It was on this foundation that prophets and apostles and fathers rested, and on this foundation men must find conviction as long as the relation between finite and infinite being exists.

Right here is a good point from which to view evidences of immortality from physical manifestations. That method of proof is merely intellectual, and that is its weakness and failure. If its facts are admitted they do not carry its own case very far. The question of immortality is not one of mere survival after death, but of perpetual continuity of existence. Prove communication by physical means with departed spirits, what then? What if there is a "second death"? What if there is a series of catastrophes and crises of being? If "the graves were to stand tenantless and the sheeted dead" were to throng our streets, I do not see but that we should be entitled still to ask the question, How long will they last?

I do not believe they could find any resting place for conviction that their own existence is to be continued except as they can hear the Infinite Author of being say, "Because I live, ye shall live also," and except as they could find some *moral* reason to trust the Infinite Voice.

You may secure communication with spirits, and for all that some catastrophe may take them off, or existence may taper to a point. Beyond the grave there may be still atrophy—consumption of our being. The struggle for existence may be the order of eternity as well as of time, conditioned on success in developing and accumulating moral vitality.

Physical proof, if admitted, has but a short reach over our being, and an infirm grasp, as compared with convictions springing from the moral nature.

The great skepticism which hovers over asserted manifestations comes from the blankness of their moral setting and the barrenness of their moral outcome. They would make a better case if they were pitched in higher moral key and had a better moral mission. To the question—"Cui bono?" morally, it is but a hollow answer that is

returned; it is as vacant as the "Idiot Boy"—on an errand; without a message.

Demonstration of immortality may be too cheap. To unravel the secrets of death by the scrutiny of the senses may not be as grand an exercise as to annul death, as Paul would, by the forces of moral life within you. A mechanical rap cannot come quite up in majesty of rank to the mighty tide of assurance that may roll in upon the soul from moral experience. If existence is a serious matter—if the question of its continuity is one of unsurpassed importance, it would not seem unlike a wise and righteous God to make the road to sure conviction in reference to it to lie over the rugged highlands of morals rather than along the dull flats of materialism, or even along the flowery vales of intellectualism.

If immortality is a great boon it ought to require the highest and the best there is in us to prophesy of it—to compass conviction of its certainty.

The moral method has in it no power of compulsion of an opponent. It can wring no consent from spirits in alien attitude. It is good only for "whom it concerns"—good only to one alive to moral issues—to one who has some confidence in moral powers—to one who can see that all things else are subordinate to moral ends. Is this unsatisfactory? It is simply an application of the principle, true everywhere in the government of God, "To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that he hath."

Over a greater truth—one that to the moral judgment entails this as an incident—is drawn the vinculum, "He charged them that they should tell no man." Why? Conviction upon it is incommunicable. To the babble and clatter of forensic argument on some subjects—Hush! It has no measure of them. At best it can furnish but skeleton for which morals must find flesh and life. The argument for the resurrection of Christ and for our immortality is one to which *nisi prius* rules of evidence are inadequate. It is an argument that is always making in the court of the high moral instincts of the soul as "friend after friend departs"—passes over to the majority, as the soul is guided by the Spirit of Truth to judge

of things to come, and as it trusts upon and has moral participation in the being of "Him who alone hath immortality"—"the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords."

CHAPTER VII.

MORALS AND MIRACLE.

I AM obliged to put at the head of this lecture a word, nearly all the common meanings and definitions of which I discard, and for which I am not prepared to furnish an equivalent word or phrase.

The term has been used to cover certain residuary phenomena, not included in the ordinary onflow of events, which the experience or the philosophy of man has brought before his mind. We shall have to let it stand to cover the same ground.* I mean by miracle—X—the unknown element in certain historic events, notably in the life of Christ.

The views of men about the realm covered by the miracle are undergoing great change—to alter probably yet more.

You might as well attempt to define the potencies of a kaleidoscope as to try to fix by definition what this term suggests to men. It is a curious proceeding to give precise limits to that which eludes comprehension.

Matthew Arnold says the miracle is doomed. True and untrue. True as to the old philosophies of the fact—untrue as to the denial of the fact.

The old notions of the unrelatedness of the miracle to the ordinary regulations of nature will undoubtedly pass away. New views will take their place—to pass away

*In order not to arouse any unnecessary antagonism I have tried to see if I could not dispense with the word agnostic. But on trial, while the terms selected seemed neutral enough, they also seemed flat, insipid, mawkish.

Yet I dislike to put the terms agnostic and agnosticism always in opposition to religion. Sometimes I want to put them in conjunction with it. Now and then, here and there, I want to be agnostic myself. I have concluded that it is better to run some risk of misconstruction of personal attitude rather than to take all pith and point out of the English language.

in their turn, but not, we hope, without leaving some permanent contribution to a better understanding of the miracle.

Much which has been heretofore considered miraculous will disappear from that category altogether. But much must ever remain which will justify the core conception which has always been shut up within this word. Let us take our stand in the center of the miracle system.

We might as well call a great many of the acts done by Jesus of Nazareth miracles, as to call them anything else. We shall probably find no better term to cover the known and unknown elements of many of his deeds.

If it is the intention of Matthew Arnold, or of any one else, to deny these deeds as historic occurrences, then the issue is joined at once.

If Mr. Arnold, or any one, means by his denial of the miracle, to assert the passing away of the former philosophies of the deeds of Jesus, we are at once in an expectant attitude. Give us, O Friend, the new philosophy. We desire above all things the hearing ear.

I suppose the usual understanding of the doom of the miracle to be, that men will no longer believe the existence of the recorded acts of Jesus as historic facts.

I cannot go over the argument corroborative of the existence of such miraculous acts. A world of literature has been evolved on the subject. I can only here express a judgment on the matter.

I know of no way to eliminate the miracles from the life of Jesus any more than I do to eliminate therefrom his doctrines. The one has as solid setting in history as the other.

I have looked over various forms of mythical and tendency hypothesis to account for the historic origin of the miracles of Christ, and I can find no better foundation for such hypotheses than the deliberate attempt to construct history in one's own mind, instead of receiving the history which in fact has been enacted.

It seems to me a denial that Cæsar fought over Gaul and reduced it to subjection to the Roman Empire is just as worthy of reception as the denial that Jesus went up and down Judea and Samaria and Galilee and the regions

beyond Jordan, "healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease among the people," not by medicines, but by word of mouth; as well as "teaching in their synagogues and preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God." I come to this conclusion as a result from *historic* study.

I cannot eliminate as matter of *historic fact* the mastery of Jesus over nature any more than I can eliminate his mastery over moral truth. Thus the matter rests with me as a historic question.

That we have thrown by wholesale into the extreme miraculous much that we shall bring back into the compass, if not of ordinary, yet of extraordinary human possibility, I have no doubt; such as instances of the perception of unuttered thoughts, and even, perhaps, much of physical and mental healing. But when we have corrected our conceptions as far as we can, there will still stretch out beyond our power of analysis much that we can do no better than to call superhuman and supernatural. The mastery of Jesus, beginning in the known and humanly feasible, will be found to extend into the unknown and humanly impossible. If there is a God over the moral universe, the utterances of Jesus fill our idea of kinship with such moral omniscience. If there is a God over the physical universe, the acts of Jesus fill our idea of kinship with such physical omnipotence.

There stand those two potencies in Jesus. They consist. I would as soon refuse credence to the one as to the other, as historic fact.

Then please tell me, as matter of philosophy, why I should reject the miracle and retain the moral truth. The miracles of Christ are no more a "sport" in physics than his ethical demonstration is solitary in morals. The fact is, the moral perception, execution and attitude of Jesus is just as miraculous as his intellectual perception or physical power.

"I do always those things which please Him," is as miraculous on the human plane as "Peace, be still."

I think no fair treatment of the interview of Jesus with the woman at the well in Samaria can do other than to allow that the perception of Jesus as disclosed by the

statement, "Thou hast well said, I have no husband, for thou hast had five husbands, and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband; in that saidst thou truly," stretches out beyond what we can well consider the possibilities of human perception.

But why am I to reject that as fact when there is a moral perception equally wonderful standing by its side which I am to accept, in that famous historic setting? "The hour cometh and now is when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth, for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."

The moral vision runs down as long a vista in this latter case as the intellectual in the former. Yet men are called upon to trust to the truth of the latter and discard the verity of the former.

The mastery in the one realm is not more inherently incredible than in the other. We never stop to think of the miraculousness of this moral insight. Its results have become so common to us that we accept them as a thing of course, much like the air we breathe.

But what must it have been to have uttered this moral truth at its time, between Jerusalem and Gerizim! The idea of sacredness in locality is deep rooted. Think of Gerizim; of Jerusalem, holding fast not only the "earnest expectation" of the Jew, but even now of the Christian so far as he hopes for a personal return of the Lord to the earth; of Mecca, toward which the devout millions of Mahometans turn five times each day in prayer; of the shrines of the cultured Greeks, as at Ephesus; of the Manitous of the Indian savage.

Then think of the spirituality of Christ's conception of the Divine being. What is here eludes us much as civilization eludes the savage. We have no comprehension for its wonderfulness. Then find what adumbrations of the truth you please, who is it that solitary and alone has brought the world to feel that God is a Father? Certainly not Confucius, certainly not Buddha. Neither had a God. We shall, in obedience to manuscript authority, rule out the troubling of the pool at Bethesda, but

we shall rule in and forever hold as historic fact that to a helpless invalid at that pool Jesus said, "Take up thy bed and walk," and that "immediately the man was made whole and took up his bed and walked."

There may be a glimmering of the possibility that that deed lies within the plane of human power. But that will not constitute the reason why we shall hold it.

The moral teaching of Jesus consequent upon this visit to the pool of Bethesda has no setting at all—it is hung in mid-heaven unless connected with some such fact as this miracle of healing. But that will scarcely constitute the real reason why we shall receive the miracle.

The miracle of the healing becomes credible when you consider the miracle of the teaching in connection with it. Whether *was* it easier to say—"My Father worketh up to this time"—a conception the reception of which seems very hard in all quarters unto this present day, to none more so than to some scientists—or to say, "Arise, take up thy bed and walk"?

The moral insight that posited the moral and intellectual truth respecting the action of God is as great a miracle as the mastery of forces that made the lame man to leap and to walk.

Daniel Webster, in the fullness of his powers, with all the solemnity possible to his great nature, wrote and signed with his own hand this statement: "The sermon on the mount cannot be a merely human production." Matthew Hale Carpenter was not content to die till he had said that as between Jesus and other moral teachers the difference was not only one of degree, but of kind.

There is but *one* sermon on the mount—but *one* sermon that sweeps the moral gamut of humanity.

That sermon is as lone a phenomenon in the moral history of humanity as the resurrection of its author from the dead is in its physical history.

But the sermon on the mount, with its clarity of outreach beyond the scope of the moral vision of man, is *here*—it is a *fact*. According to as good a judge of evidence as Mr. Webster, it is incredible as a deliverance from a human basis. We have something in the moral realm, then, transcending human powers—something miraculous.

Because we have repeated the words of this sermon from childhood we seem to think that it is part of us—that somehow it belongs to our sphere of things. But we forget what it must have been to have uttered it originally; we forget its hold on the moral nature of man to the exclusion of all other utterances.

But if we have something beyond man here, we may expect it elsewhere. The door once open is open. Given this mastery in one department, and a presumption is raised in favor of mastery in others. The mastery is *fact* in one case and history posits as absolutely mastery in the other. "Around about every psychological question," says H. W. Beecher, "there has been the whirling hurricane of infinite discussion, but is there one ethical truth taught by the Lord Jesus Christ that was ever made the subject of debate?" Mastery in morals, perpetual, enduring, *is* removed in *kind* from the human lot. But it is *fact*.

That Christ should be raised from the dead—that he should demonstrate the continuity of his life after passing through death—shows no greater mastery in physics than the sole control which he acquires over the moral nature of man. All men are satisfied to be called Christian. They will rebel against being termed disciples of Wesley or Calvin or Luther or Apollos or Paul, but to be named Christian meets the universal desire. This latter fact, which we know to be true, ought to be rejected for its uniqueness—ought to be rejected because we have nothing else like it. I do not see why the mind of man should not be as open to receive evidence of superhuman physical power in Christ as evidence of superhuman moral power. If it be true that he did what no man else ever did in morals, i. e., met every moral issue with perfect adjustment, I see no reason for rejecting evidence just as good that he did in physics what no man else ever did—that he alone was perfect master there.

There is this strong tie connecting the acts of Jesus in both departments—both were in the interest of harmony in this system.

The moral efforts of the Savior were for the production of moral symphony. F. D. Maurice says: "The

miracles of the Savior were acts for the restoration of order, not for the disturbance of it." With that conception we can dismiss all that has been said pro and con about a miracle as a "violation of the laws of nature." In Jesus' hands physical miracle was restoration of that which had violated nature's laws to the pristine conformity thereto.

His moral power was exerted to the same end. If you say things occur only by law and by that mean that there is a constant stream of recurrence of the same or similar phenomena, then we must throw overboard the moral demonstration of Jesus, for there is no stream of recurrence of the same or similar phenomena. There has not been a stream of Christs. There was no stream of moral influences leading up to him of which he was the necessary culmination. He appeared—that is the most you can say.

I see nothing to interfere with belief in miracle except some of the bigotries of modern physical science.

As if religion had not made sorry enough exhibition of itself in bigotry, science must repeat its folly. And is not this a thing for which we want always to be on the watch—the superstition and bigotry of the human mind wherever it makes excursion?

The trick of making a single thought or view, to the exclusion of all other considerations, a basis of all philosophy for the universe marks the bigotry of science as it has marked the bigotry of religion.

Many of our special scientists are as fine examples of bigotry as religion ever afforded in its darkest days. They have just as good a disposition to dictate the philosophical situation from the single base of their departments of research as ever reigned in the breast of an ecclesiastic to shut the mouth of investigation or philosophy with a verse of scripture, and show equal ability in wrenching the scripture of their departments to their "private interpretation."

I know of no greater bigotry than that which bristles forth from behind certain terms, which are always in the mouth of certain scientists—"The constancy of nature" and "The immutability of law."

Mr. Huxley says, "The constancy of nature has become the guiding conception of modern thought."

Indeed! What becomes of evolution? That has some standing in scientific circles. And what is the doctrine of evolution but the doctrine of constant change in nature and of increasing variability in law?

If evolution be true, and Herbert Spencer knows anything about evolution, then instead of constancy in nature, we have a constant progression from "homogeneousness" toward "heterogeneousness"—toward unlikeness to that which has been before. It is this aspect of the *variability* of nature, of the occurrence in it of what has never been known before, that is just the one thing upon which science is causing attention to be fastened. Mr. Darwin has built up a philosophy of the whole development of vegetable and animal life upon this globe, from time no matter how ancient, by the principle of variation, i. e., that something is here that never was here before and never will be again, or, that "appeareth," "endureth for a while" and then "vanisheth." He accounts partially and justly for variation in species by the manipulating power of changed environment on changed organism. *But why there is change in the environment and why there is susceptibility to change in the organism he cannot say.* He can do no better than common people do when they call a marked change "a sport," that is, recognize the fact of change.

This is true—the *principle of change is here*. You can do no better than to say that *variability is the most constant factor* in the actual working of this universe.

"The constancy of nature" and "the invariability of law" are the fetichisms of "a creed outworn" in science. They had no higher origin than a philosophy which attempted to explain the universe from the pots and bottles of lifeless and thoughtless matter on the shelves of a chemical laboratory, or the dead tissues of a dissecting room, or the wedges and windlasses of mechanics. Such philosophy was only hypothetically true even then. *If* a cubic foot of soil or of atmosphere had the same elements as any other it would show the same analysis. But as matter of fact there is not a cubic foot of soil or air, the whole

world round, that is like any other foot, and no foot of either that is like itself any two successive instants.

Variation, variation everywhere—that is the demonstration made in the actual working of the problem of the universe. Mr. Huxley may say, “The constancy of the order of nature is the common ground of all scientific thought”—there is no such constancy. There never has been and there never will be any such constancy, if experience and evolution are true. There may be a constant factor, but that is but *one* of the factors in the onflow of events. No two leaves of the forest are alike. Among all the innumerable hosts of the human race no man ever confounded himself with any other individual, even with his own father, or mistook himself for his own progeny. Where likeness has been most like there has always been an impassable gulf of difference—difference that, like Melchizedek of old, is without father or mother, to human knowledge or human inquisition. The miracle meets you in every man and in every thing?

There are always and everywhere increments of newness, and it is upon these increments that I wish to fasten attention.

What are they? What do they mean? We say causes are adequate to their effects. But that is a logical proposition true only in logic. Practically we do not know the totality of the cause of any effect. By just as much as there is newness in the effect, by so much what we call its cause was inadequate to its production. In one way of looking at the matter, it is better to do as Mr. Mill does—speak of antecedents and consequents instead of causes and effects.

Given antecedents, and if consequents differ from them—as they do where anything is done in this world—and you have: Antecedents + unknown elements producing newness = consequents. It is the unknown elements we want to look at and see how they are managed in the universe. What a figure the unknown element has made!

Here is the earth,

“And the old rolling skies.”

Yet earth and skies are a different thing from what

they were at a point remote in time, yet not so remote as to be beyond the range of the imagination or the compass of the judgment.

"There rolls the deep where grew the tree,
O earth, what changes thou hast seen!
There where the long street roars, hath been
The stillness of the central sea.

"The hills are shadows, and they flow
From form to form, and nothing stands;
They melt like mist, the solid lands,
Like clouds they shape themselves and go."

Take the vision of chemical astronomy and look at the dissipated fire mist, not yet even nebulous, and then look at what is here, and you can get a conception of the importance of this element of newness in the universe problem.

Look at your nebulous matter, and then at what we have, and ask yourself whether the constant or the variant has determined the universe.

Professor Gray says: "In each variation lies hidden the mystery of a beginning." That mystery is as fresh a fact to-day as at any point of time in the history of the universe. The unknown element is here working what else would be the sullen obduracy of sameness into the fresh flexibility of progression. If we had the history of these beginnings before us—of this newness—we should have a massive theme of contemplation. It is curious how it is managed now along all planes.

Sometimes you find a new moral and intellectual condition of society. It comes about in a generation—in a few years—so that what has been ceases to be and cannot be restored. Sometimes the gardener finds a new variety of plant—marked, unmistakable in its newness. How it has come to his hands he knows not. It has gathered into itself a wonderful sum of potency out of that unknown principle—tendency to variation.

But take now the principle of the origin of species by variation, as set forth by Mr. Darwin.

The sum of the variations is simply the sum of the successive increments of that unknown element of new-

ness. It makes no difference whether the gap between species is passed at a bound or by successive small increments of newness. It is the newness that bridges the chasm. This element seems to have been worked and to be worked to-day under all varieties of tension. Uniformitarianism is not true and never was. There is a line of proof decisive of that from the "sport" in the garden to the glacial debris beneath our feet, but once distributed from a plundered world.

Sometimes processes are hurried, sometimes they loiter in time. But swift or slow, there always accompanies them an element of *origination*. This element meets you everywhere.

Mr. Huxley says he would as soon speak of aquosity in water as of the life-principle in protoplasm. He says that as water is the product of the properties of oxygen and hydrogen, so the life of protoplasm is due to the properties of its chemical constituents.

The tendency to leap over a world of facts without noticing them—to fail "to distinguish things that differ"—is very marked in agnostic scientists. To begin with, on the discovery of protoplasm, how soon we had a materialistic or azoic formula for the life problem! Eureka! It is all plain! Protoplasm is composed of oxygen, carbon, hydrogen and nitrogen. Protoplasm exhibits life, therefore life is a property resultant from the composition of these four elements. The world has been filled with the proclamation of that formula. It has become the A B C of agnostic babyhood.

It turns out, however, that you might as well have a mastodon before you as a bit of protoplasm, so complicated is its composition. All the elements seem to be in protoplasm that can be detected in the bodies built from it, or it has the power of selecting from other sources the elements it wants. Protoplasm is not such a simple A B C, after all.

It has the Iliad in it.

Then, if you would do justice to the science of water, you will acknowledge that it has a property—aquosity—which is not wholly due to the properties, separate or aggregate, of oxygen and hydrogen.

There is a *tertium* and even a *quartum quid* in that matter. Oxygen and hydrogen would not manifest aquosity, if they abode together an eternity, unless they were operated upon by that mysterious potency, called energy, derived from some extraneous source; and not then unless the external power group their atoms in a particular, defined, predetermined way.

The horosity—the time-keeping element of a clock is not due simply to the bits of brass, wood and iron of which it is composed. Force from an extraneous source has to be applied to them to bring out the element of horosity. Force from an extraneous source has to be applied to oxygen and hydrogen to bring out aquosity. You can get neither horosity nor aquosity, *even then*, unless the elements in each case are adjusted in a definite, prescribed way. If you apply your external force to brass, wood and iron, they will not keep time unless certain intellectual conceptions are met in their adjustment.

There is just as good evidence that external force applied to oxygen and hydrogen will not bring out aquosity unless the force falls in with a particular preadjustment of atoms of those elements to the particular end in view, and is itself of just such numerical stress. You can have something beside aquosity out of the combination of oxygen and hydrogen.

But oxygen and hydrogen united *just so*, by *external force*, of just such register, will give aquosity.

The idea of aquosity in water is as patentable as the idea of horosity in a clock. The newness of the product consequent upon intellectual arrangement I think the United States Supreme Court would pronounce as manifest in the one case as in the other. To say that the aquosity of water is due to the properties of oxygen and hydrogen is not only to leave out of account known facts, but it is to conceal from view the most significant features of the problem.

If miracle is regarded as exhibiting the control of nature by mind, there is the essence of miracle in H_2O .

Professor T. C. Chamberlin is right in his position that the problem of nature is one of *involution* as well as of evolution.

In this involution constantly goes along origination, or out of nature the new could never come.

That the gap between matter and life was filled by potencies in matter I think may be declared inconceivable.

One may make such a proposition in words, but I think the words fail to evoke a responsive conception from thought. But be it that life has been brought out from matter somewhat as the kinds of life have been differentiated by their various increments of newness from antecedent life. You have then the new increment in the origin of life to be accounted for, or a line of increments in matter tending to such origination. You have the great "sport" of the universe—life—before you; something which was not and yet is—something which no conception of physical antecedents or causes encloses.

So it is with any of the steps forward in the history of the progress of the differentiation of species—notably so with man. Here is man. He was not. There is that in him that earth and all beasts added together could not cause—do not account for. It makes no difference whether he came by his newness in this system of things at a bound, or received it by successive infinitesimal increments. The increments summed up make man—a new creature.

I grant an element of constancy in nature. I only object to the dogmatism and bigotry which erect that principle, how much soever it may be, into an *a priori* principle of philosophy, regulative of the possibilities of the universe. It, as such, is false as philosophy because false as fact.

The one o'ermastering view which the history of the universe forces upon us is the amount of its change, its flexibility and its possibilities of variation—its miracles of newness distributed or concentrated in time.

What right one has to pass dogmatically upon the deeds of Christ, and to rule them out as incredible in obedience to a notion of the fixity of things, may be seen when we have a judgment, by a seer therein, in respect to a department in which we think things most inexorably fixed. Professor Clifford says: "We have no reason for believing that the known laws of geometry and

mechanics are exactly and absolutely true at present, or that they have even been approximately true for any period of time further than we have direct evidence of."

I do not assent to Professor Clifford's view in the matter immediately before him. But with such testimony before us of the possibilities of variation even in the laws of geometry and mechanics, we shall not worship immutable law in the realm of nature, where variation and "sport" are the inductions of science and the actualities of experience. By the side of Professor Clifford's notion of flexibility we put John Stuart Mill's assertion that "there is no *a priori* ground to judge miracles impossible."

So also Mr. Huxley. He says it is a question of evidence. The foundation of our confidence in nature is not then in any immutable constancy, for there is no such thing, but *in the conviction that its changes are rationally conducted*. The clue that leads the scientist to his discoveries is his certainty that he is following in the track of mind. The most *rational* supposition is the one he always makes to precede his experiments. Mr. Huxley expected to find a five-toed horse not at all from confidence in the constancy of nature, but from the confidence that the variability of nature would be worked along rational lines. The constancy of nature does not produce a five and then a four and then a three and then a one-toed horse. But if it produces a five-toed horse it produces a five-toed horse. When Mr. Huxley, living in the day of one-toed horse, said he expected to find a fossil five-toed horse, it was because he could run up, not a line of constancy, *but a line of variability rationally worked*. If the constancy of the order of nature *is* the guiding conception of science, it is just because of the constancy belonging to *order* considered as an intellectual method.

That Jesus rose from the dead is no more improbable than that life should be on this planet at all. That is a resurrection from the dead—a resurrection in its first beginning—a resurrection in all those small increments which mark the progress of differentiation.

If you take away the element of time you are face to face with as blank a miracle in the one case as in the other.

I do not know why duration of time should detract from the wonderfulness of any process. I do not know why the shortening in of a process should detract from its credibility.

You do not believe the miracle of turning water into wine?

Well, the wine is here in nature now, is it not? Look back over material history to the dissipation of the elements of matter in space. Now where is wine? The original fire mist is as sorry a "promise and potency" of wine as "six watering pots holding two or three firkins apiece, filled with water to the brim."

You have got your wine in nature by a series of *originations* in nature, all the way from fire mist to the grape and the yeast torula, as absolute as any "Draw out now and bear."

I do not see but that the equations in both cases are identical, except the factor of time in the first instance. The common formula is: Elements + originations = wine.

The whole problem of the universe may be stated thus for any point in time: What there was + originations = what is; or put the other way: What is — originations = what was. Look at what was and at what is, and see how mighty is the element of change—change effected at all rates of motion from slow revolving cycles to lightning stroke.

The fact is, so far from saying creation *was*, we should say creation *is*, or is becoming. Here I may say that I do not care whether the originations of which I speak spring from within this system or without it—whether they are immanent or transcendent. Here they are. The new threads may come in from existing machinery, but they make a new figure in the carpet.

I see no necessity of making any essential difference between a miracle, and what is called a law of nature. Both show the same thing, to wit, that there is a mind master of nature. I do not think there is any dividing line between miracle and law, marking where one leaves off and the other begins.

It is all one line, law, providence general or special, and

miracle—positive, comparative, and superlative degrees of one and the same thing. Sum up the originations under law and you have a miracle as marked as any posited in the history of Christ. You see design in miracle, you see design in law, because both speak of the control exercised by mind. If

“The habits of God are the laws of the world,”

still it is true that God does very much that he is not in the habit of doing, or as he did not do before.

“Behold, I make all things new” is as true as anything else in the management of the universe. Sometimes God takes time for his new processes; sometimes he hurries them to sudden conclusions. Miracle may be to law only as paroxysmal evolution to uniformitarianism. The two latter terms set forth facts. The ontogenesis and phylogenesis of Heckel may illustrate the difference between miracle and law. According to evolution itself, processes are hurried to completion in the embryonic condition of higher life which it took all geologic history to produce according to law on lower planes. The process of embryonic recapitulation, as Cope, I think, has happily termed it, is miraculous as compared with the long history of which it is a summary.

I do not believe that the progress of science can be toward the destruction of credence in the miracles of Christ. If those miracles are regarded as simply showing the presence of nature’s master, then science, in all that it is doing, is laying foundations for their credibility.

What is science itself doing but showing that nature has a master and that that master is everywhere bespeaking himself? If miracle shows the dominancy of mind over matter, that is what all science itself is doing. It has done nothing if it has not shown the flexibility of nature before the intent of a ruling mind.

Science has pushed out from unusual phenomena, the presence and power of mind, into ordinary phenomena. It has not abolished miracle, but has spread it over the whole universe. If some startled Jacob has cried out, “Surely God was in *this* place and I knew it not,” science has more quietly said, “But he is in *this* place, and *this*, and *this*,

and you may know it, if you will patiently look at the tokens of his government." Science has simply carried the presence of God from the burning bush to bushes not on fire. It has found intent in the ordinary as well as the extraordinary event, and that *intent* is the core of every miracle.

No matter if science is slow about pronouncing what is the specific intent in ordinary occurrence, that is of no consequence so long as the intent is there.

We shall surrender the miracle just exactly when we surrender the notion of government by law; for they are simply the upper and the nether reaches of one and the same great fact—the government of the universe by mind. So far from law being the grave of miracle, it is the lap in which it is nursed. If we see in nature the ordinary methodical operations of mind, we shall also expect to see *jeux d'esprit, coups d'etat*.

When the miracle goes, design in nature will go—law will go as an impression of mind upon nature. The infidel scientists become as rabid over the idea of design in law as over miracle. They are not content short of the erasure of the evidences of mind from the universe.

They will go as far out of their way to convict nature of mindlessness, as to convict religion of credulity in belief in the miracle.

We are told that the universe is not governed by mind, but by mechanical laws. As if that which is sought to be excluded did not reappear inevitably in each term of the atheistic formula.

If there is any law about the matter there is mind about it.

Science sees the law because it detects intellectual arrangement. Where there is not such intellectual arrangement science sees nothing or chaos. Mechanical laws! Is the term mechanical equivalent to mindless? Tell a mechanic that there is no mind about his operations if you dare. Does not mechanism bespeak mind? I am very glad to acknowledge that the universe is mechanically wrought. From the atoms to galaxies you do see mechanics. Clerk Maxwell says the atoms are stamped with the evidences of *fabrication*. I am very willing to

allow evolution as the mode of fabrication of the universe. I am very willing also to take up the slur of Herbert Spencer on the theistic solution of the universe, as the "carpenter theory of creation." When Clerk Maxwell says the baldest elements of matter are stamped as carpenter work, Mr. Spencer may wrestle with Clerk Maxwell. Evolution has done carpenter work, carpenter-wise. Mr. Huxley says what entranced him in physiology was the "mechanical engineering" exhibited.

You cannot put out theism and its long line of manifestation in law, providence, miracle, by "mechanical laws."

We talk about the natural and the supernatural. That is a distinction we do not want to press very closely. The more we confound those terms, the more wholesome will be our processes.

Given design in nature, and the natural at once becomes the supernatural, evidences the supernatural, becomes throughout the theater of the supernatural. Given that designing mind, and from its base everything is natural. Given Jesus as an emanation from that controlling mind and power, and all he does is natural. It is what is born of that plane. On that plane the feeding of the five thousand is in keeping with the bringing forth of seed time and harvest, summer and winter, heat and cold, over the life of the race of man. The whole onflow of nature is supernatural.

The supernatural in religion is simply what is natural on the moral line. There is no inherent, essential difference between natural and revealed religion. The latter should be regarded only as a concentration or culmination of the other.

As natural law is to miracle, so is natural religion to revealed religion.

The whole intercourse of the spirit of God with man, as known in moral sensation, is supernatural to any plane lower than the moral nature—there it is natural. President Mark Hopkins says: "Any manifestation of God as personal is substantially a miracle." There is this perpetual manifestation of God as personal in all moral sensation.

Is God limited to this realm? Is there not an irresistible tendency to the expectation that God will find expression of himself at some junctures, some connecting points of this with other realms?—that the God of design in nature will show himself one and the same with the God of design in morals—that the two realms will be demonstrated to converge to the focus of *one mind*?

There is but one God of the universe and that, I think, is *a*, perhaps *the* reason why belief in the miracles of Christ will never be destroyed.

Look over old philosophy and see what a struggle there has been to compass the $\tau\acute{o}\ \xi\nu$ (The One) and the $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ (The All)—to secure the firm conviction of unity in the system.

That is a longing which lies behind every system of religion and compels it ultimately to posit a system of philosophy.

It is in vain, I think, for any one to take the position that he will accept the ultimate mastery of Jesus in religion and discard his mastery over nature.

That ultimate mastership in morals will cease to be ultimate there or it will carry over conviction of omnipotence in the other realm. Men will not rest satisfied with a divided universe, nor will they trust they have found the absolute source in morals, till they find it one with the absolute intelligence and power.

Take away confidence in respect to the latter matter, and in respect to the former men will cry with aching, vacant hearts, "Who will show us any truth?"

I know that the sanctions of no moral truth as such rest or can rest on any physical act or exhibition of power. But behind the completeness of moral sanctions in themselves for moral ends lies this craving of the soul for $\tau\acute{o}\ \xi\nu$, and $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, in which all ends shall be gathered.

The moral realm is not a thing hung in mid-heavens, unrelated, having connection with nothing else. All things must center back, to be gathered up in ONE, to satisfy the mind and heart of man.

Men will not rest in an unrelated God over their moral nature. It is only a God over the totality of things whom they will call "blessed forever."

No, there is but one God, and whoever emanates from him and declares his absolute truth and enacts his absolute righteousness, may be expected to show forth a mastery in force that will indicate his kinship with that which lies behind all things and which we call Omnipotence.

We shall dismiss the miracle when we believe in no God, or in two gods, one for the physical world and one for the moral nature of man, for the miracle in the hands of Jesus is the tie which binds these two realms inseparably in *one*.

Miracles may not give force to moral sanctions, but the heart does long to know if he who gave the moral "promises" is the same as he who "rolls the stars along"—if the power not ourselves making for righteousness can enforce itself in the material realm. We might reach this result by experiential and philosophic induction, perhaps; but that process is long—men get bewildered in it. But there is no mistake about the matter when the Master of morals says to the winds and the waves, "Peace, be still," and there is a "great calm."

The physical miracles of Jesus are ultimately as necessary to science as his moral miracles to religion. Science owes everything to the conviction of the unity of the guiding mind over this system. The trust that it is everywhere following *one* intellectual clue is the secret inspiration of all its power. That trust has open demonstration of its truth in the double mastery united in the person of Jesus. Says F. D. Maurice:—

"The illumination of the paths of physical science has surely come to men, and may come in greater brightness still, from the faith that he who awakens and guides the thoughts of his children towards the kingdom of peace and righteousness, is the same who teaches them to explain the secret *order* of his visible kingdom, that he may be glorified in both."

Here let it be said that if science can demonstrate that the "*order* of the visible kingdom" is evolution, it will do a great service for religion. That principle recalls God from retracy, from abdication, and makes him once more regnant—makes him a *living* God as freshly engaged in

the problems of the universe as at any moment in its history.

It will also demonstrate for philosophy a great desideratum—"the mobilization of the infinite." Of course I use evolution as including the *involution* posited by Professor Chamberlin as set forth above.

You will perceive that I have adhered closely to the miracles of Christ in this discussion.

I have purposely done so because it seems to me the miracle system there culminates. From him either way it insensibly fades away into the less demonstrative forms of providence and law.

Not that now and then there is not a stroke of demonstration before which the mind must pause and recognize that the smoothly running machine is not all, but that there is mind that operates it, however smoothly it may run.

It is remarkable how little of what may be called miracle there is in that part of the New Testament which is concerned with events after Christ left this material stage of action, in fact remarkable how little of miracle there is in the Bible throughout. Take Paul; there is almost nothing of the miraculous about him, in the sense in which you use the term in regard to Christ.

You are often in a border land with Paul where you cannot exactly tell whether you have passed the borderless limit of law or not, and have come out where mind is so evidently regnant that you can realize nothing but its presence and its will.

This, however, is evident on comparison of the two classes. Christ's mind is an original operant power. Paul is rather operated on by the unseen mind.

I should not want to deny the miraculous in Paul's conversion, both on the physical and the moral side. I should not want to assert it very vehemently.

There has been no adequate attempt to push up into explanation of that affair the ordinary operations of the Divine Spirit and of Omnipotence.

To my view it makes no difference about that matter. God was there. Paul became convinced of that.

If there was miracle in Paul's moral experience at that

time, then the history of man is so full of experiences so similar in kind that one would be praised for courage rather than discretion who should deny the continuation of miracles on the moral line. But beyond this affair on the road to Damascus, I do not remember anything that need be essentially distinguished as physically miraculous in Paul's career.

But if you do not see the miracle, the eye is blind that does not see the quieter demonstration of providence over Paul's career and in his influence over human history.

When you go back in history before Christ, naturalism and rationalism may reduce much that has been regarded as miraculous to a lower form. But still there will remain much that stood in its day and will stand to all time as the forth-gleaming of mind from behind nature, demonstrated in providence and miracle.

The wind blew as naturally over the sea (Red? or Mediterranean?) on a certain night long, long ago, as it did a few years since up Niagara River laying bare the water mains of the city of Buffalo, supposed to have been laid deep enough to avoid all untoward contingencies in nature. But somehow on that night of old a nation was there to march in the path of that wind, and from that night march a new face was put on human history.

It was thought then, and it will be thought to the end of time, that that kind of management of men and of the forces of nature indicated the control of this world and of all its inhabitants by a living mind in whose hands is all power. On that night,

"Out of darkness came the hands

That reach through nature moulding men."

The history of man is too full of management like that to allow any whole-minded man to deny the presence of mind behind nature, bursting up at times to full miracle height.

Do you laugh over the story of the falling of the walls of Jericho, at the sounding of the rams' horns of Joshua? Do you laugh when you read of famished, stricken, beleaguered Leyden, standing in the breach for human liberty, the relentless Spaniard wreathing it round with

cobra grip, being delivered, strangest of all, by the falling of its walls? Do you laugh at that strange coincidence, that the very thing which laid the city open to the power of the enemy struck him with panic, so that he fled in dismay? The walls down—the city open to the invader—and the enemy—gone.

The man is to be pitied who, looking at such a transaction, cannot say that there are *some* things done in this world which admit of no explanation but the watchful care of the Lord God of Hosts.

Look down at Hampton Roads, if you please, at as late a date as March 8, 1862.

The Merrimac has come out of Norfolk Harbor—has had her will with the Union navy, burnt and sunk as she listed. One day's work more will give the southern confederacy an open port, the freedom of the seas, and the right to recognition from the nations of the globe.

The morning dawns and the Merrimac comes forth to do that day's work. Was it done? What prevented it? Two guns. Where? In a nondescript craft that had dropped into harbor over night as if from God out of heaven.

The anxious nation had not heard such a thing was in existence. If the people had heard of it they would have laughed it to scorn. Yet there it was, and its two guns fire "shots heard round the world," and make history.

The Monitor, like Excalibur, came from the sea and went to the sea again. It will figure in coming story and song as Excalibur or the mantle of Elijah.

There is too much of such work done in the world to allow the denial of miracles.

In the crises of men God concentrates his management to crisis.

That has been, it is, it ever will be. There they are—the Red Sea, Jericho, Leyden, and the Monitor in Hampton Roads, and the history of man other than it would be without them. Is there *design* in the universe? Exactly. Well, these are prominent places in the long plan.

That is a tough story of what happened when Elijah and the priests of Baal met to try conclusions on Mount Carmel.

How much of embellishment has crept into the history of the case in the course of ages of transcription, I know not. But I believe that enough occurred there to bring out in bold relief the fact, which was needed, that there was a "God in Israel" and that he controlled the forces of nature. And truly what is there incredible about this case?

The forces of the universe are operated in the *long run* against idolatry and "whatsoever loveth and maketh a lie"; why not in the *short run* sometimes—in the crucial moments of history? "Fire and hail, snow and vapor, stormy wind fulfilling his word" modify in the ordinary course of nature the mental and moral condition of man. Why under extraordinary conditions may they not be made to secure the same ends?

Why may not God sometimes park his artillery as well as to fire piece by piece over a long line?

A bolt from a clear sky is not an unknown thing in the physical manipulation or the moral procedure of God; why else is the expression proverb on all tongues?

May not the heavens gather their powers for one blow that shall confound wrong, as well as to dole out its retributions infinitesimally?

No man is in condition to pass judgment on this subject of miracles unless he brings to the matter *the consideration of the moral situation and moral discernment*.

The indictment that may be laid against the materialistic agnostics is that they judge of highest matters on the lowest plane. They rule out all the testimony that is significant and pass judgment on the poor inconsequential remainder. You have no right to judge of the resurrection of Lazarus or of that of Jesus from the simple naturalistic point of view. That does not furnish the whole elements of the case—in fact, scarce a point pertinent to it. It is like passing judgment on matters in the evolved universe from the condition of unassociated atoms. The crowning evidence in respect to miracles comes from the moral horizon. The evidence from that quarter, as it can be gathered, is not all in. It comes in as men learn to sing the new song of moral harmony with God. Moral evidence is ancillary—witness not *of* the fact but *for* the fact.

Given precisely the same antecedents or causes in nature, and you may expect the same or substantially equivalent consequents or effects.

Given the same status to Jesus as to any other man, and he might have staid in his tomb.

But the state of Jesus is everywhere at an immeasurable remove from that of any other man.

Professor Gray says: "The very reasons on which scientific men reject miracles for the carrying on of nature may operate in favor of miracles to attest *the incomming of the supernatural for moral ends.*"

The misery of the case is that the materialist scientists dismiss the moral problem entirely from view.

Any woman, poor, old and ignorant, who has meditated upon the significance of her moral experiences has as good a capital in hand with which to pass upon the credibility of miracles, or from which to erect a philosophy of the universe, as any learned materialistic scientist whose vision is confined to material things.

The miracles of Jesus show him the ally of that power who gives the increment of newness to every event—show, just what we want to know, that the highest power is lodged with the highest moral capacity.

They lay the foundation for the conviction our whole being craves to reach, that power and righteousness belong to ONE. They coincide with the conclusion which we draw from the whole long history of man, that *nature* is managed for *moral ends*.

NOTE I. "The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by man, without a moral object, is apt to be confused with that of its being done by God with an adequate moral object.

"The former is immeasurably great; the latter is only equal to that of the theory of theism, i. e., nil."

ROMANES.—*Thoughts on Religion.*

The matter may also be put in this way: The antecedent improbability against the truth of the miracles recorded as performed by Jesus Christ will depend upon whether those miracles are viewed in a moral setting or not. I should not believe them if they were recorded of an ordinary man who had no moral purpose and mission. But they are credible to me when I see them as part and parcel of the

most unique moral demonstration the world has seen or will see. I do not view the miracle as testimony to the moral mission so much as its necessary accompaniment.

NOTE 2. Herbert Spencer is authority for the statement that Mr. Huxley had reservations in his mind as to evolution till he saw Professor Marsh's specimens indicative of the ancestry of the horse. Thereafter he accepted the doctrine without reserve.

Simply saying that I think Mr. Huxley's judgment in this case was correct, yet I want to call attention to the psychological process out of which the judgment was made up. Mr. Huxley had less than a half dozen points in the geological and biological processes, extending over say ten million years of time, over the duration of the tertiary epoch, on which to pivot his inference.

I do not find a greater strain on my credulity, when the whole theistic and moral situation is taken together with the physical, in accepting the miracles of Jesus Christ than I do in striding across geological æons with Mr. Huxley, carrying with me a thread of conviction that the eocene orohippus with his four toes, and a splint indicative of a fifth further back in time, was the ancestor of the one-toed horse of to-day.

Here I wish to say that the right of private judgment is spread over both domains. I cannot compel Mr. Huxley to accept my judgment on the miracles, neither can he compel any one to accept his judgment on the ancestry of the horse.

But I shall not surrender to Mr. Huxley my judgment as to the fact of the supremacy of Jesus Christ in nature as well as in ethics. On this ground, even if he is my equal, still I am his. Doubtless here he withheld his testimony for reasons satisfactory to himself, and for reasons satisfactory to myself my testimony will be given.

NOTE 3. In his very last public utterance, Mr. Spencer, as also does Weisman, puts natural selection in antagonism to design. This seems to me an illogical procedure.

Natural selection is a method of operation. Design mainly looks over work wrought and says it gives the impression of intent. To put these principles against each other is to say—if you know the tool with which a result is wrought, therefore there can be no design, no intent in it.

NOTE 4. The current seems now to set against belief in the miraculous or virgin birth of the Savior.

If one has a belief in the resurrection, he will have no trouble

about the virgin birth. If there was such crowning miracle as the resurrection from the dead, at the end of the career of Jesus, there is no reason why it should not have begun with miracle. Denying the miraculous birth and accepting the resurrection is not logical, to say the least.

CHAPTER VIII.

MORALS AND SPIRITISM.

THE matter before us is the claim of communication with and from spirits in another world, life or state of being. The claim that such communication can be made and is made is not new. In all stages of human history and among all races there have been believers in such communication, and the belief has had its cultus of some sort.

But within the memory of the present generation this belief has come into a prominence which, in recent centuries, it has not before publicly enjoyed. I wish to discuss this movement of the last quarter of a century, its influence and attitudes.

I prefer to use the term spiritism, to cover the ground in view.

The terms spiritualism, spirituality, spiritualist, spiritualistic cover another realm of meaning and ought to be preserved for their own realm. They suggest in philosophy belief in the dominance of mind over matter. Spiritualism there is the antithesis of materialism.

In religion these terms are suggestive of the genius of ethics. Spirituality there is the soul of morals.

There may be spiritualists who are not spiritists at all. It is to be believed that there are spiritists who are also spiritualists.

But spiritism is the proper term to apply to that system of claimed communication with departed spirits which has sprung into existence in the last twenty-five years. How to discuss this matter profitably in the limits of an hour's lecture has greatly perplexed me. I have finally concluded to let the intent to tell why I am not a spiritist hover over my mind in what I have to say. I do this because I shall thus easiest preserve myself from polemic attitude, and because in this way I may be best able to help those perplexed about spiritism.

There is a place in the treatment of this subject, perhaps,

for denunciation and satire. But they ought not to be too prominently employed. Conditions change. A generation of children have grown up under the tuition of spiritism.

These children are bound to the system not only by the force of such evidence as the system itself has afforded them but by all their reverence for fathers and mothers who have given their adhesion to it. The matter may need firm handling, but more and more will there be need of kindness and sympathy in its treatment.

I do not wonder at spiritism—that we spring startled at any rap—that the ear questions every sound.

This is a grief-wrung world.

“There is no flock, however watched and tended,
But one dead lamb is there;
There is no fireside, howsoe’er defended,
But has one vacant chair.”

I do not wonder at spiritism. This is a great universe. There is much that is unknown in it.

I do not wonder that the two things—the sorrow and the marvel—are put together. They always have been put together. Always, as grief pressed and the unknown close hovered, spiritism has been rife.

The religion of Africa is spiritism. The practical religion of China is spiritism. Confucius himself said spirits were “to be respected, but to be kept at a distance.” The Turanian is always a spiritist. Spiritism seems to me reversion to Turanianism. Run back over all history and you find spiritism everywhere.

It is a mistake to suppose we have a fresh irruption of spiritist belief in this late movement—one of new and unexampled power.

There is less spiritism in the country than there was fifty years ago. We shall not tell our grandchildren so many spiritistic stories as our grandmothers told us. We heard more about things being bewitched in our childhood than we do to-day. In this modern movement we have only a crystallization of what was in solution in the minds of the people before—attended, I think, with loss of power in the process.

We have taken the clamps and restrictions of law and of social ban off the black art and allowed it to come forth, like everything else, in the light of day.

Spiritism avails itself of the new methods of communication by rail and printing press and gets the advantage of consolidation. So it can bring its full force to bear and tell for all that it is.

It is better that this be the situation. Its facts and its tendencies will now be put openly on trial and they must establish themselves in the judgment and the conscience of the people.

One of the first things which attract our attention as we look at what popularly passes as spiritism is the amount of fraud connected with it.

Whatever else it has done, this modern movement, probably like all the old ones, has produced an unparalleled crop of frauds and humbugs. I admit that there are genuine unknown phenomena beyond this prearranged humbug.

These phenomena may be spiritistic—they may be something else.

Spiritism may not indeed be all fraud, but it may be all delusion so far as communication with spirits is concerned. When the money in circulation is predominantly counterfeit I shall be careful about what I receive.

Spiritists themselves confess the great amount of fraud that passes current under the banner of spiritism. Many of them deplore this condition of things and should have credit for their revolt and warfare against it.

It is curious, however, to see how far this better class is obliged to go in confession of the possibilities of fraud in their system in order to defend the system. When there is not fraud at this end of the line there is likely to be at the other. There has been a tremendous emigration from Crete to the spirit land. There are terrible liars over there as well as here. You call for Plato and up steps Tim Finnegan and says, "Yis, sor, that's me intirely."

Andrew Jackson Davis says there is not one medium in a hundred thousand that really has communication with the great names he or she professes to represent.

Davis does not mean, of course, that they do not have

communication with somebody. There are tramps celestial as well as tramps terrestrial, ready for some consideration known to themselves to personate anybody. But that is an enormous discount to make in the spiritist business. With fraud on this side the line and fraud on that side the line, I am put to extreme caution how I accept anything.

I must say that that notion of fraud on the other side looks like invention to save credit on this side. If a medium fails to get a correct answer it is a handy retreat to be able to say that imposition was practiced by some lying spirit. By that explanation I am led to doubt the genuineness of what takes place at this end of the line more than ever before.

Here is an ardent, and I have no reason to believe any other than a genuine and honorable, believer in spiritism who says that not one in ten of the materializations which are now so popular in spiritism are genuine. Of course he claims that the tenth one is genuine.

Again, look at the enormous amount of the fraud element. I violently suspect the tenth case. Of course if there is not fraud in the tenth case we are still left with the question what the tenth case is, and to that we will attend by and by. But I want attention fastened to this fraud element. To my mind it makes up the major part of the demonstration which spiritism so-called is making before the public.

You can safely discount a half, two-thirds, three-fourths of what comes to the surface as spiritism, at the outset, as fraud and humbug unmitigated.

Let it be said that there are a large number of spiritists who are as anxious as any one for the exposure of all this deceit. But when this fraud element is weeded out, spiritism, phenomenally, will have shrunk to very small dimensions.

There seems to me, however, a fanaticism of belief among spiritists as to the remaining element. For instance, there have been so many exposures of materialization that to me the whole thing is fraud save one possibility for delusion.

But you may explode case after case to a spiritist and

it seems to have no effect on his mind. The unexposed case is still genuine. If that goes by the board, still it is the next one that is genuine.

When I have chased down a thousand lies in one direction I shall haul off from the pursuit of truth on that point of the compass. Possibly number one thousand and one may be true. But it is not a promising quarter. I can do better elsewhere.

But there are elements about spiritism which are not referable to fraud. This I readily grant.

These elements appear prominently as psychic and physical phenomena, and out of these spirit communications are argued.

Now please dismiss from your minds any notion that I am going to explain these phenomena. I trust to explain, only, why I do not accept the spiritist's solution of them. I may reject his solution without being able to furnish one of my own. Bacon said the subtlety of nature is ever beyond the subtlety of man. I expect that will remain true for some time to come. We are here on the border land of the unknown. The objection I make to spiritism as answer to the unexplained phenomena in view is that it is, as it has always been, the ready solution of ignorance. Electricity and spirits have always been thrust forward as the resolution of every difficulty in reference to the action of matter or mind—insisted on the more strenuously the denser the ignorance.

In Africa there is a great deal that is unknown, and the field of influence and force allotted to spirits is very much larger there than in America. Spirits are the explanation of everything in Africa. I have no doubt that when the negroes become acquainted with electricity, with them, that will divide with spirits the explanation of unknown phenomena.

Because we have not found out explanation of everything unknown it does not follow that spirits resolve the difficulty. Otherwise inexplicable, therefore spiritism, is *non sequitur*. Yet it is the great argument of spiritism.

Here let me say that I do not suppose we should destroy spiritism if we could explain every single thing which is in doubt to-day. If something should heave up

dimly in the land of the unknown to-morrow, there spiritism would attach. It has always there attached, and the thing that hath been is the thing that will be.

The phenomena of spiritism that we may allow as genuine fact lie out on the confines of knowledge, like Lockyer's experiments disproving the existence of the elements or the experiments indicating the composite nature of chlorine.

Spiritism is a supposititious, hypothetical answer to what is as yet unknown.

Spiritism brings forth certain phenomena and says: "You have no other answer to these phenomena, therefore spiritism must be true."

Mr. Lockyer brings forth certain experiments which seem to show that hydrogen always appears at certain temperatures when any element is subjected to examination. He posits thereon the probable unity of matter.

Now in both cases we are out at the extremity of the grasp of human experiment and human reason.

It will be a long time in the case of Mr. Lockyer before I shall conclude that the elements are varieties of one substance produced by heat. I shall still hold that, in the case of the appearance of hydrogen from a supposed pure element, he has a case of occluded hydrogen, or a case of the occlusion of any other substance that appears, because that is in the line of experiment heretofore. It is well enough known that certain substances occlude or conceal certain other substances, the former all the while preserving the appearance, under ordinary tests, of being pure. Then again, it is not improbable that under high heat some of the atoms of one substance should strike the same rhythm of motion as do those of another. Synchronous motion may not demonstrate identity of substance.

Now there are certain lines along which we have been operating that have resolved some of the phenomena of spiritism. I see no evidence that we have come to an end of the resolution of these phenomena on those lines or on others known and unknown. Spiritism does present a wonderful number of unknown and hitherto irresolvable problems. All things unknown bring grist to its

mill. But if we have patience we shall resolve more and more of them.

I do not propose to march up to the end of my knowledge and then posit spiritism. When I get to the end I shall put the vinculum "Unknown" over what is beyond.

True, one has the right on partial evidences to frame temporary hypotheses, but such hypotheses should be very loosely held.

I believe that spiritists as a rule do not like creeds, yet they present one of the most tremendous, wholesale creeds ever offered to the superstition and ignorance of man. They impress me as being quite rarely acquainted with that noblest of all exercises of mind—suspension of judgment.

I want to point out some of the lines along which I think some of the spiritist phenomena are resolving into common knowledge.

Take the seeing of spirits. The late Judge Edmunds of New York City was a leading spiritist in his day and is appealed to now as authority able to silence objections to spiritism. There is no suspicion of fraud attaching to his testimony. He was an estimable man; and what he said was his experience we shall accept as truthfully stated. The Judge was a spirit-seer. He saw troops of spirits in procession along the walls of the court-room while he was engaged in his legal practice. (Old Tombs shysters probably—old "soger" jurymen—a sorry lot; great taste for parade ground—the dingy walls of a courthouse—and the universe open and in bloom!) The Judge took these spirits for realities and so of course was a spiritist. But the Judge's conclusion is one which only the baldest credulity can adopt when we have taken a few lessons in physiological psychology.

The brain has the power of making its own pictures, without the help of eyesight and even in spite of it, and of presenting them to the mind as realities. We will call this subjective vision. We will call our ordinary sight objective vision.

Now, that there is such a thing as subjective vision the phenomena of dreams declare. The representations of dreams have no corresponding objective reality. Yet we

know that they are just as real to us *in the condition of sleep* as any objective sight when we are awake.

But sleep is not a dividing line between objective and subjective vision. A man may be most fearfully awake, and subjective entirely supersede objective vision. Take the case of delirium tremens. If you could get your patient asleep you would be very thankful. What ails him is that he is awake and frightful objects are scurrying across this field of subjective vision to the partial or entire obliteration of objective vision, though the entire apparatus of sight lies as open to the perception of real external objects as ever in life.

Now the physiological psychologists, I think, prove to us that the phenomena that are so illusory in dreams and in delirium tremens may occur all along the scale from sleep to the most wakeful moods, from conditions of the highest nervous excitement to that of ordinary quiet—that in fact subjective vision may be induced voluntarily.

For instance, you can think of a white horse. You have a certain form and appearance before your mind. Now you can conceive that that might come out as real to you as it does in a dream.

There are people so sensitively organized to subjective vision that this white horse, on suggestion of it, would stand out as plainly before the mind as it does before the eye in the engraving of the Village Blacksmith, or when the real object intercepts vision in the street.

You have a result of subjective vision here voluntarily induced. But what is spiritism about in all its attitudes but just the attempt to get into conditions where such subjective visions would be induced? What is mediumship but just the courting of such conditions? Who are the spirit-seers but just the tense or unstrung nervous organizations to whom such visions would be easily incident?

You cannot always believe your own eyes. Sight is not always trustworthy. Usually when you see a thing it is there, but sometimes it is not. The difficulty is that the subject of subjective vision is the last to detect it.

We rarely in our dreams suspect our dreams. No man in delirium, tremens or otherwise, suspects the falsity of

his apparitions. I have no doubt Judge Edmunds saw spirits, but they were the outward projections of his subjective vision and not the inward projections of his objective vision. The spirits were trooping on the entablature of his brain and not on that of the court-house.

This seeing of spirits occupies a prominent place in the proofs of spiritism. Not long since one of the most prominent of the spiritist leaders died. It was mentioned in the spiritist press that his spirit was seen standing in the midst of his family at his funeral.

If such a statement is not to be regarded as itself of subjective nature, the apparition, I have every reason to believe, was entirely subjective to those who beheld it. They had been all their lives putting themselves in the conditions which would induce subjection to just such subjective vision.

I do not know what limit can be set to this fact of subjective vision in the explanation of spiritist phenomena.

Take materialization. You know pretty well what that is without much explanation. You remember the case of materialization furnished by Katie King for Robert Dale Owen. That proved to be a fraud. But materialization is very popular as evidence of their system to spiritists. Discount nine cases out of very ten, on spiritist authority, as a humbug. Now what does the genuineness of the tenth case consist in? I believe in just that delusion which confounds subjective with objective vision.

Let us chase up a case. Here comes a woman, supposed to be a spirit, out of a cabinet, and distributes rosebuds to those in the room. We will let the woman go, so as not to make a fuss, and attend to the rosebuds.

If I have a rosebud given me that will abide with me—that I can carry away and put up on my mantel in a vase, and analyze the next day, finding that it has sepals, petals, stamens, and pistils, as other roses, I shall conclude, till I am better informed, that the aforesaid rose was raised in some garden of earth, therefrom plucked by human hands, and by human hands given to me.

I think such conclusion is assented to now by spiritists themselves with reference to such rosebuds.

But your true spiritist rosebud is one that does not

abide—one that appears and disappears at the will of the medium or spirit. Well, when I handle such rosebuds I shall conclude, until I am better informed, that I have been deluded into mistaking subjective for objective sensation. My rosebud has had no existence at all outside my own brain and nerves appendant.

There is a further complication in these cases, of course, when many persons see the same object, as the spirit hands from the opening in the cabinet or the full-sized ghost proceeding from its door; admitting that that whole business is not fraud, as the most of it is.

If there is genuineness about any case of this kind, I think the physiological psychologists are on the track of the quarry even here.

Subjective impression of all kinds would seem possible to be induced *in common* as well as in an individual case.

The very conditions of a spiritist seance, so-called, could scarcely produce other than a common result.

There is certainly usually a common expectation in view, and one of the most common requisites is that all minds shall be passively subject to some guiding will.

I have seen a boy in the mesmeric state, so called, stamp his coat in the slush at the suggestion from the mesmerizer that it was on fire.

I do not know why a dozen boys at once, in common paralysis of their faculties under the superior will and power of the mesmerizer, could not be led to common subjective perceptions.

I do not see why subjective vision cannot and should not be common under the spiritists' conditions. In religious meetings in Kentucky a century ago a common paralysis of self-control was induced, resulting in a common nervous phenomenon called the jerks.

It seems to me that we have a wedge here, which we know to be trustworthy, that it is possible to drive in very many places through the spiritist phenomena.

I do not say that what we have in hand is explanation of everything in spiritism. But it will explain something, and for my present purposes that is all I care about.

The fact is that the phenomena of spiritism are resolv-

ing. I see no reason to doubt that the resolving process will go on.

It does not seem to me that we shall have to go very far among well known dynamic agents to get a clue to the explanation of much that is now puzzling.

Take a scientific discovery—the photophone.

Almost any matter—selenium especially—set in vibration by the tones of the human voice, will so modify a beam of light that that beam, flashed how far soever it may be, will communicate to intercepting selenium the precise vibrations from which it received its own modifications. Here we have thought communicated across space by light.

But there are dark rays or waves in the ether as potent as those luminous. What may they not do?

When you know that the brain is an electric machine—that every certain thought is attended by a certain electrical condition of the brain, that the potencies and possibilities of transmission and *induction* by electricity are substantially infinite, it would not seem hard to realize that the *electric* action of a dictating brain might be communicated electrically across space, to be taken up by a passive brain which should respond in thought similar to that which disturbed it. Why not such communication between brain and brain by electric or magnetic induction, as well as induced common vibrations between selenium and selenium by a beam of light?

It is said that if two telephonic lines could be established—one between London and Gibraltar, and the other between Halifax and Norfolk—that it would be theoretically and perhaps actually possible to read messages on each line which were going over the other, there being no communication between the lines but the earth.

Take that psychological performance, of which spiritism makes much, called mind reading. Why, even with magnetic induction, may you not be not only on the track but on the high road to the solution of this phenomenon? All the conditions of the experiment suggest induction of the brain of the reader from the common battery of the experimenters.

I am far from pressing psychological condition com-

municated and induced by these subtle forces of nature, to which we know we are subject (what probabilities are there not that there are others of which we know nothing?), into explanation of all the recondite phenomena of spiritism. They are known to explain some things. They are suggestive of possibilities of explanation of others. They furnish at least analogies of ways in which we may expect explanation to come.

Before taking leave of this part of my subject I want to advise any one before he adopts spiritism to read up in mental physiology—Carpenter, for instance. I think Carpenter pushes some of his principles out into fancy with too much of positiveness. But that does not interfere with the healthfulness of having his views as part of one's mental furnishing.

But better even than Carpenter's work is a little treatise, written by the late Dr. Edward H. Clarke of the Boston Medical School, entitled "Visions or Pseudopia." Pseudotia should have been added to the title as well. The treatise is as fascinating as "Walden" or "The House of the Seven Gables."

I think this treatise lights up, with satisfactory explanation, a large realm of subjective seeing and hearing which usually figures in the evidences of spiritism.

The lectures of Brown-Séquard on the Nerves, delivered in this country half a dozen years since, are healthy reading as elucidating some problems in spiritism.

There are certain phenomena on that border land between physics and psychology which await explanation. I think, however, we are on the track of elucidation without resort to any spirit agency other than that of the individuals immediately therewith connected. The writing on locked slates is a puzzle. But so was planchette. I think we are settling into the belief, however, that planchette receives explanation through the nerve guidance of the individual operating, conscious or unconscious.

When you know that if your whole brain were removed all the acts which you now perform could be performed by the direction of what is left of the nervous system, nothing of what is done being reported in consciousness, it seems possible that, even when you have your brain,

much might be done in this undertow of nervous power without its ever coming to the surface of intellectual recognition. I think planchette has a rational explanation in this way.

In the case of the locked slate we shall have to add a hitherto unknown control over matter, not by mind directly, but by the intervention of some of the physical forces which always accompany the exercise of mind.

I am not offering this as explanation. I only say I shall look long in some such direction for light before I shall adopt spiritism.

I see a case of this sort reported—writing was taking place on a slate in the hands of a medium. She was called from the room and some one else took hold of the slate and straightway the pencil sprang across the room. The individual before whom that happened became a convert to spiritism. Now I should be a little cautious how I offered electricity as an explanation here, because that, like spiritism, is the ready and constant resort of ignorance. But if the behavior of that pencil does not suggest the operation of electricity, there is not much use in talking about electricity in a thunder storm. Physical forces are not wanting to cause the physical movement of the pencil in the locked slate.

How it is guided to produce its mental product, if there is no fraud in the case, I do not know. *But I shall look for the power that does this work in the spirits known to be at hand in the individuals operating, and not to problematic spirits.*

The answer to the movements of the pencil is as likely to be found in the former as the latter. The former are *here*, probably capable of producing the results in ways known and unknown.

In reference to this slate writing matter I want, however, to save myself from the unpleasant predicament of trying seriously to account for pseud facts. I bear in mind that the almost unbroken induction heretofore in similar cases has been trick or delusion.

Signor Blitz's egg bag is to me just as inexplicable as these slate writing cases. There is just as much reason why I should conclude spirits are operant in the one case

as in the other. No man can say anything is beyond the possibility of fraud, because *confessed* tricks are beyond the power of detection. It is just as impossible to me that there should be trick about Blitz's egg bag as in the case of the writing on locked slates, yet I know there is trick in the first case.

I think I am now where I can give a formula which will express my estimate of spiritism as it is popularly set before us. Spiritism = fraud + elements otherwise explicable + elements as yet inexplicable. I want to fasten attention on the third term of the second member of this equation. It seems to me that it is a healthy process sometimes to posit a plain "I do not know." Is it not likely that, at the boundary of our connection with the whole system in which we have place, there will be much which will be unknown?

Spiritism marches up to this boundary with the explanation of everything behind it common to everybody and then projects spiritism as explanation of what is before it. I object to spiritism because it seems to me a fetch out of absolute ignorance to explain the unknown.

Spiritism has a scrap bag of phenomena—the rest, residue and remainder—the odds and ends of human knowledge, semi-knowledge and ignorance, and that constitutes a difficulty in dealing with it. Explain one of its mysteries and it has another. An explanation that meets one difficulty does not meet another.

The radii that run from the human situation out to the unknown are infinite in number. Spiritism driven from one radius can skip to another on the outer circle which defines what we know.

It may take long years of patient investigation to dislodge it from this position.

Meantime it has the benefit of the argument, "You can not explain, we do."

I have *one sovereign* skepticism hovering over the whole realm of spiritism. As a system of communication with departed spirits it breaks in two in the middle. It cannot bear its own weight.

A quarter of a century of communication with all the host of heaven, with the spirits of just men made per-

fect, and with those imperfect, ought to have left an impress on the world's intellectual possessions that should be recognizable.

But it is only necessary to look over the literature of spiritism (and its name is legion) to be utterly disappointed in the hope that therein you may once more come in contact with the minds of the great or even of the little departed. I have no comments to make on the literature of these communications, only to say that if anything "flat, stale and unprofitable" ever did appear before the mind of man, this is it. I forbear to quote from the literature of these communications. I do not want to bring mind in contact any more than is necessary with the dreary drivel. I only want to say that I have never seen a line that would stand examination as coming from the supreme minds of time.

You saw how quickly the Kiddle Book slumped through as communication from Shakspeare and Scott and Byron—spiritists themselves hastening to disown the communications as genuine. But the Kiddle Book is just as good as any other purporting to do this work of communication with the great minds, or even the ordinary sensible minds, of the dead.

No book of revelations from former authors upon the earth has been able to establish itself in the book market. That fact is enough to carry the whole case. We gladly buy Shakspeare, Scott, and Wordsworth. There is nothing that we want so much as to get hold of something more from these great masters.

But it does not come. When spiritism comes with its claim to give more from these loved authors, the world looks at what is set forth and says, "Take it away, we do not recognize it." We have had nothing in this quarter of a century of communication with the dead which sustains itself in literature or in science.

We have had nothing to show that when a man laid down his pen and went from this realm of existence, spiritism has ever taken it up. It is only necessary to read right and left in the mass of the so-called communications to see how, of the earth, earthy, they are.

The fact is, the literature of spiritism of any sort is of

such rank that it has little or no standing in the book market. But the communications are all stamped with the impress of the general literature.

I have never seen a finger-length of pretended communication from any of our poets, statesmen and scholars which did not betray that they had no concern in its origin as plainly as the Morey letter showed to a fair man of ordinary intelligence that it did not proceed from the mind of Mr. Garfield.

Mr. Seward comes forth and utters platitudes instead of wisdom. From Daniel Webster we get not "one more roll of that thunder inimitable" for which Mr. Choate longed, but the simperings of a school girl. "Alas! how changed from that Hector who returned clad with the spoils of Achilles!" But the other day Andrew Jackson Davis had a communication from Immanuel Kant. It was plain enough to be seen that this Kant was not even an *alter ego* of Andrew Jackson Davis, but Andrew Jackson Davis *ipsissimus*.

Detached sentences of Latin, Greek and Hebrew figure as evidence with the spiritist. I want a supplementary chapter to Isaiah or a lost book of Livy, or a completion of Christabel from Coleridge. Those authors could write on earth and they are under every spiritist table. Let us have the chapter and book which will bear its own weight.

When a system is a failure at its core—when it is a wholesale failure, I shall not attend much to its retail business.

But spiritism is nothing if it is not ready to meet such an exigency as this. Failure with it is all the same as success. It slides as smoothly over this great breakdown as if nothing had happened.

The explanation is that the great spirits of the departed can find expression only in the measure of the mind of the medium. That is a retreat whereof I can see no end. Again that is a puncture from which the whole system falls in collapse.

If all I can get out of Shakspeare is something of the size of a school girl's mind, I have certainly no evidence from the communication that I am in connection with the mind of Shakspeare at all.

Calling a young lady's sentimental gushings communications from Shakspeare is not exactly proof to me. The reason why we shall never have communications from Shakspeare that will bear examination is because such so-called communications have no other origin than the mind of the so-called medium.

Here lies on my table a treatise on ethics which the author tells me he wrote with no other help than that of his spirit guides. But I am unable to see how the spirits helped this author. The treatise is not without merit. It shows the ability of a fair mind tinctured with spiritism as the basis of its philosophy. The author has ability to write of himself just such a treatise as this is.

Anyway, however much the spirits may have helped the author, they have rendered no essential service to any one else, for there are a great many better treatises on ethics, literary-wise, or in philosophical grasp of the subject, than this.

There are then no intellectual results to correspond with this claim of communication with the minds of the departed. If the literature of spirit communications is genuine, then, if life is worth living, existence is certainly not worth prolonging.

If spiritism affords any proof of continued existence after death, its evidence also shows that our intellectual powers in the next world taper to vacancy.

Here I want to make a few comments on Zöllner's *Transcendental Physics*. The problem of the book seems to be to find proofs of a hypothetical place for hypothetical beings.

If you ask me if I can explain the prominent phenomena set forth in that book, I say distinctly, No.

If I do not allow myself to suspect fraud, I do suspect delusion with regard to some of the phenomena. Some of the phenomena I think are explicable by known forces and some lie out in the darkness of the unknown—a region which will always have its problems to tax and defy resolution from man.

But the simplicity, the gullibility of Zöllner is seen in the fact that he has not challenged the mental "out-put" in connection with his phenomena. That strikes me as

altogether of too childish a nature to carry belief that it proceeds from spirits. If one spirit can write on a slate another can, and some one ought to write something beside intellectual dish-water. But every revelation in Zöllner's book is poverty-stricken bosh. Zöllner thinks he has demonstrated a fourth dimension in space. I do not know about that. Professor Clifford says there is an elemental flatness in physics. I do not know about that, but I think I know elemental flatness in literature and, in the spirit revelations in his book, Zöllner has succeeded in demonstrating it, in all the planes of all the dimensions that I know anything about. There is an ear-mark about this matter that goes with me over the whole phenomena and forces me to the conclusion that whatever Slade and Zöllner may do, forces known and unknown that pertain to *themselves* are the sole authors of what is done.

I do not think we have to go very far to find some of the forces operant. Unless there is terrible lying, Slade is an electric battery or highly charged magnet. He turns the magnetic needle about by the movement of his finger—the finger not touching the needle. This is to be noted, that Slade is always exhausted after these electric phenomena. A lady was exhausted to sickness who put forth the same electric powers. Now the low intellectual results of these Slade and Zöllner experiments seem to me to be accounted for on the ground of consumption of vitality in the physical experiments. There is no power left to be directed to the coinage of thought, and you have consequently the flat mental result.

There is one further clue. Did you ever chase up the literature of your dreams? When written down, did it not seem very inconsequential stuff? I can further to myself account for this low intellectual result if I suppose the brains of the party to be in an abnormal or hypnotized condition—a condition which I am convinced hovers over spiritist experimenters everywhere. I know of no limit to the possibility of the contagion of it, any more than I do of limit to the possibility of the contagion of the jerks.

Now please bear in mind that I am not pushing these ideas as explanation of all the physical phenomena in the Slade and Zöllner experiments.

Their final conclusions are to me a weak absurdity and I think I can see lines along which this absurdity is reached. There is one other thing indicating the abnormal condition of the medium's brain as a cause of this low mental result. The best of mediums acknowledge often a powerful tendency in themselves to deceit when under influence. How much would you give for your moral nature when you are asleep? You steal and cut throats without compunction. There is argument in this bad moral tendency lying parallel with that from the low mental result.

In these experiments of Slade's, light, heat and electricity all come to the front, with the physical exhaustion of Slade, as apparent in their production as it is in the case of discharges from an electric eel.

Now when you have that condition of affairs, with *nil* for an intellectual result, I am compelled to look along the line of the *forces disclosed* for further explanation; especially when I know there are infinite possibilities in them yet undeveloped in their connection with matter and mind.

Let us look at the matter of mediumship. Even if communication is held with the departed, mediumship is a bad process physically, intellectually and morally. As a rule mediums come from a class who are already too sensitive nervously for healthy adjustment to this life. If a large share of the medium's powers are not the result of nervous excitement, high nervous excitement accompanies them.

Many a young woman of excitable nerves has found herself on the road to easy production of spiritist phenomena, but has been wise enough to shut off contact with or approach to them because of the injury to her health they occasioned.

First and last the system is an experiment with raw nerve.

You can get remarkable phenomena out there at the end of our nervous possibilities. But you can have health only when you keep nerve down to sober companionship with staid muscle.

Then look at what mediumship is intellectually and morally. It is the surrender of the control of one's body and

mind to another being. Such surrender to any spirit, be he who he may, this side the throne of the great Jehovah, is a bad and a wrong process.

The sacred things are God and individuality. The good try to set men up in possession of their own individuality. The last and best result for any one is physical, intellectual and moral self-possession. Only the bad want possession of another's being. Well does spiritism speak of obsession, for there can be no possession of the being by another which is not a sitting upon or in it which is against it. The fact that a spirit is disembodied gives him no right to the possession of my being.

The law of intellectual health is to make the most of our own faculties—not to borrow from others, men or angels. If it has not already been proved, I predict that it will be, that spiritism is a foe to intelligence and education. When one wants to find out something, instead of employing his own faculties, if he can call up some defunct Indian chief or some Italian Lazzarone (Lazzarone the other side as well as here), to tell him, he will employ that latter process. Painful examples of just this result are numerous in the history of spiritism.

If the unhealthiness of mediumship morally is not apparent, it will be. You can no more make the control of one being by another a healthy transaction for either party morally in spiritism than you can in slavery.

The inherent, essential sin of slavery was just this subordination of one being to another, and an out-crop of immoralities was a natural result of this condition. If the same result has not been reached in spiritism (I leave every one to judge what tendencies in that direction have already been observed), it will be reached. We have had experience enough in that kind of exercise along all lines to lay down an *a priori* principle. Given the control of one being by another, and immorality of some kind will result.

There is a wrong adjustment to begin with. Spirit control will be the excuse for bad design and act. Want of responsibility for much done and said under spirit control is even now pleaded.

Do not say that good people try to exercise control over others. Not to the abdication of a single faculty of those sought to be influenced; if they do they cease to be good.

There is no influence of anybody that is right except as the end in view is self-control inspired by the Most High.

If spiritism has not demonstrated the malign character of obsession, it will. What is bad in inception will end in further badness.

There are good people connected with spiritism. Nothing is further from their thoughts than wickedness, and they hope much good will result from its investigations and communications. But they will be disappointed.

They cannot control the system. It will throw whoever tries to ride it. It went to the bad in Alexandria of old and will repeat its ancient history in America. Bring it out to the light of day and it is the "black art" still.

It inverts the problems of existence. It makes that first in importance which is last in fact.

If it be true, we want little or nothing of it. It is a meddling with matters before we get to them. It forgets the here in the there. It jumps arithmetic to fumble with conic sections. It neglects the strawberry and potato patch for cosmogony. We do best by holding closest to natural conditions. It is said that alligators can count. But I would not have alligators "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Let boys cipher and alligators bask in the bayous. Let men work and think on their plane and spirits on theirs. If a spirit should say, "I am here," the answer to it should be, "So am I."

"So much to do,
So little done, such things to be."

To be, is of as much importance as, to be about to be.

If a spirit says, "I can write," the answer should be, "So can I, and 'pour my fustian rhetoric on the town.'"

If a spirit says, "I can be materialized," the answer should be, "I am materialized and can do more work in an hour than you can in all day."

If a spirit can wrench a slate from your hands, invite him to shovel gravel on the road. If he can do the one

there is no physical, certainly no moral reason, why he should not do the other.

If a spirit wants to exercise his gifts as a religious instructor, I think we may say:

“Be thou spirit of health or goblin damned,
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,”

you do not know what is right on our problem better than we do.

The archangel Gabriel cannot tell us what is right or what is wrong any clearer than we can find out of ourselves. In fact that is not healthy preaching, from spirits or men, which attempts to spare people *the trouble of finding out what is right and what is wrong*. That only is hygienic which inspires men to make the distinctions for themselves and to follow the right when it is seen. The very essence of religion is individual right adjustment to individual circumstance.

No, the answer of any proffer of “spirit control,” if it can be, is: We propose to keep the control of our own physical, intellectual and moral being in our own state; if you have any business to attend to in yours, it is well.

This is what will take place. The thin-voiced, husky utterances from that world will control judgments that should be independent, personal here. Then men will become the servants of something that is as absurd as the energy spent on the pyramids. This tendency in the system will carry to a weak and ignoble end. The medium will play the role of sibyl and priest, and the practice of private judgment will go where it has always gone with sibyl and priest.

The system is reversion to a wisdom that went out as folly on a wild night of old, when riders, chariots, horses, waters were all mingled together in a reflux sea. Since that night man has made his best progress by following the wisdom which directs each man to make, by his own judgment, the best adjustment he can to this life, industrially, socially, intellectually, ethically, and to make habits and character so developed his capital with which to face any exigencies which may be to come.

So my final skepticism results from my conviction of this inherent moral untowardness of spiritism.

Its moral barrenness beats against the face of its asserted fact.

If it has opened the heavens, something heavenly ought to have descended upon it, whereas it has scarcely kept up to the level of earth. Given a God, and I do not believe he would *let* communication between worlds take place by so unhealthy a process as mediumship. Given a God, and I do not believe he would unlock the secret of eternity to so characterless a movement as spiritism.

The great and the good in God's government are inseparable companions. What prophets and righteous men have desired to look into I do not believe God would disclose to mere fumblers over curious phenomena. Things hang together in this universe better than that. Great marvels are set forth in the history of the career of Christ. I hold them to be fact because they had such marvelous moral accompaniment. I do not believe in your resurrections from the dead, my spiritistic friends, because they have no adequate moral guy to support them. Spiritism has so far had no moral mission to accredit it.

Said a friend to me one day: "What are you doing?"

"Reading spirit communications."

"What do you find?"

"Not much."

"Nothing about the Great White Throne?"

No, that is just it. There is nothing in spiritism about the Great White Throne. There are many spiritists who are theists. But the prominent influences that stamp the system are atheistic—perhaps I had better say polytheistic.

If anywhere agnosticism comes properly into play it is over the spiritist phenomena. The kingdom of God is not answer to physical or psychical conundrums, but "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost."

I shall not make a religion out of the fourth dimension of space. I shall not make a religion out of spiritism. I would as soon make a religion out of one as of the other. In religion—the art of "dealing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God"—I do not think I shall forsake the leadership of Jesus of Nazareth to follow a footprint on scot inside a locked slate.

I prefer to hold the conviction, which holds me, of the existence of God, and let come, what will come under his government, rather than to accept the atheistic immortality current in spiritism.

Life possibly, now we have it, may be worth living. But if there is no God, I see no great desirability of its eternal or indefinite continuity. The influences that come upon one as he reads spirit communications are most depressing. If they are true, existence is "rayless and pathless." I can see nothing after my study of spiritism but chaos and therein a flock of spirits

"Unhousell'd, disappointed, unanel'd,"

struggling for nothing so much as to come back here and get possession of a medium.

Against this vision of orderless welterings and flounderings I prefer a vision that looked out over existence and posited this symbolism:

"And I heard as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluia! for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth. Let us be glad and rejoice and give honor to him."

"I know not where his islands lift
Their fronded palms in air;
I only know I cannot drift
Beyond his love or care.

"And so beside the Silent Sea
I wait the muffled oar;
No harm from Him can come to me
On ocean or on shore."

I still prefer to stand with those who hold faith, first and last, in God:

"God, who at sundry times and divers manners spake in past times unto the fathers—who hath in these last days spoken unto us by his son."

I prefer this manifestation of the Divine Spirit as proof of immortality to any spirit manifestations of lower order. In a Godless universe death may not possibly end all, but something else may.

I am content with the voice which has said to me:
 "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you.

"Because I live, ye shall live also."

NOTE. Hypnotism seems to be the assignee of spiritism so far as the surrender of one's being to another person is concerned. To take up state, thought, or action from the suggestion of another is the first step toward idiocy. If there be such a thing as hypnotism, the conditions which it prescribes are such as are more likely to start motions to sin and crime than to any other exercise of the mental and moral nature.

The conditions of hypnotism are per se the surrender of self-control. Paul has specified nine virtues and has put self-control as the last of the nine. It is the last peril when one's self slips from one's own grasp.

Hypnotism is the anodyne nature administers to the victim of the raptor beak and the canine tooth and claw. Dr. Livingstone felt it as he lay beneath the paw of the lion, and evidently Nansen's companion, beneath that of the polar bear.

Pigeons are hypnotized by laying them on the back. The reason is obvious. It is the most unusual and so the most helpless position in which an animal can be placed. Not knowing what to do, it has no will to do anything.

For a human being to be hypnotized is voluntarily to slide back along the line of animal atavism to the condition of the victim of rapine—voluntarily to take the place of the under dog in the fight. Keep clear from that surrender as you value the heal of your body and the weal of your soul.

1897.—Next year Spiritism celebrates its jubilee, it being fifty years since the Fox girls heard, or made the raps.

I offer the following toast for this jubilee:

FIFTY YEARS OF SPIRITISM—

Contribution to knowledge—nothing.

Contribution to morals—nothing.

CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS—

Intellectual feebleness and confusion.

Moral tendency to tolerate everything questionable.

CHAPTER IX.

MORALS, POLITICS AND LAW.

WE greatly regret that our politics is not more moral. Another thing is lamentable, and that is our haste to thrust moral questions into politics. No sooner does a moral idea possess the mind of man or woman than there is a movement for the formation of a political party whose duty shall be to pass laws to enforce the new-born moral conception.

When the party is successful at the polls and the law has been passed, the moral idea is supposed to have triumphed.

But it may be that just when politics steps in morals step out, and by the time you have got down to the enrollment of the idea among the police regulations of society all the savor of its morals may be sublimated.

It is one thing to carry a point at the polls and to pass an act through the legislature, and another thing to secure a real moral victory.

I think a slight examination of the history and fortunes of many of the great moral questions, which have been and still are before us, will show that the real moral issues have taken no advantage, but rather detriment from the political turn given them.

Take that subject, which more than any other, perhaps, has been tossed up and down American politics—slavery. There was a moral question at the basis of that matter, if there ever was in any before the mind of man. And if ever men and women were morally in earnest the Abolitionists were. Yet the moral issue on that question came at an early date before the minds of the people, freighted, by advocates of freedom, with the political project of the dissolution of the Union.

That political project or a political notion of some kind was constantly kept before the minds of the American people, to the confusion of their judgment on the underlying moral principles.

I know great results have been wrought out of the po-

litical treatment of slavery—really military treatment. But that a thing is done does not necessarily justify the way in which it was done. If the end in view has been but imperfectly gained, and at enormous cost, we may fairly enquire whether other methods might not have been more thorough and more economical.

I think we may fairly charge the late war, with all its involved misery, destruction of property, debt, bloodshed, and bad blood, to the clause in the constitution of the United States respecting the rendition of fugitive slaves.

That clause was “the little rift within the lute” that made “mute” the “music of the union,” and “ever widening, slowly silenced all.”

Henry Clay said in 1852 that the fugitive slave law was the only thing the north had to complain of; and Daniel Webster said the laws passed by the free states in nullification of the fugitive slave law were all the south had to complain of.

Now the fugitive slave clause in the constitution was a bad affair, and came to present profound moral questions to the conscience of the people. But that the difficulty was wisely met may be fairly questioned when one looks at the terrible results which grew out of the course taken. The war possibly might have been avoided—might have been mitigated, if the people of the north had had patience to deal with the question more as one of morals and less as one of politics.

When you come to read the second resolution of the platform of the Republican party for the year 1880, and compare it with the laws passed by various northern states in nullification of the fugitive slave law, the exercise results in suggestions not altogether comforting.

We have executed a right about face and a counter march in reference to the sovereignty of the national constitution and the finality of decisions of the supreme court. This tergiversation is the result of trying to meet a moral issue with political expedients.

It is a profound practical *non-sequitur* that we must be defended, at once, and by law against every evil we may be brought to face.

To suffer something for morals while they are making their way in social adjustment is a very old principle of conduct, and one warranted and called for by the sanction of high moral authority.

The state-rights laws of the northern states against the operations of the fugitive slave law were an attempt to secure one of the highest moral results without any of the pains and penalties necessarily incident. Men might under the guidance of morals have refused to obey an immoral law, and have taken the consequences, instead of attempting to shield themselves under state legislation.

Had this course been pursued we might sooner have secured a real anti-slavery moral conviction.

Whatever of fines or imprisonment men escaped by such legislation was more than paid for by the agonies of the war which it helped to provoke.

Had the anti slavery cause been worked more fully as a matter of morals, treated as a matter upon which it was more desirable to secure moral convictions than legislation, retaliatory or protective, we might have been further ahead than we are to-day in the recognition of the rights of man, further ahead in that "peace on earth and good will toward men" which is the end in view in all moral adjustment among men.

That the anti-slavery forces should take some political action may be granted. But when they took up the cudgel in offensive action, as in the proposition for the dissolution of the Union and in the States Rights legislation, they were wrong.

The leading anti-slavery society of the nation dissolved as soon as the war of the rebellion was closed. If that society ever represented a moral issue, there was more need than ever that it should be continued in existence and activity when slavery was abolished. The name might have been changed, but the moral reasons for its continued existence were plain. It ought to have been borne in mind that we had a result in the war, to wit, the abolition of slavery, which was not yet founded in the morals of either section of the Union. Slavery was abolished not because it was decreed to be a moral wrong by the whole nation—it was not even abolished because it

was deemed a political nuisance by the north. Its abolition was carried solely because the north judged it had a war right to damage its enemy.

There never was a day previous to the issue of the proclamation of emancipation when the north as matter of morals would have consented to its issue.

That we took a step as a war measure vastly in advance of the moral convictions of the north is evident enough from what has since happened.

One would have thought that the party which decreed emancipation would have some *a priori* conception of what it was to turn four millions of slaves over again to the manipulation of the same people and the same social forces which had held them in bondage.

If such former slaves were to be constituted voters, one would naturally suppose that the party which made them such would feel some moral obligation to appear among them to instruct them in the duties of citizenship.

One would suppose that there would be some solicitude manifested on the part of such party to protect these child-citizens against the disappointed rage and wounded pride of their former owners. That such work was never done is the simple, sorrowful history. After having used the negro to the nation's advantage during the war, beyond merely endowing him with the right of suffrage we cast him off as carelessly as if he were of no further moral concern.

The prominent men even of anti-slavery antecedents who ever appeared in the south to discharge one of the most obvious moral duties can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Beyond Henry Wilson, Matthew H. Carpenter and Stewart L. Woodford, who can be mentioned?

There were those who were not prominent who went to the south, with intelligence in their heads and good will in their hearts, to try to live a nobler civilization into southern society. But against these the north combined with the aristocracy of the south in the cry: "Away with all carpet-baggers! Let the negro find his place with his natural protectors; the former masters understand the negro best and know best what to do with him." The derisive treatment by the north of its emigration into the

south is a moral curiosity when it is put alongside the glory given to that which went west. We call the western carpet-baggers founders of civilization and empire. And yet it was from the west that the son wrote: "Father, come west—almighty mean men get office here." When the party to which the anti-slavery forces belonged was in the last ditch in a presidential election, after accepting political aid brought by the emancipated negro it cast him off again with a haste that amounted to indecency and has continued to treat him with the callousness of utter moral indifference. After our great political convulsion, including four years of war, all we have to show of moral gain is the result of such efforts as are put forth by the religious denominations for the education and moral culture of the south.

Politics from the beginning of the war divested itself of moral intent, and since its close has been careful not to perform a moral act.

If politics has been recreant to duty so far as the former slaves were concerned, it has also been recreant to duty towards the former masters.

The political leaders, after having overthrown the system of slavery, kept themselves at a safe distance from the scene of their action—retreated to the north and developed the plan of ruling the nation by a solid north, leaving the old slave-holders a clear field to develop their idea of ruling the nation by the white element of a solid south.

Even in the very last presidential election (1880), after having had a national convocation of leaders on the subject and after resolving to put speakers in the south, the anti-slavery party put no man in the field and uttered no word south of Mason and Dixon's line—a conclusion so lame and impotent that the heathen gods would look on it with astonishment.

The thing which ought to have been done in the south was to follow up all war measures with every kind of moral influence upon all classes.

The south should have been constantly alive with speakers representing moral ideas and exhibiting moral influences. It should have been shingled with a kindly, helpful, hopeful literature.

The anti-slavery society marches up to this splendid moral opportunity—and—dissolves.

The mistake was in supposing, because a thing had been done politically, that it was done.

The social cruelty practiced at West Point, so that no negro cadet can remain there, is not so unrepresentative of northern sentiment respecting the negro as we are inclined to think. How can such treatment be possible? It occurs in the north, among pupils the majority of whom are from the north. West Point is a representative institution. Its officers and its pupils have been selected by the element of the nation which fought the war for the Union.

Now turn to the south. Take the March number of the North American Review and you will read the following ultimatum from Chief Justice Chalmers, of Mississippi:

"The men of the north must understand once for all that the Anglo-Saxon race will not be governed by the African, and if they are wise they will content themselves with aiding those who propose that the African shall be wisely, justly and fairly governed by the Anglo-Saxon."

The political condition of the south is proof positive that that is a representative utterance of the white element of the south.

The question is, notwithstanding all that has been done politically, how much further is the south ahead in moral conviction upon *the rights of man* than it was twenty years ago? How much has been done to put it ahead? How much has politics done toward the desired conclusion?

The rights of man, as morals, have not been earnestly embraced by the nation, north or south.

The moral significance of what we have done is not appreciated—not accepted. A certain political conclusion has been ground out when its moral alphabet has not been spelled out by the American people.

The engine which did the work was never fired by moral conviction. It is working now without the spring of that heat. As a moral question, the rights of man, and the duties of man to man, need as thorough discussion at

this moment, everywhere in the land, as at any moment in the nation's history.

The moral forces of the nation are paralyzed under a pseud political conclusion.*

The course pursued in the temperance reform has been the same. Here we have an effort to pluck fruit by politics and law that has not been ripened in morals.

The popular awakening to the evil of intemperance was speedily turned into a political movement to form a party and pass laws to suppress the evil.

So far has this tendency gone that comparatively little effort is now put forth in the temperance cause except to secure the passage of temperance laws and to enforce them by the courts.

But a social order, even if it can be secured by law, is not necessarily a moral result. A social order is a good thing, and in a proper state of public sentiment we may proceed to enforce temperance as a social order.

Everything is now directed on the temperance question to gain the social order, and this tendency seems to have swept the church from its feet.

*1897. If there is any induction that may be regarded as proved it is this: that any of the essential objects of civilization can be secured in any race or tribe of men in one generation, if the proper environment is supplied.

It was just as easy to have educated and moralized the first generation of negroes born after the war as any other. It would have cost no more to put the proper environment about this first generation of children than it will in the long run to put in such environment by driblets, and now here and now there. This conclusion does not require faith to sustain it, it is open to sight.

If the Blair Educational Bill had been adopted, and then heartily carried out by the south, the whole race question would have disappeared in a generation. We have chosen to wander, for God only knows how many generations, in the wilderness, rather than to take a plain and open road to the promised land.

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows, and in miseries."

We have chosen to stand and see the tide slip idly out from under

The last newspaper, lying before me as I write, gives a telegraphic report of the proceedings of a representative meeting of one of our largest religious denominations. The report contains the following statement: "Another resolution was adopted, declaring that prohibition is the only plan for Christian effort in regard to temperance."

So far from prohibition being the first power for the church to use, it is the last which it should invoke. Just as it was and is on the rights of man, the temperance cause has not yet been half worked as a moral reform.

Fire from heaven would have made things quiet, orderly, in a certain Samaritan village a long time ago, but whether a moral result would thereby be achieved seems to have been questioned by the universal Master of morals there present.

There is no more common mistake than that which we make when, having attained moral clarity, ourselves, on some matter, we thereupon resolve that every one ought

the keel of a great adventure in which success was assured, and so our problem is still unsolved.

The race problem! There is no such problem before enlightened morals—it only exists for ignorance and sin.

At this date one who knew the sentiment in regard to the rights of man a half century since must wonder where that sentiment has gone—for gone it has—out of what gate did it go?

Has the scientific notion that we are only survivals out of the struggle of beasts for existence, and that the strongest egoistic struggler is the best beast or man, put to death the conviction that others have rights and that we have duties toward them?

That idea seems hardly to be entertained, though it may have contributed to the present indifferent moral condition.

Has the old sentiment been metamorphosed into such moral sentiment as there may be in the contest between capital and labor? But this calls for an entire transfer of moral regard to another class of persons—from the most to the least needy.

Then this contest between labor and capital is largely essentially void of moral significance; it is a squabble between the haves and the have nots as to who shall have. It is hard to discern moral intent and purpose in much of the contest. *Vide* the Homestead, Cripple Creek and Leadville riots and insubordination.

to have the same vision. It is easy from thence to proceed to social and legal outlawry of him who asserts he has not such vision

Now let us look at the situation in Illinois, for instance.

We are not a homogeneous people. If we were all united in high temperance views, and only a few saloon keepers and bad men were defiant of public sentiment, we should have one set of questions before us.

But that is not our case. It will not do to reason about temperance as if we had only the saloon element before us. Look at the immense continental factor in our population which is not in sympathy with advanced temperance views. Take the great German element, especially as you meet it in the country. As a rule the Germans are quiet, order-loving, industrious citizens. Property and life are safe in their neighborhood. They perform, and respond to, all good neighborly actions. Very few of them are totally abstinent, yet as a rule they are temperate in their drinking habits—rarely using any intoxicant except beer. There is no reason visible why this element will not yield in time to the refining and elevating influence of higher temperance ideas if those ideas are brought to their minds in a gentle, Christian way. They are no worse in manners or in morals than our own ancestors, running back a few generations. But how much of instruction have they had? Next to none. Little has been done, and less perhaps is doing to secure this real moral result. Here is one of the grandest fields for moral effort, and scarcely a sower or gleaner in it.

We irritate and put beyond the possibility of moral influence this great class of our population when we talk of prohibition and give them to understand we are going to bring the law down about their ears. They do not relish being put in a position where they shall seem lawless. They do not acknowledge that they are of a lawless disposition. They do not like to have a lawlessness manufactured and construed against them. They do not like threatening, especially when they are in a majority in the town or village. When morals are in view, the simple matter of the control of the use of intoxicating liquor is not the only thing involved. An attitude is called for

that shall take into account the whole condition of things, and the totality of morals. Temperance is not the only virtue, nor prohibition the only grace in temperance.

The truth is, the most of those who have a special interest in the temperance cause become impatient of the slow operation of moral influences and want to take a short cut to the end they have in view by law.

Instead of saying that "prohibition is the only true plan for Christian effort in regard to temperance," it may be said that there ought to be such Christian effort put forth as that all the people could be enlightened to see and to feel the wrong of the sale and the use of intoxicating liquors and so be led to put both under social ban.

Of course there will remain some in any community who will not be touched by moral influences. We need not wait for the application of the principle of local prohibition till every man approves it, for then there would be no need of it. But let us find a fair approximate line for its application.

Prohibition is a radical term. It means the utter extermination of something. Crimes are to be prohibited. That which is to be prohibited ought to take its place in public estimation somewhere along with crimes.

Now whether or not you are to insist on prohibition in your community depends not solely upon your own estimation that the sale and use of intoxicating liquor is on par with assault and battery, burglary and forgery, but whether the mass of the people would put such sale and use along with you in the catalogue of crime. If they will not, then the conclusion is that the necessary moral work has not been done, and that the interest of good morals, in their broadest reach, demand that you do not try to enforce prohibition till such work has been done and its natural outcome secured.

Moral elements in reference to prohibition usually rise about as high as this: If after a heated canvass, marked usually by high blood and ill feeling, a bare majority of votes for no-license can be secured, it is then thought that the moral victory has been gained, and that the victors have the full right to enforce their views upon the minority, though that minority may lack only two votes of a majority.

Now, while we must make much of the principle of government by majorities, yet we must remember that that principle is only a rough political expedient—a social compromise by which we contrive to make life with each other tolerable. When we are in a minority we get a glimmering notion that majorities do not make right.

It seems hard to make men see the same truth when they are in a majority.

As majorities cannot make right for us, so it is often not right for us to insist on our power when we are in a majority.

There is a higher law than the rule or the will of majorities, and that is the moral obligation upon majorities to bring minorities to their view by rational moral means. George William Curtis said: "A minority has a right to be and to convert the majority." In obedience to this higher law of morals there will often, in this temperance cause, be a call to waive the right given by the rule of government by the majority—a rule of political expediency.

It is serious business to vote one half of the community save one into the class of supporters of crime. Whoever does it ought to be sure that that minority have had the moral instruction which, to their own apprehension, puts them into that class. Especially does this become serious when the decision is likely to be reversed at the very next election. If we want laws to be held sacred we must be careful what laws we enact.

There are certain hygienic views, not generally accepted, yet held with intense conviction by their advocates. There are persons who say they have as clear convictions of the harmfulness of some every-day article of diet as they have of the evil of liquor drinking.

The great mass of well-meaning Germans drink beer with as little sense of wrong, probably, as I have in eating pepper and salt. It is conceivable that the hygienic reformers might have the power to prohibit common articles of diet. So long as the use of the prohibited articles seemed right to me, their prohibition would not be morally edifying to me nor helpful to the cause of the reformers.

Your righteous soul may be vexed from day to day with the lager beer saloon. But you will be a little slow to invoke the aid of the law in the matter when you remember that your father or grandfather took cider to his own field hands. They would not have allowed a constable to arrest them on their way to the field. You will be the more patient, too, when you remember that that father or grandfather in his youth rebelled against rum and in his old age against cider.

You cannot get the sense of criminality, very deeply, on men's minds in respect to the sale and use of intoxicating liquors in one year, when they know or hope that the next year they can reverse the public decision at the polls and annul the law or ordinance of the previous year. It is no very wise marshaling of moral forces which precipitates these contests upon the people of our cities and villages and towns every year.

As we are proceeding now, after the convulsion of the community on the temperance question, politically, we follow up the temperance victory, if one is gained, by a lawsuit. Now, while we are attempting to push one side of morals along, it is worth while to see if some other side does not slide back. There is nothing which will work more "corruption of blood" in a community than a temperance lawsuit. It is provocative of bad tendencies as to truth on both sides. Good neighborhood is worth something as a moral constituent in society, as well as sobriety, if the latter is enforced by law. Take morals in totality, and it is questionable if as much demoralization results from the ordinary drinking in our country towns as is engendered by the political quarrels, and the bad blood aroused and the lying practiced in lawsuits over the enforcement of a prohibitory law.

"We have a passion, make a law
Too false to guide us or control,
And for the law itself we fight
In bitterness of soul."

In most places the question of prohibition or of no license is prematurely up. If half of the community are criminally minded it is better to wait for morals to do

some work before attempting purification by politics or law.

Attention is called again to the fact that it is not what light *we* have attained in regard to the inherent wrong of the liquor traffic, but to the moral light which the people generally have on the subject—whether *they* are ready to put drinking and stealing in the same category. In case of other crimes there is unanimity among well-meaning people. No approximation to such unanimity among well-disposed citizens supports prohibition.

I submit whether, in most communities, it is not a fact that the ballot and the writ are used not in aid of moral forces, but as a substitute for them.

The ballot and the writ may produce a certain amount of social order, but it is doubtful, if, as they are used, they strengthen temperance morality. The order may be worth having. It may be necessary to have it. But the order and the morality are two different things, and it is well to get a clear conception that the former is not a measure of the latter. The institution of African slavery operated finely as a prohibitory liquor law over the negroes. Since the abolition of slavery intoxication has become terribly prevalent among the former sober slaves.

But which way shall we go here, backward or forward? If forward, how?

When you call for a writ against a man it is well enough to pause and ask yourself if you have tried sufficiently to summon the man that is in him out of him, before you summon him to court. Think for a moment what a writ is. It is simply a substitute for war. It is in another form, but it is as much as the sword an assertion of the will and might of the strongest, and goes to men as such assertion.

When wine is in, wit is out. When the writ comes to the front, moral influences go to the rear.

To say that prohibition is the only plan for Christian effort in temperance is to bid good-by to the gospel and to trust to the power of the tipstaff.

It is the usual course, I think, to class prohibition with criminal laws or at least to support it by analogy with the principle of such statutes. Governor Chamberlain

said in 1872, respecting the prohibitory law of the state of Maine:

"The law is as well executed generally in this state as other criminal laws are."

I do not here propose to join issue with Governor Chamberlain as to his statement of fact. I only want to call attention to the fact that he associates the illegal sale or use of liquor with murder, burglary, arson and theft.

Is it not matter of question whether the people of the state of Maine, in large majority, make that association in their own minds?

But let us leave Maine and go to Kansas, where we can get some recent statistics.

There were 92,000 votes last November (1881) in favor of a prohibitory clause in the constitution of the state of Kansas, to 84,000 against it.

Are we to suppose that the attitude of the people of Kansas on prohibition of such crimes as murder, arson, burglary and theft is 92,000 for prohibition to 84,000 against?

Are we to suppose this 84,000 minority stand in their own consciousness in the same relation to murder, arson, burglary and theft, as that in which they stand toward a prohibitory liquor law?

Is it not about as strong a strain as our institutions, as society can bear for 92,000 people to press an issue which puts 84,000 people in the class of supporters of crime?

The fruit is not ripe on that showing. There was 8,000 majority in Kansas for the prohibitory liquor law. Heaven be praised for what that indicates. But there was 41,000 majority in Kansas for Garfield.

As a social question there is a good deal clearer horizon in Kansas for putting a man who votes the Democratic ticket into the criminal class than there is to consider a man an aider and abettor of crime because he votes against a prohibitory law.

We may rejoice to find that the majority of the people of Kansas are of pronounced temperance principles. But is it not a blunder to incorporate a prohibitory provision in so sacred a thing as a state constitution by so small a majority, especially when a minority of such tre-

mendous proportions is animated—if not by its convictions, at least by its temper? Consider the large element of the people of Kansas who are of foreign birth and breeding, with their notions of the sinlessness of drinking unless it amounts to intoxication. Is it a wise moral procedure to put the opinions and customs of that class—but a few years among us—under constitutional ban?

There will be solid miles of German settlements where the new clause of the constitution will be so much brown paper—wet at that.

Is it nothing to put such an element into an attitude of contempt for law? Is it said that it must be taught respect for law? Yes, but by what force? By the exasperating effect of law brought to bear against them, or by moral effort to sink that respect into their moral convictions? They have respect for law now so far as they are convinced that law ought to go.

The people of Kansas may find that they have made a high bid for contempt of law—for fraud upon law. It is in vain to enact a law and call upon people to support it as holy, because it is law, unless they are convinced that it is holy, as principle, before it becomes law.

And now comes from Kansas the proposed statute to enforce the new clause of the constitution.

This statute prohibits the use of fermented wine in the Communion. I am willing to go, in general consent, to the abolition from the Communion table of anything that is called or might be made wine. I am willing to substitute water and have done with the matter. But I confess that I revolt against regulation of that sacrament by statute.

One grows thoughtful, too, when he thinks of putting an imputation of criminality upon the holiest exercise of the holiest souls during the whole history of Christianity.

Have we so exhausted the genius of the 10th chapter of 1st Corinthians in the church that we must fly to a statute to regulate the table of the Lord?

Is not the disposition of the church likely to be a better guide on the matter in view than the temper of politicians?

If you want to cook a prohibitory hare, first catch a prohibitory hare. If you desire a thing treated as a crime you must first produce the conviction that it is a crime. Your vision may be clear; but suppose your neighbors are two to one against you? Suppose you are even two to one against your neighbor? There are many things to be thought of even then.

I cannot see any fallacy in this position: Prohibition has crime in view—the people have not yet come to the point where they regard the matter to be covered by prohibition as a crime. What follows? Much. Three-fourths, perhaps nine-tenths of the people will help in regulation.

There is an open door to the production of public sentiment.

The Apostles did not ask for a law to prohibit idolatry, but they called on “all men everywhere to repent,” and in three centuries idolatry was not.

When prohibition of idolatry was enacted, Christianity ceased to be what it had been.

Feeling that the proposition to give woman the ballot on the subject of license—the so-called Home Protection plan—had not had exhaustive thought upon it, I invited not long since the women in the community in which I live to give, on a certain Sunday evening, either orally or in writing, an opinion on the Home Protection proposition as to its bearings upon temperance as a moral reform, and upon universal suffrage for woman. Many excellent opinions were given. Some variety of view was elicited. A large majority of the opinions were in favor of the Home Protection proposition. One lady sent in a written opinion, which, without her knowledge, I take the liberty to transfer to these pages. It indicates points upon which thought may yet be profitably expended. The opinion runs as follows:

“Under this call for an expression of opinion by the women of this place I should hesitate to speak of my *want* of opinion, did I not understand the object of the call to be to ascertain the public mind as well in its *hesitation* as in its conviction.

“With reference to the first point, a mental canvass of *this* community leaves me with the impression that on

the question of license very few families would be divided by a sex line. Such instances might possibly occur, but would not be more frequent, I think, than divisions between those of the same sex in the same family. What would be true of this community would, I suppose, be true in a general way of other communities.

"I do not think the extension of suffrage to woman would greatly affect, anywhere, the relative strength of the votes for and against license. Considering the question abstractly, I should suppose it would make a vast difference, for the women are few and the men many who want the saloon for their own use. But taking into account the families that I know, I can scarcely find one where I believe the men would vote for and the women against the saloon. Still I have the impression that the votes of women might, probably would, make some small difference in the relative strength of the two sides. If so, in closely balanced communities, like our own, women might often turn the scale *at the polls*.

"And were I not convinced that the use of liquor cannot even be diminished by legal means, except when there is an immense preponderance of public sentiment in favor of those means, I should hope much from woman suffrage.

"As to woman suffrage in general, I shrink somewhat from its oncoming, as I should shrink from any great change which might bring unforeseen consequences. Yet it seems to me that most of the arguments that are used against woman suffrage tell with equal force against popular suffrage. If voting has a corrupting tendency, let us keep men out of it as well as women.

"But on the whole, in spite of all the abuses that it leads into, government by the whole people seems to be favorable to the best development of mankind. If women are one day to share political duties and burdens with men, this gradual taking up of the burdens seems likely to bring about the change with the least shock.

"So if I were again called on to sign the petition for Home Protection I think I would do as I did before, not pledging myself, however, to exercise the privilege of voting in this matter if it were granted."

This opinion fastens attention on some salient points.

I have no view other than is therein expressed in reference to woman suffrage in general. The desirability of that must be decided by women themselves. When women in large majority desire the ballot they should have it. I am not yet quite convinced of its necessity or advantage to woman or to society. In my uncertainty I think I shall trust to woman when she says clearly that she *sees*. But of one thing we may be assured. The ballot on license entails universal suffrage. After this the deluge—so much of an event as that may be. This may be no objection to woman's ballot on license, only it ought to be seen that the ballot here carries the whole case.

There is no valid reason why the ballot should stop with the temperance question—perhaps no reason why it should begin with it. If woman's ballot can purify society, there are other evils that press right along which must be met and overcome by it. It may be wise to take a long breath before reaching conclusion on this Home Protection plan. It certainly will be wise for woman to take a long breath after the right to the ballot is obtained, before she decides how to use it on the temperance question. In the present state of our society it is not a plain matter that it is duty to vote for prohibition. The higher law of entering into the moral condition of those in opposition may veto the prohibitory vote.

The consciousness that one has *not* done *moral duty* may make one pause before putting the temperance question under the manipulation of politics and law.

The vote of woman *may* be a *substitute* for moral influence, not an aid of it. She may learn to say, as I think most men do, "Send the constable."

Perhaps that is no reason why women should not vote. But right there lies an open door to a possible and probable decline of moral power in the community. The Home Protection movement may give us certain political and legal results without accompanying moral convictions.

Human nature must receive some very remarkable change if the moral force of woman's ballot on temperance does not finally settle to the ethical level of a lawsuit. There is where man's has gone before her. A pro-

hibitory law, or no-license, secured by woman's vote, may become long tongs by which to save the unpleasantness of what can yet be well managed only by contact of hand.

Is this a reactionary attitude on the temperance question? I am compelled to speak as I do because I know there is a large element of earnest, conscientious thought in behalf of temperance, lying in the direction of these views, that hardly dares express itself.

I could not retain my own self-respect did I not file this demurrer to the conclusions of the extremists. I ask simply that so much force be allowed the demurrer as there is force in the reason of it.

It may be that voting for a prohibitory liquor law is not the only possible exercise for the moral nature of man—may not under some circumstances even be a proper exercise of man's moral nature. "The commandment is exceeding broad" and includes a great many considerations.

Individuals must work to their own results in their own light.

My light is this: If we were cut off from the possibility of looking in a political and legal direction for methods in the temperance cause, beyond a judicious use of the principle of local option and the enforcement of common police regulations, for the next twenty-five years, we should at the end of that time realize a more radical temperance ideal than we are likely to do in the course we shall pursue.

We should then be held to legitimate moral work.

Instead of making a vote do our work, we should do it ourselves. It is a poor way to give a man moral enlightenment to vote at him.

Information being given and the truth spoken in love, we should secure such results as that course can bring. As it is, we shall secure such moral results as are enclosed in writs. The judgment of the radicals in any cause as to ways and means is often not the best.

The very fact of tense conviction as to something that ought to be done may make one hasty and inconsiderate as to the mode of doing it.

"The mills of God grind slowly" and we wish to set some other mill grinding.

An act of the legislature is as handy as a shillalah, and the fingers itch to pick it up.

Our divorce statutes are an outgrowth of the same disposition to remedy all human evils by law. Somebody is unhappy and there must be a statute to help him or her.

I should be derelict in duty if, having gone so far in this discussion, I did not indicate some outline of policy to be pursued.

So composite is the population of this state, so variant is the strength of the temperance sentiment in different localities, that any general state statute cannot be framed that will meet all the exigencies of the case.

It will be a long while before it will be wisdom to try a state statute which will have any more comprehensive provision than that of local option. It is not wisdom to attempt to govern this conglomerate city and some homogeneous rural village by the same statute.

On the proposition to close public houses on Sunday Mr. Gladstone says: "It is not a question of constitutional or of political arrangement, but one of police, and as such Parliament should distinguish between different portions of the Kingdom."

In places in the country where there is an undoubted preponderance of no-license sentiment—one on which reliance can be placed from year to year, the no-license position may be insisted on and the writ may follow where the clearly expressed abiding public will is not respected. But the places are few, I think, where the field is so clear.

Let us look at the case of towns where the sentiment respecting license is about equally divided—probably the case of a majority of our towns. Suppose the prohibitory element to come into ascendancy in one year.

The saloons are not licensed. Suits are commenced against them. These suits are appealed and continued through the year. The next year the license party have the most votes, license is granted and the suits discontinued. Thus the thing goes on from year to year in the see-saw of politics.

In such cases it is better to secure as close restrictions

as possible and then call on all citizens to help enforce the provisions of the license.

The most of our German citizens who would defend to the utmost a saloon in a no-license year—refusing to find a verdict against it in any case because such verdict would be construed as a prohibition victory—would assist in any prosecution for the sale of liquor to minors or for keeping a disorderly house. In any of our country towns dependence can be put on Germans as on Americans to help so far on the temperance road. I should not scorn but accept such assistance.

If you ask me if I would vote for license, I say, yes, in the cases immediately in view.

Now I shall be straightway asked if I would do evil that good might come. I think those who ask this question on reflection will see its unfairness. I do no evil at all. The evil will exist do what I may. I simply tax and restrain what I cannot control. And I combine and consolidate restraining influences in a greater degree in this way than will be exerted in any other. I shall still practice abstinence, bear my testimony against the institution of the saloon and believe that Christian influences will in time abolish it.

It is unfortunate that we have the word license in our statute. "Words make this way and that," says Plato.

In Michigan, instead of "licensing" a saloon they "tax" a saloon. It makes all the difference in the world with many people whether you "license" or "tax," though the thing done is just the same. But the truth is that "tax" better describes the fact, for the liquor would be sold anyway. License in fact gives no *permission* which would not be taken without it.

Yet it would be gain to say "tax"; a certain *seeming* would disappear under that word which comes to the front in the other.

So "local judgment" would be better than "local option." It is by no option of mine that a saloon exists in the village in which I live. It is there, it has been, and will be in spite of me. It is my judgment that it should be restrained and "taxed."

Now look at this city—Chicago. Do you suppose you

do the temperance cause any favor by advocating in the present condition of things the application of prohibition to this city? What do we want of more law? The laws we have cannot be enforced. Even the civil damage law—a law certainly that has many equities in its favor—one from which we hoped so much when it was enacted—is up to this date a dead letter in this city, no single verdict having been recovered under it. For years rights of action under that law have lain about

"Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks
In Vallombrosa."

The fate of that law, its uselessness to its ends, ought to teach us how utterly serviceless the best law may be. Home protection would be a rush sword—it would double back on itself.

But if the men who have Christian hearts and clear heads would call on all citizens to combine to suppress unlicensed and disorderly saloons—to declare forfeit the licenses of those keepers who sold to minors and to hold all to strict rules—so much could be carried in this city, high and dry, from year to year. I believe it duty in this city to recognize and affiliate with that large German element, who fight you successfully on prohibition, but who would help you on the line of strict regulation.

Is it Christian wisdom, because you cannot have everything you want, to lie off and let things go to loose ends? I have faith to believe that a real, hearty, kindly effort at combination of all the elements favorable to regulation of the saloons would soon give you closed saloons on Sunday.

Why is not a direction which Jesus gave for the government of the church a good thing to be put in action in all social difficulties? If you have any trouble, go to the parties that make it and talk it over. Take the Sunday saloon question in this city. Why would it not be a good thing to have a conference with the officers of the saloon-keepers' association to begin with? If they will not listen to your request, tell it to the city—tell just what you said and just what they said, and let the people decide on the case. I believe you could get such popular

verdict as you desire. If you could not, it would show just where moral work is to be done. There are many things besides politics and law to be thought of in the temperance question.

Will you think what opportunity there is in square miles of this city for a man who is unemployed to find a chair in which to sit and rest except in a saloon—what chance there is in cold weather for him to find a fire by which he may be warm, and not be an intruder or a trespasser, except in a saloon—what chance there is for him to get a cup of tea or coffee that can compare in cheapness and in palatableness as a drink with the lager he can find in a saloon?

If we substituted the word nutrition for prohibition it would solve the evil of intemperance over a wide realm. There is an incomputable amount of liquor swallowed, especially by working men, to aid indigestion—the result of bad cooking, or of indifferent, untimely or unsuitable meals.

A writer in the *Contemporary Review* of last August says that drinking in England is “a secondary evil—that the public house does not represent so much the power of appetite as the lack of a home.”

The statistics, which are relied on to show that drink is almost the universal cause of crime, are subject to challenge. Drinking is often the effect as well as the cause of crime.

There is a certain class of crimes of which drink is undoubtedly the cause. Wife beating, assaults and some murders are so caused. But there is also a large class of crimes of which drink cannot be the cause, and if drink goes along with them it can only be regarded as a concomitant, or even a subsequent. In fact crime and drinking are to be regarded as different ways in which a general low moral condition manifests itself. There is a lower deep which causes both drunkenness and crime.

Then bear in mind how the condition of neighborhoods and of the country are altered by the changes in our population—by immigration.

The thing that could be done is the thing which cannot be done. We have another and a more difficult problem than we had twenty-five years ago.

In the last ten years we have received 3,200,000 immigrants. Somewhere towards a seventh of our population were foreign-born. The liability to receive refractory material is the penalty of opening so wide the national arms. The communities are few where you can wisely and justly attempt to do by law what you might do were it not for the presence of this alien element.

Political and legal action with us is altogether too facile. Every man can make a party and demand the enactment of his pet scheme into law.

It is only necessary for him to hold the balance of power in a legislature—to stand a solitary pivot over which the greater parties can or must turn—for him to succeed, though the larger parties hate both him and his measures.

Our statute books are lumbered with legislation ahead of moral sentiment, secured in just this way. The whole system is a reproach to morals, the contempt of politics, and the disgust and scorn of law.

I can see how the sharp, impatient spirit of the Puritan, looking at any evil, can hardly abide it—how it must, to be true to itself, cry out, “It must be abolished”—“prohibited.” I honor that spirit. It is a great executor in this world.

But as experience widens, I see more and more that the spirit of the Quaker is the practical solvent of many a human difficulty—the disposition to rely more on life and testimony and less on the force of the secular arm. And truly has not this spirit a deep religious setting?

In the description in the Apocalypse of the state of society in ancient Pergamos, there are certain things declared, by One in “the midst of the seven golden candlesticks,” to be “hateful.” They were things that ought to be exterminated. Yet the “Alive Forevermore” did not threaten writs and a posse comitatus. “I will fight against them with the sword of my mouth.”

NOTE.—1897. I do not see that the fifteen years that have passed since the above was written have made it compulsory to reverse many of my judgments.

As to whether the people regard the selling and drinking of liquor “as a crime like other crimes,” this fact may be put in evi-

dence: In this year of grace 1897, out of 54 arrests reported in a paper published in Portland, Me., 47 were for drunkenness.

We have woman suffrage in Colorado. It is too early to tabulate results consequent, but I will hazard this prediction: We shall have more politics and law than we had before, but no more morality.

I have not the authorities at hand, but it seems now to be demonstrated that the smaller the political or governmental unit over which prohibition is sought to be enforced, the more certainty there is that it will succeed. That is because moral influences are a matter of close range. Prohibition advocates may canvass a whole state and not do as much good as a man will by speaking with his neighbor.

CHAPTER X.

MORALS AND DIVORCE.

I WILL not burden these pages with columns of statistics pertaining to marriage and divorce. From a careful study of the statistics I find that in the United States, on an average, from an eighth to a tenth of those who seek marriage seek divorce. Society is teaching that there is a road out of marriage as well as one into it. The courts stand open everywhere for divorce business as for any other. The dockets are crowded with divorce suits and the cases dispatched with brusque celerity. From the fact that this immense business is done by law we are at liberty to infer that the people are quite indifferent about polygamy, provided it be consecutive and not contemporaneous.

The ratio of divorces to marriages for a generation has been rapidly rising in all sections of the country—sometimes more than doubling in ten years. Now to a Christian moralist this is not a very pleasant nor hopeful state of affairs. The question arises how it has come about.

Proximately it may be said that there has been in almost every state increase of legislation favorable to divorce. But that is answer not radical enough to suit our purposes. **Why has such legislation arisen?**

It has come about because of the hesitancy—the uncertainty of moral conviction on the subject among the people.

Strange as it may seem, the Christian church, with a very clear charter before it for its direction, has been singularly divided and has uttered very uncertain sounds on this subject.

Thus such moral convictions, as there have been, have not been gathered up and directed against the evil to be met and overborne. One would think that the Christian church had a very plain charter in reference to divorce in the words of Christ (Matt. xix. 9): “I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery.”

Yet the history of thought will show no more labored and massive blundering than has been committed on this subject of divorce, with that plain direction before the mind.

Nothing is more admirable than the hold the Catholic Church has on her communicants, the round world over, in the matter of divorce. With an insignificant exception the foot of that church is on the whole divorce business. She does not tolerate it even in cases of adultery. Loose laws for divorce, strict laws for divorce or no laws at all concern her not. No one divorced, except a Christian from a heathen, can partake of her sacraments. In face of all the social and legal influences leading in the direction of liberty of divorce, it is wonderful how well she holds her masses in hand. Yet the position of the Catholic Church on the divorce question is a gigantic blunder and helps confound the confusion.

If she holds her subjects from divorce, the reasons why she does so become part and parcel of the excuse those outside her fold can give for tolerating and practicing it.

When, with the plain direction of the Savior before it, the largest section of the Christian church will not allow divorce for adultery, it is not strange that the rest of mankind conclude that there is no sense or force to anything said in the scripture on the subject.

If the Catholic Church can read out, from the words of the Savior, the explicit permission of divorce in case of adultery, the rest of the world can read into them permission of divorce for every cause. This latter feat the German commentator De Wette absolutely executes, saying that by specifying one ground of divorce Christ allows others—of course putting himself in direct antagonism to the common sense principle: *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*.

But the procedure of De Wette does no more violence to the language of Christ than does that of the Catholic Church.

Whoever denies an exception plainly expressed lays foundation for some one to deny the rule.

The council of Trent pronounced anathema on any one who should say that the church errs when it says there can be no divorce in case of adultery.

How came the Catholic Church to occupy that position? The story is as long as the history of Christianity. But this may be stated as a key to the solution of the mystery.

There grew up in the early centuries this system of philosophy which still hovers over Catholic and Protestant churches alike. Christ imperfectly expanded his system and Paul filled it out. Wherever Christ and Paul touched on kindred subjects Paul's was the latest and most perfect utterance and must have the preference. Christ is to be read in Paul. That principle, repugnant as it ought to be to orthodox souls, compelled the Catholic and Protestant churches alike to their contradictory, inconsequential and forceless positions on divorce and on many other matters besides. The later fathers, reading in Paul, found him saying in the seventh chapter of 1st Corinthians: "Unto the married I command, yet not I but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from her husband:

"But and if she depart, let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband."

Unable to make out what Paul was doing here, unless he were modifying and helping out Christ's system, these fathers concluded, according to their system of constructive philosophy, that this must be the last and the most obligatory utterance on the subject of divorce. So with this they overruled Christ's exception and passed along their system of construction and interpretation till it was permanently adopted by the council of Trent.

It will at once be seen that these fathers had to help out so flexible a philosophy by the *assumption* that Paul was treating of a departure of a wife from her husband because he was guilty of *adultery*. For this assumption there is not the slightest foundation in a single word uttered by Paul.

But that is the road over which the Catholic Church has come to make the word of Christ of none effect as it is set forth in the exception in his rule.

Going on still further in their studies in Paul, the fathers found what they took for an explicit permission for divorce in a case of desertion of a Christian by a heathen partner. So they made one further amendment. After striking out Christ's exception in case of adultery,

they inserted, instead, desertion of a Christian by a heathen partner.

So the Catholic position of to-day may be stated as no divorce at all except in this case of desertion in a mixed heathen and Christian marriage.

Of course when the church has uttered its "Thus saith the church," that is an end of all strife to the masses. But it is a little curious to see how this Samson, shorn of authority, becomes weak as any other man when it condescends to reason. Canon Todd, in an article in the *Contemporary Review* of the year 1875, defends the Catholic position on divorce. But by what argument? This:—Mark and Luke do not have the permissive exception clause in the statement of the rule.

But Matthew *does*. Is what is not expressed to rule out what is? Shades of Strauss and Baur! What can we not do in your methods?

One way in which to bring about a united public opinion—one that shall tell as a social force over all the community—is for the Catholic Church to abandon its wrong attitude on the exception in the Savior's rule.

But if the Catholic Church has been in a wrong attitude the Protestant Church has been still more wrong. It has added desertion as another exception to the inviolability of marriage as laid down in Christ's rule.

The general course of Protestant opinion and comment until recently has taken no notice of the restriction to mixed marriages of what Paul said about desertion. High Protestant authorities have allowed divorce in any case of desertion.

The Catholic asserted the rule, denied the exception, and substituted for the exception desertion restricted to certain cases.

The Protestant asserted the rule, asserted the exception and added to the exception desertion without restriction. The Protestant's added exception is one that practically can make void Christ's rule.

Desertion is a sieve through which all marriage can filter into dissolution.

Out of what language has desertion been foisted in to mar the Savior's rule? Paul has said (1 Cor. vii. 15):

"But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God hath called us to peace."

Now we must first look at the ancient system of philosophy of interpretation which allowed that statement to "alter and repeal" what Christ has said.

Really who is first, Christ or Paul? If Christ were to express himself clearly and explicitly on a subject and Paul were to express himself clearly and explicitly in opposition to what Christ says, who should stand aside? If Christ has expressed himself clearly and there is uncertainty about Paul's language, about its meaning and application, then what ought to be done? One would think that Christ's definiteness ought to overrule confusion about Paul. But the exact opposite is the course which has been pursued. There is uncertainty as to Paul's meaning. But a construction has been put upon the uncertain element in Paul's language and problem, and that construction has then been brought forth to override language used by Christ clear as ever struck the mental comprehension of man.

What has been constructed into Paul is this—that he is treating of divorce—that he is regulating marriage, providing for its dissolution and for re-marriage. Here as elsewhere in scripture, what is constructed into it makes trouble. Such commentators as Neander, Tholuck, Stanley and Woolsey substantially agree in the view that Paul is only treating of a matter of manners and conduct *in marriage* and that he has not under contemplation the dissolution of the marriage relation at all.

There are a few considerations, aside from the matter of putting Paul in antagonism to Christ, to which I wish to call attention.

Paul in this chapter in 1st Corinthians is making an argument *against marriage at all*.

Is it likely when he is opposing normal marriages that he would go out of his way to set up abnormal marriages? Then again (and I am surprised that attention has not been fastened to this point), what a tremendous leap Paul must have been taking over into heathen society as a legislator in respect to *its* marriages!

That Paul might legislate for the *Christian church*, as such, even in civil matters can be conceived. But that he should go further and stretch out his hand over heathen laws and interfere with their operations is something past reception. For the very words which are supposed to inaugurate the right of divorce for desertion disclose the fact that the desertion is conceived of as the act of a heathen partner.

The marriages of the heathen had a certain sacredness in their eyes. Desertions and reconciliations were the order of the day then as they have ever been in human nature. Must not something like this have occurred and left its mark in history?

A heathen husband deserts his Christian wife. After a few days'—perhaps hours' absence, he returns. His wife tells him that he has no further relation with her—that he is divorced and that she intends to marry some one else.

When he asks for her authority for such procedure she tells him that at a meeting of her Christian church the night before she heard a letter read from one Paul of Cilicia, who was a leader among the Christians, giving her the right, when her husband went off, to divorce him and marry some one else. Is it to be supposed Paul lost sanity far enough to put himself into such attitude of legislation over the heathen? If he did, would not the outcome of that attitude, in the complications it would have insured, have been heard of in history?

This whole system of philosophy and exegesis breaks utterly in pieces.

The simple fact is, Christ expressed his mind on divorce and *Paul uttered no word on divorce*.

All that Paul said went no further than regulation of manners and conduct in the marriage relation. "If the unbelieving depart, make no trouble, let him go." Paul regarded these parties, separated because of religion, still as husband and wife. "For how dost thou know, O wife, but that thou mayest save *thy husband*?" Or, better, "How knowest, O wife, that (by compelling him to stay) thou wilt save *thy husband*?"

While the church has been uttering these uncertain and

contradictory sounds, is it any wonder that secular society has had its confusions?

The civil and the canon law grew up side by side. When the Roman Empire became nominally Christian the secular power could not yet hold the people to the strictness of the church on the matter of divorce.

In the civil law there lingered along forces that ran back for their mainspring into the conditions of the old heathen society. By these secular laws of the later Roman Empire and its successors in Europe divorce was allowed for various causes, much as we now permit it by statute. But the church had its rules and its practices on this and on many other subjects of mixed secular and moral concern.

These rules and practices grew into what is called canon law.

Canon law came early to prevail in England, and so there grew up there the practice of sending all matters pertaining to divorce to the ecclesiastical courts.

Down to the year 1857 divorce was administered in England in the ecclesiastical courts according to canon law.

According to the law of the church, divorce from the bond of matrimony, i. e., dissolution of the marriage bond so as to allow re-marriage, could only take place for the single cause of desertion—strictly desertion of a Christian by a heathen partner.

Following canon law, divorce from the bond of matrimony was not allowed in England for adultery till the year 1857.

Practically, then, under the jurisdiction of the canon law, as heathenism passed away, marriage was absolutely indissoluble.

One would think this left the church without any mission on the subject.

No, the church was not oblivious to the ills of the state of marriage and it did its best to meet them. The church provided a disciplinary process for all those evils for which we are now almost indiscriminately breaking the marriage bond.

This disciplinary process it called divorce *a mensa et*

thoro, i. e., divorce from table and bed, or as we say, from bed and board.

In a case of cruelty of a husband toward a wife, for instance, instead of breaking the marriage bond and of allowing the parties to marry again whomsoever they listed, it placed a temporary edict upon the power of the husband over the wife, restoring to her her right of individual control until it was satisfied of his reformation, or until reconciliation had been effected between the parties.

Where the canon law was adopted, as in England, as part of the law of the land, these disciplinary decrees of the ecclesiastical courts were enforced by the secular arm.

As might be supposed from the fact of the composite nature of the settlement of this country and that it was the ecclesiastical law of England which was so distasteful to the leading influences in the formation of our institutions, the ecclesiastical law of England never formed a part of the common law of this land. *So in this country if there were no statutes to sustain them there could be no actions for divorce.* There is no common-law right to such action existing in the United States. The whole matter stands in statute, and our position respecting divorce represents the wisdom or the unwisdom, the righteousness or the fraud, of legislators.

In very many of the states provision has been made for divorce from bed and board as well as divorce from the bond of matrimony.

Sometimes it is left by statute at the option of the parties to apply, for the same causes, for divorce *a vinculo* or divorce *a mensa et thoro*.

But there has been a tendency in later years not to recognize divorce *a mensa* at all. It is not provided for in the statutes of Illinois. Divorce, for whatever cause, must be in this state a total sundering of the marriage bond.

Divorce *a mensa*, standing in the statutes of Massachusetts for generations, was abolished in the year 1870. The bad tendency of the public mind and practice is, I think, nowhere more evident than in the treatment this matter of divorce *a mensa* has received. Some lawyers and judges have had a special spite against it, and, tak-

ing special pains to make their spite prominent, they have unfavorably modified public opinion, or at any rate secured legislation unfriendly to this action.

One reason why men have set themselves against it is just because of its origin. To many men nothing can be good that comes out of the church.

But it ought to be remembered that the restrictions on divorce in European civilization and its derivatives are due almost if not quite entirely to the church. If we are to go anywhere and to study any one's methods of dealing with divorce or with restrictions upon it, the church is the first party to which we should resort.

It was the first power that laid prohibition on the right of divorce according to the individual will which prevailed in the Roman Empire. All the instrumentalities with which it wrought to bring out in practice the high estimate of marriage it has actually created, deserve serious consideration.

The church has always known how to deal with the masses a great deal better than it has how to interpret the word of God.

If you look at the matter from an *a priori* point of view, something like divorce *a mensa* would seem to be most naturally suggested. If there are evils in the married state it would seem to be a rational proceeding not to break up a marriage by civil power till an attempt had been made by civil power to eliminate its ills. Yet Illinois does just that irrational thing by refusing divorce *a mensa* a place in its statutes.

Take a case of cruelty in marriage as an original matter of consideration. Would it not seem a proper function of society to put its protecting power around a wife and to inhibit a cruel husband from his control over her person?

That would meet the evil by something adapted to the evil.

But now what we do is actually to put a premium upon cruelty by breaking up the marriage bond and permitting the guilty as well as the innocent re-marriage.

A man in this state can have as many wives consecutively as he desires, by being cruel enough, to each in

turn that he marries, to induce her to commence a suit for divorce *a vinculo*. We invite men to play high in cruelty.

So of all these other evils that file along before us in the statutes as causes of divorce.

Our position is just that of statutory invitation to their commission. If a man were held to kind treatment of his wife, or in default thereof should find that society would suspend his power as a husband without giving him the privilege of another wife, we should be likely to hear less of cruelty in the marriage relation.

Now it is just exactly that wisdom which the church invented and practiced—the wisdom of eliminating the evil instead of breaking up the marriage.

The power of society thus becomes disciplinary, not disruptive, in its fundamental relation.

There is a prejudice among lawyers against divorce *a mensa* because it did not have place in English common law. But the utter inadequacy of common law to the social situation is proved plainly enough by the mass of statute law by which society tries to meet its exigencies. The old common law did not contain all wisdom—could not contain it, if there is any truth that social evolution is from the simple to the complex.

It is only necessary to read in legal treatises to find that in legal quarters there is a pet passion against divorce *a mensa*.

As the lawyers manipulate most of the legislating, this aversion finds expression in the refusal to put divorce *a mensa* upon the statute book or in its removal therefrom.

Lord Stowell a hundred years ago said that divorce *a mensa* left the parties “in the undefined and dangerous character of a wife without a husband and a husband without a wife.” That remark is copied as great wisdom from law book to law book and is carefully preserved even to this day.

Now it is not to be denied that a hundred years ago there was brutality prevalent in English society, high and low, which would regard any woman not specially under the protection of some man as game for sensuality. But it is suggested that there has been amelioration in

manners and morals such that Lord Stowell's wisdom is outlawed.

Have we any such social state as that a wife and a mother who should ask of society protection from the cruelties of a drunken husband and yet should have sentiment enough and regard enough for religion—for what she considers the teaching of God on the subject—not to desire the bond of matrimony to be sundered, hoping that out of discipline reason and the old love will return, should be considered an “undefined and dangerous character” or be in an “undefined and dangerous position” in society?

Judge Swift's remark that “divorce *a mensa* places parties in a situation where there is an irresistible temptation to the commission of adultery” is also carefully preserved.

That remark is simply a standing insult to everybody, and I would not quote it were it not necessary, in order that the influences that are brought to bear upon legal minds in law treatises might be made evident. From minds so tutored comes legislation on divorce—come the “general infelicity” clauses—the “*omnium gatherums*” of marriage ills for which divorce *a vinculo* is allowed.

Mr. Bishop, whose treatise for well-nigh a generation has held the legal field on the subject of divorce, designates divorce *a mensa* as “an ill-begotten monster made up of pious doctrine and worldly stupidity.” He further says: “It could never have been tolerated for a moment but for the idea having entered men's minds, as a part of their religion, that marriage could not be dissolved without committing an offense against God.”

This, bear in mind, is argument, in our leading elementary treatise on divorce, against divorce *a mensa*. To it we have to reply: Exactly so; divorce *a mensa* could not have arisen unless the idea had entered men's minds, as a part of their religion, that marriage cannot be dissolved for other causes than adultery without committing an offense against God.

Mr. Bishop has succeeded in making a most excellent statement of one of the deep convictions of the Christian religion. It is strange he did not have perception enough

to see to what he was putting himself in antagonism. He assails one of the fundamental convictions of Christianity—one that has been felt in society—one that will yet again be felt, though now it be asleep.

"This nuisance of a law is suffered to stand unquestioned in more than half the states of this country," is quotation from Bishop's treatise. Is that argument? Is that elementary comment on law? The fact is that aside from its character as a thesaurus of the facts in the law and the practice of divorce, and as a compend of legal decisions, Mr. Bishop's treatise is unworthy of the position it has held.

It is sophomorical in style, sophisticated in argument, passionately blind, and inconclusive in philosophy.

I have called attention to this state of affairs in the law because a great many people cannot understand how it is that we have drifted into such an attitude in legislation on divorce.

They are not aware what influences have been at work at the springs of legislation.

I do not know what influences prevailed on the legislature of Massachusetts to repeal the statute authorizing and regulating divorce *a mensa*, but I have no hesitation in saying that I consider one of the most potent of these influences to be a generation of lawyers indoctrinated with the passion and wrong-headedness of Bishop on Divorce.

There has been in the various states of the Union more or less of tinkering of the statutes in aid of interested parties. The people of a whole state sometimes wake up to the discovery of the fact that they have a new law on divorce or an important modification of pre-existing law favorable to easy divorce.

The probability is that the whole matter has no deeper foundation than the wiles of that ever active individual the "smart attorney," who thus makes a clear field for some client who wants the privilege of consecutive polygamy.

These statutory permissions for divorce for all kinds of causes have crept in while public attention has been directed to something else. They do not represent public

sentiment. They represent simply the desires of a few uneasy spirits and the flexibility of legislatures under adroit manipulation. They exist simply by sufferance. The people have never demanded them.

It is safe to say that not one of these alterations favoring loose divorce was ever called for by representative petition of the people.

The evils that are upon us came by statute, and by statute they can be made to depart.

Divorces rise and fall just according to legislation.

In the year 1879 there were granted 316 divorces in the state of Connecticut. That number was 85 less than the year before—130 less than the average for many years preceding.

This was the result of the repeal of a single clause in the divorce law.

Vermont granted in 1879, 126 divorces, which were 71 less than the number of the year before—the result of a modification of the divorce statute. Yet we hear of no general distress—no threatenings of insurrection in those states because divorce has not been as loose as before.

If society could be purified by optional divorce there ought to be a very perceptible increase in its happiness and morals since the flood gates of divorce were opened in this country.

But there are many now living whose experience runs back to the days of stricter practice in reference to the indissolubleness of marriage. Their testimony would be that those days were not more intolerable than these.

There were thirty-five causes or specifications, aside from adultery, on which divorce was granted in Massachusetts in 1881. Yet down to 1836 there were only just two causes for which divorce *a vinculo* could be had in that state, to wit, adultery and impotency.

Desertion was not a cause for divorce in Massachusetts till 1838.

Now life was as tolerable and society as healthy in the generation of our fathers in Massachusetts as it is in these days of free divorce. If Massachusetts were to blot out to-morrow the statutes which uphold thirty-three of these thirty-five specifications society would have no unfavor-

able experience as result. It would only notice that fewer suits for divorce than before were brought as the issue of its legislation.

It may be said that the argument here cuts both ways—that it is easy to conclude from it that no harm is done by such permissions of divorce. But that does not follow. The end of *this* condition of things is not yet. The most of the marriages now in existence were instituted when, even if laws had been modified, public opinion still held to the indissolubility of marriage.

But familiarity with the practice under our divorce statutes will gradually sap that public opinion. When that is altered—when we have a generation brought up in the knowledge that the marriage bond is easily broken, at the wish or whim of the parties, we shall see a rapid social disintegration, such as all peoples have suffered who have gone over this road.

The way out of our trouble is now safe and plain.

Let the statute recognize adultery as the only cause for divorce from the bond of matrimony.

Let it leave all other difficulties in the marriage relation to be settled by the parties themselves or to be regulated by the police power of society implied in the principle of divorce *a mensa et thoro*.

According to the statistics compiled by the Chicago Times there were begun in Cook County in the year 1875, 415 suits for divorce for other causes than adultery.

If there had been no statute for such cases society would never have heard of the evils which came to the surface in these divorce suits. In most of the cases the evils would never have had any existence, for the parties would have quietly adjusted themselves *in* marriage *because* there was no open road to them out of it.

Where there were real evils, like habitual drunkenness or cruelty, the guilty parties could have been held under the principle of divorce *a mensa* as wards of the court to or till good behavior.

This plan would satisfy all the religious elements of society.

The Catholic Church might still hold its stricter rule in its practice with its own communicants. But so far as

society went in its direction, it would doubtless have its approval.

Protestantism would be satisfied, for this plan would harmonize with its increasingly clear conviction as to the teaching of the New Testament. All lovers of morals would uphold it, because it would posit what society has found intellectually and ethically—the indissoluble family as the unit of social organization. The family is set in the moral convictions of the people. Whatever is destructive of the family or detrimental to it must step aside.

The President (Arthur) has given this manly utterance in reference to polygamy in Utah: "In my judgment it is the duty of Congress, while respecting to the uttermost the conscientious convictions and religious scruples of every citizen, to prohibit within its jurisdiction all criminal practices, especially of that class which destroy the family relations and endanger social order."

It will be with nerveless step that we shall attempt to stamp out polygamy in Utah, because we shall be conscious of inconsistency, until we reform our law and practice respecting divorce.

COMMENTS ON SOME VIEWS FROM A LAWYER'S COIGNE.

I find in the September (1889) number of "The Law," a periodical published in Chicago, an article on the scriptural doctrine of divorce. I wish to make some comment on this article.

The author quotes what Jesus said, to wit: "I say unto you that whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery."

Then the question follows: "This plainly is an admission of divorce for one cause; is it not more?" Well, *what* more? One would like to see *that particular more* written out. It is easy enough to *inquire* if there is not something more in the Savior's language than its face shows, easy enough to assert that there is; but *what is it?*

The Pharisees ask if it is lawful for a man to put away his wife for *every* cause. If Jesus did not limit his answer to *one* cause, what are the causes, plus this one, which he included in his answer? If there are such causes, there included in the language of Jesus, somebody can *show* them to be there.

The next question is: "Is there not in the assigned motive of Moses' law an approval of such legislation as under all the circumstances, and in the best judgment of legislators, will conduce to the greatest good of society?" If Jesus had stopped in what he said with the assignment of the motive for Moses' law, there might be some pertinence to the question. If he had said no more than, "Moses for the hardness of your heart suffered you to put away your wives," then the question might arise whether what was allowable for Moses might not be allowable down time. But Jesus did *not* stop at the point of assigning a motive for Moses' law. He cut at that law and its motive both before and behind. He said that that law did not correspond to the intention of the condition of marriage "in the beginning," i. e., in the Divine intent, and then he went on to say what has no meaning if it does not mean this: I say unto you, whosoever avails himself of that law except in case of fornication becomes criminal himself.

Jesus might have given this turn to the matter: Moses for the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives and you may avail yourselves "of such legislation as under all the circumstances, and in the best judgment of legislators, will conduce to the greatest good of society"; but somehow he did not do it.

The question is asked, why Jesus did not criticise Moses for promulgating his law on divorce. The only answer there can be is because he did not choose to. Moses had been dead from twelve to fifteen hundred years and Jesus seems to have chosen to criticise the living rather than the dead, to criticise those who would avail themselves of the permissions of a law given in times of moral obtuseness. What Jesus did say to *them* was that they could not practice *under that law* by putting away their wives unless in case of adultery. The very point in issue before Jesus was what it was right to do *under the law*. That is just the corner into which Jesus was put by the Pharisees. They made him pass on the rightfulness or wrongfulness of practice under Moses' law and he did pass on it by saying: Moses allowed you to do so and so; but I say unto you, you are wrong to do what Moses allowed except in one instance.

This disposes of all the dust thrown in the air about the difference between private divorce and divorce by law. The Pharisees did not raise the question of private divorce. They did raise the question of what it was lawful to do under Moses' law, and Jesus told them.

It was the morality of transactions *under the law* that Jesus passed on.

Judge Horton, at Lake View last summer, said: "Jesus did not condemn that law; he only stated the motive of the law-giver without comment."

English and Greek cannot be plainer than the exact opposite of that statement.

If Jesus did not condemn the law he did condemn practice under it. He commented on it as something suited to unmoral times and then laid down his rule, cutting the whole ground from beneath the Mosaic permission save one exception.

Jesus was a moral teacher, but he did not hesitate to pass on the morality of laws, as the Sermon on the Mount shows again and again.

To-day no statute or legal proceeding can cover up and make right what Jesus pronounced wrong.

With reference to the Savior's words, "What God hath joined together let not man put asunder," I quote from the article: "It seems impossible to believe that some marriages were ordained or approved of God. May not the meaning of the words of Jesus have been: When *God* hath joined together a man and a woman as husband and wife, let not the man sunder that holy relation by putting the wife away?" That is to say, the happy marriages are ordained of God and the unhappy are not. It is related to the great credit of Buck Fanshaw that he never "shook his mother." The clergyman, if I remember rightly, asked in wonder why he should shake that estimable lady. When God hath joined together a man and a woman in a happy marriage, why should the man "shake his wife"? Is it probable that Jesus descended to the vapidness of saying that if a man found himself in a happy, God-ordained, divinely ideal marriage, he should not seek to break it up? Such a man *would* not break up such a

marriage. Jesus did not descend to the elemental flatness of telling him not to.

That of which he spoke was marriage, the condition, the institution, into which he said if one entered he should not come out thence unless on account of the high treason—the *lese-majeste*—the adultery—of a partner. If the language of Jesus does not convey that meaning it is impossible to put meaning into language. If Jesus did not say that he said nothing.

With regard to any supposed utterances of Paul on divorce only a few words need be said. Paul's express command to all parties save a Christian deserted by a heathen partner is to "remain unmarried."

In the case of a Christian deserted by a heathen partner he said: "If the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or sister"—what? "*Hath not been reduced to slavery.*" Paul has used a word there which he has used nowhere else in respect to the marriage relation. Elsewhere he has said that the husband is *bound* to the wife as long as he liveth—using a different verb from the one in the case in question. Paul means something by his change of terms. If you put the proper meaning to the term Paul has used in this case, you make him both consistent with himself and with Christ. To say there is no *slavery* in marriage is not to say that a deserted partner may go off and marry whomsoever he or she wishes.

There is an inherent absurdity in putting this construction upon Paul's language, for it puts him in the position of a legislator on Roman marriages or of a judge as to their validity.

The heathen partner had some rights in his marriage on the side of Roman law. Is it to be supposed that Paul meddled with those rights?

History gives an answer to that question. *There cannot be found an allusion to such sort of divorce with liberty of re-marriage till a century after the Roman Empire became Christian.* The work of adjusting married life in all that era of trouble and conflict has not left a trace of practice under Paul's supposed permission—not a word of a commentator supporting this supposed con-

struction. If when the trouble was on, people did not use Paul's supposed permission, it is because they did not see it in his text.

But one of the marvels is the slide over which is made from Paul's supposed permission of divorce, in a single case, to the permission of divorce for desertion in general. The possibility of the case that was before Paul has pretty much passed away. About the only men in this country who could claim right to practice under it are the "squaw men" in some of the unchristianized Indian tribes. If Paul granted a permission for divorce in a certain case, *we* have nothing to do with that matter, for the condition to which Paul's permission attached has passed away.

Judge Horton brought forth to do duty once more those precious morsels from Lord Stowell, Judge Swift, and Bishop, against divorce *a mensa et thoro*. It is only necessary to look at those quotations a moment to see what bosh they are.

A woman asks a court to give her the possession of her own person against a drunken and brutal husband. She is not in love with any one else, does not want to marry any one else. Judge Swift said that to grant a woman such a request is to put her in a position "where there is an irresistible temptation to commit adultery."

Such a sentence as that is simply a libel on God, man and woman, and it is about time men were ashamed to quote it.

THE SYMPOSIUM ON DIVORCE IN THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

The result of the discussion of divorce in the November number (1889) of the North American Review is as good, perhaps, as could be expected from the nature of the questions asked. To the caption: "Is divorce wrong?" the men are few, who for one reason or another, would not want to answer both yes and no. Mr. Ingersoll would probably want some sort of a statute, covering the matter, non-observance of which he would call wrong.

Cardinal Gibbons would call *a mensa et thoro*.

The main question splits up at once into: Divorce for

what causes? divorce of what sort? To the specifications under the general question: First: "Do you believe in divorce under any circumstances?" the answer would be, that depends on the circumstances. The same answer would be given to the second: "Ought divorced people to be allowed to marry under any circumstances?" The answer would be, that would depend on what the divorce was granted for.

"What is the effect of divorce on the integrity of the family?" The answer might be that under certain conditions it might tend to establish it. If a man, married to one woman, were living in concubinage with another, it would be a way to testify to the unity of family life to release the lawfully married woman from any relationship to such a husband.

No. 4 is a curious question, because it attempts to raise an issue about a condition which does not exist in this country save in South Carolina. "Does the absolute prohibition of divorce where it exists contribute to the moral purity of society?"

Suppose it did not, what then? Is society to be bluffed, bullied or coaxed into granting divorce to keep some people from committing crime?

If adultery *were* committed, in some degree more appreciable, as a result of striking off some of the statute causes under which divorce is now obtained, that would not prove that it would not be better after all for society to strike out those clauses.

If the question be, What would be a right statute? it would really seem not to require more knowledge than most people possess to answer it.

Any legislature that will repeal any clause in its statute allowing divorce for any cause except adultery, i. e., practical bigamy or polygamy, or that will transfer such clause from the *a vinculo* to the *a mensa* category, will do right. We need not wait any longer to begin a determined movement in this direction.

Must we wait another half century for Carroll Wright, or some successor, under authority of Congress, to put together another set of statistics before we can dare to take any definite position? The trouble is not with the sta-

tistics, but with the statutes that allow the statistics to be made.

The statutes are inherently wrong if there were *no* statistics as their outcome. We ought not to teach, even theoretically, that marriage can be annulled for the causes that stand on our statute books. Our present statutes have no rights which any one is bound to respect. As Matthew Arnold said, "they are the result of no man's *thought* on the subject of marriage." They are the result, to use slang, of what has tumbled to us in a time of indifference and inattention.

This North American Review symposium has value because it shows what forces could be massed in an attempt to reconstruct statutes.

Bishop Potter's position, rather, it should be said, the position of the Episcopal Church, that there should be no divorce *a vinculo* except in case of adultery, may be regarded as the position of all Protestantism so far as it is a religion. Those who might be inclined to the opinion that on scriptural grounds divorce might be allowed for desertion would doubtless make no objection to the rule in legislation that should stand on the stricter text of Christ.

So the matter stands in Protestantism. Now Catholicism could be depended upon to go as far as Protestantism would go, because it goes further and does not allow of divorce *a vinculo* in case of adultery. Cardinal Gibbons has uttered the most hopeful word that has been spoken in reference to divorce in this country. It is this, that "the number of legally recognized grounds for divorce should be lessened." That is spoken like a statesman as well as a Christian.

Now suppose we combine Protestantism and Catholicism on just that ground, we could make a new heavens and a new earth in the divorce situation.

The mass of the people of this country to-day could be united on Cardinal Gibbon's suggestion so far as to remove all *a vinculo* causes except adultery to the *a mensa* column, provided we set up a proper court to which all matrimonial causes should be sent, as is done in England.

Do we want to wait another half century to collect sta-

tistics before we move forward to secure this end in view?

Now how radical is such a platform? It is simply and solely such statute condition as the people of the state of New York have lived under in time past, and under which they live to-day.

We do not understand that married life in the state of New York is in any specially intolerable condition.

The point at which we have arrived disposes of Mr. Ingersoll's trouble. It is hard to argue with Mr. Ingersoll. He says

"An undisputed thing
In such a solemn way,"

sometimes in equally solemn guise "the thing that is not." He has lived in a state for some years whose statutes make provision for the treatment of just such cases of hardship as he supposes. Any woman can be freed from the control of a drunken and brutal husband under New York law as it now stands. If that is not a fact it could easily be made a fact. If two parties come into court and declare that they "loathe" each other, they doubtless could be allowed to "loathe" each other separately. But whether they should be allowed each to go and get somebody else to "loathe" is another matter. That might depend on one's view of the marriage relation. Mr. Ingersoll argues the case as though marriage were a simple matter of contract.

He knows very well that in this country the law has held marriage to be something more than a contract; and that something is not a sacrament either. The Pilgrims protested against the sacramental view of marriage and called in the civil magistrate to give it sanction. If all Protestantism does not repudiate the sacramental notion of marriage, it does regard it as only one of its incidents.

What the law of this country has held is that marriage is more than a contract between parties, that it is an institution of society. It ought to be as absurd to speak of a man's taking a contract to be a woman's husband as it would be to speak of a child's taking a contract to have a certain man for his father. Both matters are past and

finished. We are bound to our parentage and we ought to be bound to our marriage. A man has a right to have brothers and sisters in the same family in which he was born. This is a right of which society should see no man is deprived. It is, as Mr. Ingersoll says, a pathetic and sacred thing for a woman to become a mother. But a woman ought to pause long enough before entering the door of marriage to decide not alone whether she will have one child by that husband, but "the rest, residue and remainder," however so many they may be—by him or by nobody; such children or none. If that rule is not to prevail in society, the coming generations will cease to be family born. It is better that some women and men should suffer some privation in this generation than that that consummation should be precipitated upon the next.

Rose Terry Cooke puts well the radical truth in this matter: "No ordinance of God is meant for the mere pleasure or self-indulgence of humanity, but for an education in a Divine life." Trials *in* marriage are better for man than license out of it, better than a wavering, uncertain family line.

MR. HUXLEY'S GAME FROM DIVORCE DISCUSSION.

We read that Nimrod "was a mighty hunter before the Lord." Mr. Huxley seems to be a mighty hunter, even as Nimrod. Precisely how Nimrod caught his game cannot be determined with accuracy at this date. But Mr. Huxley, it seems, has only to hold the mouth of his bag open and his game tumbles in. It will be remembered that a few months ago the welkin was ringing with the brazen sounds of controversy between Mr. Huxley and the Rev. Dr. Wace. One of the points in issue was the probability of our having in hand anything that we could with confidence call the teaching or the words of Jesus. On this point Mr. Huxley made this utterance: "I am of opinion that there is the gravest reason for doubting whether the 'Sermon on the Mount' was ever preached and whether the so-called 'Lord's Prayer' was ever prayed by Jesus of Nazareth."

Mr. Huxley's argument in support of this position is founded on the assumption that the Gospel of Mark is

"the nearest extant representative of the oldest tradition" of the teaching of Jesus, and that that gospel fails to contain the Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer. Mr. Huxley's method of treatment of the four Gospels seems to be to reject or to put under the ban of strong suspicion anything not recorded in Mark.

Many things beside politics make strange bedfellows. In the divorce discussion, as it has been carried on in the North American Review, and in other periodicals, some of the writers have taken the position of absolute prohibition of divorce. So far as they have referred to the New Testament for the support of their argument they have taken the precise ground of Mr. Huxley in his controversy with Dr. Wace. It is a little startling to see Cardinal Gibbons, Mr. Gladstone and the Hon. E. J. Phelps, in New Testament criticism, resting peacefully in Huxley's bosom, but there they are.

No one wishes to dispute the right of these gentlemen to rest in *Huxley's* *gremio* if they so choose; but it is better to know just where we are all round. The argument against granting divorce in case of adultery as it is conducted by Cardinal Gibbons and Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Phelps, out of the New Testament, rests, in the main, on this ground: Mark and Luke do not have the excepting clause, "saving for the cause of fornication," and, though Matthew has it, and has it twice, we will follow Mark and Luke in their omission of the clause. If we are to take the ground that we will follow Mark's omissions, instead of Matthew's text, twice repeated, in the matter of divorce, wherewith shall we have to answer Mr. Huxley when he says he chooses to follow Mark's omissions respecting the "Sermon on the Mount" and the "Lord's Prayer"? If we go with Cardinal Gibbons and Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Phelps it may seem that we go where we will; but Mr. Huxley lieth in wait and may "bind us and carry us whither we would not." Are we quite prepared to give up the Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's prayer even if Mark does not have them?

Then let us hesitate about taking a position in New Testament criticism that will return to plague us. It is easy enough to see where we shall go. A great deal will

go overboard when this position is taken. The Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer goes out of Matthew. The interview with Nicodemus and the colloquy with the woman at the well goes out of John; so that we have no longer the doctrine of the spirit's new birth, the birth from above, and no longer the doctrine that God is Spirit, to be worshiped anywhere where spirit is, taught on the authority of Jesus.

Of course this does not trouble Mr. Huxley. But it ought to trouble churchmen and it ought to trouble scholars who are not ready to surrender everything to the destructive critics.

These gentlemen who advocate the prohibition of divorce in case of adultery stand in this attitude.

They prefer a second-hand authority to a first-hand authority. On the *face* of the case Mark was *not* a reporter at first hand of the sayings of Jesus; and on the *face* of the case Matthew was such first-hand reporter.

But that is not all. These gentlemen prefer to follow the *silence* of a second-hand reporter to the statement, twice recorded, of a first-hand reporter. It is hard to conceive of a more illogical attitude. Its absurdity, however, is still heightened by the fact that there is no break in the manuscript authority for the text of Matthew. That text stands down here in the cursive manuscripts and away back in history as far as the uncials will allow you to peer.

Now we have our choice, either to follow the manuscript authority for what Jesus said or to allow each man to strike out what he pleases from the manuscripts and write up the teachings of Jesus from his own inner consciousness.

The fact that some New Testament author failed to insert something which some other author did insert may have its difficulties, but we are not yet driven to the position of founding the doctrine of Jesus on what a second-hand reporter failed to put in his notes.

Finally there is a consideration to which I wish to call attention in regard to that exception of Jesus from the prohibition of divorce. The rationality of it is something which few stop to consider.

Inherently and in itself it bears the marks of the wisdom and the insight of Jesus.

Take a case of a husband whose wife is guilty of adultery. From her unlawful intercourse she may bring a spurious child into the family. If you do not allow divorce in this case you simply go back to the beastliness of polyandry.

Take the case of a wife whose husband is guilty of adultery, and if you do not allow her divorce you simply establish polygamy. If there is any way out of these dilemmas somebody can point out that way.

The above remarks are offered simply in the interest of straight-grained thought. They are not intended to complicate action in reference to legislation on divorce. As to this latter matter the supreme wisdom lies in the statement of Cardinal Gibbons that we all join hands and strike out of our statutes the clauses supporting divorce, one after another, back as far as we can go together. If we get such an impetus that we go clear back over the Savior's excepting clause, it would doubtless be better so than it is now.

From that side of the straight line we should be able probably to see more clearly how to deal with the offense of adultery.

Mr. Gladstone's article in the December number of the North American Review of 1889, has openings for the excursion of a coach and four through it in several directions. The position taken that Jesus, in Matthew v. 32, was treating of divorce "*a mensa*," is a first-class specimen of anachronism, *husteron-proteron*.

In this connection too Mr. Gladstone gently skips mention of the fact that in Matt. xix. divorce for fornication, with implied permission to remarry, is as plainly stated as in Matt. v.

"Divorce with limitation (i. e., *a mensa*) rests upon no clear ground either of principle or of authority." How then did it come into existence and maintain itself in Christian law for eighteen hundred years? Briefly, in my judgment, that article is splendid hunting ground for *non-sequiturs*.

At this date, 1897, in taking leave of a subject upon which I have devoted much attention for more than a third of a century, I wish to express the conviction that the blunder and sin, combined, of society in dealing with the subject of divorce in this century has been in discarding instead of perfecting in legislation and law the principle of divorce *a mensa et thoro*.

NOTE. I think I should be allowed the privilege of saying that the first tract issued in this country on divorce was written by me, and published by the Boston Congregational Publishing Society, in 1871. Other authors, notably President Woolsey, had published before on the subject, but no one in tract mode.

The Midland Publishing Company of Madison, Wis., published in 1889 a "Treatise on Divorce," which I wrote for a Social Science series edited by A. O. Wright, then and since widely known as a leader in the field of thought and action briefly denoted by the terms, Charity and Reform.

I would like to refer to this Tract and to this Treatise for a discussion of the question whether Social Science has or will be likely to have any light on the divorce question which will modify the conclusions reached by Christ as expressed in the nineteenth chapter of Matthew.

In other words, is not a rational Social Science compelled to coincide with the teaching of Christ on divorce? That question, not touched in these pages, is closely treated in the Tract and Treatise referred to above.

CHAPTER XI.

MORALS AND CAPITAL.

It is said that good times settle industrial troubles. But are good times perpetually secured? We may not have a present pinch, but again and again prosperity will ebb and flow, and again and again trouble will be found along industrial lines. I cannot settle the dispute between capital and labor. No one can settle it. It is one of those questions which never are settled, but, like life, are always in process of adjustment.

What is just between employer and employed has been, is, and will be matter of debate.

I have no thought of closing the debate on a single one of the living questions, much less do I think to offer wisdom on those which are to be.

I cannot see clearer than any other man what ought to be done. My mission is performed when I call attention to the fact that there is an *ought to be done* in the case. We shall not get much light in the matter till we recognize the fact that the *moral element* is of leading importance therein.

The *spirit* in which the adjustment is sought to be made will determine whether any satisfactory result will be reached. Men wonder where the difficulty is—why some definite settlement is not reached. There will never be any settlement which will obviate the necessity of constant effort at moral adjustment. The moral or immoral end in view by the capitalist and laborer, each will reflect itself back over all the processes of attempts at arrangement. If capitalists treat labor as a mere commodity in the market, to be bought at the cheapest rates like any other ware, according to the necessities of sale, forgetting that there is a sentient being in a day's labor—a man with feelings, hopes, ambitions, prides—forgetting that there is a family behind the man, with its needs and social dues—forgetting the second of the two great commandments, we shall have an industrial condition which at best will

be an armed truce, to be broken by bad temper and cunning, and patched again only with mental reservations to break it at every favorable opportunity.

It is not an even thing between the capitalist and the laborer—between him who has and him who has not.

In the friction of interests between the capitalist and the laborer, the one may have his percents of interest ground up, it may be his principal, but the man himself is untouched; while the *vital force* of the other is expended, the attrition of labor wears away his powers—his only possibilities for himself and family. When capital is all gone the former owner is still on even terms with the laborer—no worse off than he in the struggle for existence.

Capital is so much vantage in a man's hands as against the man who has nothing but vital force to expend. Something moral attaches to this vantage.

The right of private property will be maintained. It is one of the most radical and stable of our possessions in morals. It will be some time before we shall exchange the implication in "Thou shalt not steal," for Proudhon's wisdom, "Property is robbery."

But it will be found that we shall acquire, if we do not possess, a conviction that an equation cannot be made between capital and labor with moral indifference.

We shall not make much headway toward peace in the industrial situation till the theory is disowned that the only rule to be observed is that of demand and supply—that capital may buy its labor where it may buy cheapest.

That is a precept worthy only of hell. The game of humanity is up if that principle is pushed to the front as containing the supreme—the controlling wisdom.

When that principle is the guide we may not have exactly war nor exactly slavery, but morals can look upon the condition it institutes only with the same kind of abhorrence with which war and slavery are beheld.

The principle simply covers a way of giving expression to the unalloyed selfishness of man.

If that principle is right, then not only is the strike right, but its usual means and modes of compulsion of capital to its will—its corners upon the conditions of capital, its intimidations of competing labor are right.

Communism is as near to right as the principle that demand and supply simply shall regulate wages.

Communism may be the nearer right, for it is possible to suppose some moral enthusiasm behind it, but it is impossible to suppose it behind the principle of *Laissez faire* in industry.

"Am I my brother's keeper?" is a very old question in morals and has had its answer from eldest time.

Labor is *not* like any other commodity in the market, to be bought at cheapest rates.

Higher moral considerations attach in the one case than in the other. Commodities in the market are largely the surplus of satisfied want. They are commonly what the parties who made or raised them can spare after their own wants in kind are supplied.

The purchaser may, usually will, consider the case closed by the pressure of his own demand in respect to a bushel of potatoes, wheat or corn, or a yard of cloth or a pound of nails.

There are cases, however, where the ware stands in such immediate connection with its artificer as to bring out more fully the moral considerations which attach to labor.

It is a different thing to buy a yard of cloth out of a store, or a bushel of grain from an elevator, from what it is to buy a basket from a cripple who by basket making is trying to keep the wolf from the door. That thought will bring the perception of the difference between labor and other commodities.

The laborer is the representative of actual, existing, living want—a long range of want—first individual, then running out into the demands of family, and beyond to adaptation in social life. He stands before you as a laborer because labor is his only source from which to supply his want. You cannot look at him without looking at his want. He embodies the want.

Unless you have abandoned morals you cannot look at *your* problem alone when you hire a laborer. He has a problem to solve as well as you, and the thing which morals calls for is the adjustment of problem to problem.

Difficulty in the labor question has arisen, on their

hand, from the attempt of capitalists and employers to escape the necessity of this adjustment of problems—the attempt to deal with a laborer as though he were a thing—a bushel of wheat or a pound of nails. Whoever relegates labor to that position will find himself in opposition to the Eternal that loveth righteousness, and the society which adopts that principle will be “turned into hell,” as are all people and persons who “forget God.”

There is an opposition to the immigration of the Chinese that has not yet had a chance to speak, between a loose jointed philanthropy that tumbles in affectionate embrace of everything human as it is, on the one hand, and, on the other, the din and hubbub of the bad feeling between capital and labor.

This unspoken opposition is founded on just this conviction, that as against the citizen-laborer of this country, capital has no right to buy labor where it can buy it cheapest—that this attempt to employ Chinese labor is simply an attempt to solve one’s own problem without looking at the problem of his neighbor.

The Chinese laborer is popular with the capitalist because in respect to him the capitalist can relieve himself so largely of considerations that spring from ethics.

Chinese laborers make no more draught on the moral nature than a frontier breaking team that does its work and feeds itself.

They work cheaply, take care of themselves; whatever problem they have they withdraw entirely from the notice or care of the employer.

That is the charm in Chinese labor. But it is an immoral—a wicked charm, and if it does not fail it will be because a Christian civilization fails before it.

I am glad to record the failure of the North Adams experiment of introducing Chinese shoemakers into Massachusetts.

It was a bold experiment on the part of capital to dismiss from its regard all that part of the social problem which lies beyond the mere support of the individual laborer—all the complication which arises from family life and social connection.

Dennis Kearney immorally represents a moral princi-

ple. No thanks to him, of course, for his disposition in the matter, because in spirit he seems but a mischief maker.

But his position of opposition to the settlement of the labor problem by the introduction of male Chinese labor to compete against the American citizen who tries to support a family according to the ideal of a Christian civilization, is one founded in morals, and the opposition to Chinese immigration will not break down just because Dennis Kearney puts himself forth as an apostle of such opposition and in his bad way.

It is probably a rare exercise for a man to sit down and think over the labor question by the fireside of morals. One would be surprised to see how far such an exercise would take him. It might lead him to see that his poor relation, the communist, had title to some sort of an idea which it would be well to try to understand.

From one point of view capital may be regarded as a surplus surviving after former needs have been satisfied. The necessity of it to the supply of present civilized needs is to be asserted.

But when you come to put to yourself the question of the dues of capital and labor, respectively, as such, you have a division to make on the one hand to a dead want that was in its day satisfied and with something to spare, and on the other to a living want unsatisfied, clamant. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, and morals, his representative force upon the hearts of men, will look to the living need. Communism is an advocate of a result towards which morals look and which morals will achieve, to wit, that past surpluses shall be held not for their own specific increase and agglomeration, but for the satisfaction of the present need, for the benefit of the present state, or for ministration to the need that will arise. Communism is mistaken in its means rather than its end. The result it wants to secure will be reached not by war and confiscation, not by law compelling distribution, but by morals looking at the needs in all problems and using existing means according to moral inspiration and judgment. There is a hopeful tendency now to be observed; the prosperous man is more and more be-

coming his own executor—distributing his own surpluses according to his own perception of deserts and needs, instead of hoarding large sums to be handed over to some one else to be distributed according to his wisdom or folly.

There need be no fear but that society will find surpluses enough for use in any enterprise where capital may be required. It is not necessary that large aggregates should exist in the hands or under the control of single individuals for the accomplishment of the greatest results.

One of the secrets revealed to governments in modern times is that they are under no necessity to make arrangements with rich bankers for large sums—that they can get all they need by appeal to the people for the loan of their savings. History will show that the worst quarter from which to raise large sums is the few who have property in superabundance.

The structure of society need never be changed, titles to property may remain as they are, and morals will achieve the substantial good for which communism is blindly groping.

There is a tendency, resulting from the competition of capital *inter se*, to lower rates of interest. This is a tendency which ought to be accelerated from the moral quarter.

If there is anything which represents a satisfied want it is interest for the use of money. There is more inherent morality in the Mosaic prohibition of interest at all than usually gets recognition even in theologic quarters.

Man being what he is, however, that prohibition will be reckoned as of local and temporary application. It is true enough that rewards must be held out to enterprise or accumulations are not likely to be made at all.

But might they not be made as the result of higher moral aspirations and of lower regard for self-interest? In fact even now are not ethical inspirations as powerful incentives to saving and accumulation as selfishness? Religion advocates and practices frugality.

But as a moral question between interest due to capital and wages due to labor, there is not much doubt which ought to go down the scale and which up.

Moral considerations will perpetually tend to the decrease of interest on capital and a corresponding rise in the wages of labor.

Here again the end which communism contemplates will be secured, but of course, be it understood, by moral means—by the very moral impulses of capitalists themselves.

Nothing but the roughest approximations to justice as to rules of interest can be made by law. Perhaps usury laws are justifiable as exhibiting a common judgment of society beyond which contribution should not be made to wants already satisfied. But the tendency in morals in reference to interest for the use of money will be to gravitate away from the boundary marked by a law respecting usury, as common honesty among men gravitates away from the conversion of property unlawfully.

It is said that the tendency of modern civilization is to make the rich richer and the poor poorer—is toward the accumulation of property in a few hands; and the mergence of land in England to the ownership of a few proprietors, as also of railway property in the United States, is cited as proof of the statement.

The facts in reference to the land of England and the railroads of the United States cannot be denied. But this may not be a necessary result. The evil may after all be flexible, susceptible of remedy.

There can be no doubt that morals will utter no uncertain sound on such a tendency. They will say there is something wrong when such results can be secured.

It is a little singular that just exactly opposite tendencies have been in operation in England and in France for the last century—that the one has exactly undone what the other has done.

The land owners of England number but 60,000 all told. That was the condition of France a century ago—a few nobles owned all the land and the people were tenants, little removed from serfs under the feudal system. All that has been altered within this century.

The land owners of France to-day number eleven millions.

The condition in England has been brought about by

the law of primogeniture and by other laws favoring entail of land from generation to generation.

The condition in France has been brought about by an opposite course in legislation—an opposite drift in law.

Primogeniture was abolished, and the division of estates when they passed by inheritance compelled. By this simple procedure a homeless nation has within the memory of living men been converted into one where families have a home on land to which they have a title in fee.

In 1820 Mr. Webster, when the Code Napoleon, by which these changes in French law were introduced, had been in operation only sixteen years, uttered the prediction that the changes in the laws of inheritance would ultimately change the form of the government of the French nation and that the change would not be in favor of the power of the crown. He said: "We have had experience and we know that a multitude of small proprietors, acting with intelligence and that enthusiasm which a common cause inspires, constitute not only a formidable but an invincible power."

Mr. Webster's prediction exhibited a marvelous insight into the consequences of some very simple legislation. French homes in fee and the French Republic are here to-day to convince us that some of the bad tendencies of our times and situation are not beyond remedy.

An evil, to be remedied, must be clearly seen.

Take the railway problem and take the New York Central as an instance. It is an immoral result for that great line of commerce to belong to one man or to a few owners—for its rents, issues and profits to go directly only to the enlargement of their coffers—for the people to be parties only of secondary interest in the management of such property—for the people to be compelled to take such privileges as may be left to them after such dividends are made to such amount of capital as perhaps one man chooses to nominate—for rates of transit of persons and merchandise to rest in one will—for such a property to pass by inheritance from father to son.

Turkey itself can scarce exhibit a worse result in the morals of finance and industry. Consider out of what this property is built. It is built from the necessity and

the right of the people to transit over the face of the earth. Public policy founded in moral considerations began with the practice that transit should be free. Roads were opened through the land free to all. And wherever the people have needed a new route through private property it has been opened at the public expense, free to all comers and goers thereon. We have kept the rivers open free to all who would put thereon boat or ship. When transit by canal was inaugurated there was no thought but that this right of the people should still inhere in this mode of locomotion and that the people should preserve title to the canals so far as they were property. The people of the state of New York own the Erie Canal. That canal has paid all costs of construction, repair and enlargement, and paid to the state, up to 1880, \$30,000,000 besides. In this instance we see the principle exemplified that the new and more artificial modes of transit and communication should still inure to the benefit of the people.

The genius of De Witt Clinton made the Erie Canal and gave it to the people of the state of New York. The genius of Vanderbilt converted New York Central Railroad, already made, to himself. Here is one of the most marvelous perversions in a moral right the world has ever seen. If the process and result in the case of the canal were moralized, the process and result in the case of the railways have not been moralized.

It is right that the people should have transit from place to place. If there are costs about its procuring, that transit should only be subject to the liquidation of those costs. It is an immoral procedure to try to found a perpetual private property on such public right, or to subordinate the public right to the private property.

When now steam locomotion by rail comes to take the place of other modes of transit—to supersede the old road, and even the river, and largely the canal, it is simple justice to man and his necessities that this mode of transit should follow the course already established—should belong to the people—should be used by the people as nearly free as dues to cost of construction and operation permit.

It is simply good morals that the people should own or control the railways as they do the road, river, or canal.

The people's right of transit and communication is the first right. It will run through all means of locomotion invented or to be invented.

But now we have the exhibition of a means of locomotion substantially extinguishing the right or trying to effect that end.

The granger legislation and litigation has been decried as injuring the prospects of commerce. That action was not entered upon in the interests of commerce. It was an attempt to see who was master. Whether it would help or hurt commerce was not in its view. It rested in a determination to find out whether the people had lost their right to transit because steam had superseded horse power as a means of locomotion. The right of the people to transit has as good foundation in morals as the right to property. It is the higher right, when it comes in conflict with the right to property, and has always been considered so to be.

A clear moral perception here would help to legislation which might in a generation work as wonderful modifications in these colossal individual railway properties as the modification of the law of inheritance in France wrought with the great estates which had swallowed up all the land of the realm.

The moral foundation of the whole matter is that the right of the people to transit is the first right.

Whoever has put money—actual money into any means connected with transit—should have such interest paid him as justice says is fair for any surplus of satisfied want; whatever is earned beyond that should be used for the benefit of the people, either by way of help in the payment of taxes or remitted to them in reduced rates of transit.

Private property, huge, plethoric, mastodonic, is made out of a public right. If the essence of immorality does not inhere in that it will be hard to determine what is immoral.

The eminent constitutional lawyer, George T. Curtis, sets up the Dartmouth College case, wherein it was held that a charter is a contract protected by the constitution from alteration by subsequent statute, as settling

adversely governmental control of railway corporations.

But there is a very wide difference between legislating in respect to a charter, which encloses only a privilege which the people may enjoy, as education in a collegiate institution, and in respect to a charter laid down over a right which the people do and must have. Legislation in aid of such public right no more impairs the obligation of contracts than running a street through a private garden is an attack on the principle of the private ownership of property.

Mr. Curtis asks the question whether the right of legislative control over railways rests on a presumed dedication of the private property therein to a public use.

Whether dedicated or not, such property was superimposed on a pre-existing public right—a right which can find expression in no other way than in regulation of rates.

Whoever laid down money over such a right ought to be charged with due notice of the probable complications resulting from his own act.

If a charter is a contract it is no more sacred than an original right. If the two come in collision there is no doubt which ought to give way.

I suggest that we have followed the Dartmouth College case to an extreme which is reducing civilization to absurdity. The Dartmouth College case might have posited good and wholesome law in its day. It may be good and wholesome law now in a certain class of cases. It is still right to keep educational, eleemosynary institutions, religious trusts, from political, legislative manipulation.

But a new condition of things—one never conceived of by counsel or court in the day when that case was decided—is before us.

To go on applying that decision to all possible cases in the increasing complexities of our civilization is the Chinese wisdom of perpetual imitation of the thoughts and deeds of ancestors.

There is a term we are using in science and philosophy which ought to be brought to the front in law in this connection—differentiation. It is time we differentiated some

lines along which the Dartmouth College case, *in rerum natura*, cannot apply from those in which it may. I think one line of non-applicability is plainly discernible when a charter is laid down on as radical a right of man as the right of motion—the right to go to mill and to market—the right to an even chance with everybody else in getting to mill and to market—a right which is presumed in all the law regulative of common carriers.

Where is Lord Mansfield? New conditions demand new law. The right of eminent domain rests on the right of locomotion. The former exists for the latter. Every dollar laid down over a public right and use should give account of itself to the public, should explain where it came from and its right to tribute.

There seems to be no end to the fortunes which may be made by the conversion of this right of the people to a private use.

The New York Central Railway and the Erie Canal run side by side. The canal has paid for itself and now renders a revenue to the state. There is no question but that the railway has earned as much revenue as the canal. Yet instead of the cost of its construction being extinguished out of its revenues, the people are now compelled to pay rates so that dividends may be made on a capital stock much larger than the actual cost of its construction.

The people have paid in rates enough to build the road and pay for its equipments, and are now paying in rates enough to represent capital sufficient to build two or three similar roads, and the end is not yet. Last winter the New York legislature gave to railroad corporations, substantially, the right to fix the amount of their capital stock at their own option. Look on this picture and then on this. The canal the people own. It works for them and pays them revenue. The railway the people have paid for, but they do not own it, and are now paying rates representing a value of several times its cost. The case of the New York Central is simply one instance in the whole railway situation. Is it any wonder that gigantic personal fortunes are wrought out of such processes? Such immeasurable personal fortunes are only possible as the result of wrong.

Is it any wonder that the railway interests make a great din about granger legislation?

However bungling its operations may be, grangerism is simply groping to lay hold again of a right the people have carelessly let fall. It was not born a day too soon and if it does not, some other agency will carry its work to its proper conclusion.

The right of transit is a right of the people. The right to regulate transit, to prescribe its rules, belongs to the people. They should of course pay due heed to the rights of the private property invested in the means of transportation.

But look at this fact which I pick up from a daily paper—you will see the like two or three times a year. The representatives of forty-four railway companies met together recently to fix rates of transportation over their roads.

It is said that the inter-state commerce of this country amounts to more than \$30,000,000,000 (1881). It would seem that the people ought to have some share in fixing the rates on such vast sums. Yet how many representatives of the people were in this conclave of railway agents? Not one. Who appeared there in the interest of the people? Nobody. If any one had appeared he would have been laughed to scorn. These railway agents simply met at the command of certain railway capitalists, and their sole function was to see how they could combine in the assessment of rates so as to raise certain dividends on certain amounts of capital reported by the railway capitalists.

That committee raised the rates of freight at one bound for the forty-four roads they represented from 15 to 45 cents per hundredweight, and that patient pack mule, the American people, never lifted a heel or wagged an ear.

Two alternatives are before us. Either the people will control the railways and the telegraphs or be controlled by them.

These two rights, one public and one private, will not long coincide. The one will dominate if not extinguish the other. The corporations are understood to be mar-

shaling their forces now to secure a reversal of the decision of the Supreme Court in the granger cases, and to have the doctrine established that railways and telegraph lines are entirely private property—subject to no legislative control.

Then, as Wm. M. Springer has said in a recent article in the *North American Review*, “farmers, shippers, merchants, and traders will be permitted to earn a living if they are careful and frugal, but beyond that they must not hope to go. The transportation and telegraph monopoly will gather in all the rest.”

The telegraph business should go to the postal department.

The railways should be set, as was the canal, to the problem of paying off the cost of their construction, then to become the property of the people.

That is what ought to be done with the main lines, perhaps with the whole system.

The people by this time might have owned the trunk lines from the seaboard to the Mississippi, if they had provided a sinking fund for cost of construction, as was done in case of the Erie Canal.

Do you fear official corruption if this course is pursued? Where is the corruption now—in the postoffice or with the telegraph companies?

Which has corrupted most the politics of the state of New York, and that of the nation, the Erie Canal or the Erie and New York Central Railways?

The answer to these questions goes very far, for the business of the postoffice reaches to every village in the land, and the tunnage of the Erie Canal exceeds the total import and export tunnage of the nation on the high seas.

The simple truth is that the public business is now that which is the most righteously conducted.

Morals have a clear vision over the following proposition: A man has no right to property which he cannot in large measure personally supervise and determine how it affects the rights and privileges of others.

We are imitating the faults and vices of the old world. We heap together huge estates—give a few directions to subalterns and go off to England or the continent to keep

out of the way of the din of the friction of the management of our huge properties.

The question comes, what moral right has a man to collect revenues from thousands, tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of people without ever looking into their problem?

That is the very essence of eastern despotism.

Where were the owners of railway stocks and bonds when their clerks were figuring out the rise of freights from 15 to 45 cents per hundredweight?

Were they out on the lines of their roads, mingling with the farmers who had mortgaged their lands that these roads might be made—with the village people who had subscribed heavily to build depots for the railway companies, trying to find out how *their* problem stood—whether the farm was going to wreck under the mortgage, or whether the trains were managed for the accommodation of the people of the villages? A railway stock or bond holder or director so acting would be a greater curiosity than anything in Barnum's museum.

Is there any doubt what the moral duty of a holder of stock or bonds or of a director is in this respect?

In what moral estimate is held the absentee landlord of an Irish estate? Yet we are repeating that same absentee problem in railway management.

And the same bitter fruits in the alienation of the people against the absentees and their property will ripen in the one case as in the other.

The railway capitalists made bitter complaint against the granger legislation. That legislation was only Nemesis for absenteeism—for failure to put in appearance and compare problems—for failure to meet one of the first moral duties of man.

The problem is yet to be tried of the operation of a railway with an inspiration to see what can be made out of local instead of through traffic.

It is in this direction that morals point. The charm of the through railway business is that it enables one easily to free himself from all moral considerations.

There is a question the moral bearings of which have not yet been sufficiently examined, and that is the right

to give fictitious life to capital by perpetual charter privileges—by bonds and contracts of long date.

The greater part of the wealth of the world perishes, if not in a single year, in a very few years.

Even the most durable of our structures—houses and machinery—have to be renewed partially or entirely from time to time; that is to say, the principal has to be renewed, in part or in whole, in order to derive income from it. If your property is in horses you have to feed them, if in houses you have to repair them. But we have invented a way of circumventing the wear and tear of nature by chartered privileges—by bonds of long date and by other methods, so as to preserve the principal from waste and from need of repair. It is evident that property so protected has very special privileges. It has the long arm of the lever as against other property or against industry.

It will be found vain, however, to try to cheat nature in regard to the perishability of wealth. A debt due her, delayed too long, is usually collected with vengeance. If attrition does not come upon wealth to wear it away in one method, it may be swept away in another.

So far as bonds or contracts of long duration are personal there is no question what morals will teach concerning them. They must be paid. But difficulty springs up when governments or corporations take such action as entails burdens to be borne from generation to generation.

The right of railways to make their capital stock immortal and to claim perpetual contribution to it cannot be admitted.

Railways and other corporations are proceeding in this respect in the footsteps of governments.

Governments have and will find that it is no use to try to cheat nature in respect to the perishability of capital. They cannot give perpetual vitality to their debts and float them as capital to all posterity.

The government debt that is not gradually dissolved runs the risk of being thrown overboard in a mass by and by, by the people. If you do not want to hear the word repudiation, be careful how you lay foundation for its utterance.

The people find that the principal of everything else has to be renewed constantly or perish, and they will ask if the principal of government debts should not follow the same law of mortality.

There is a moral element behind their question and it can be seen.

William Pitt in his contest against Napoleon Bonaparte ran up the national debt of England till it became incapable of being discharged either in that day or possibly in any other.

Who gave William Pitt the right to tax the English nation to the end of time to carry out his schemes?

He held no power of attorney from the subsequent generations. You speak of one distinguished nobleman or statesman after another being premier of the ministry of England.

There has been no premier of the ministry of England but William Pitt in this century and there can be no other.

The ghost of William Pitt sits at the head of the English exchequer. Nay, rather, he sits there *in propria persona* and all his successors are ghosts flitting away one after another.

The budget of Peel, of Russell, of Palmerston, of Derby, of Disraeli, of Gladstone, is the budget of William Pitt. The burden upon the back of the coming premier, whoever he may be, will be to provide for interest on a debt created by William Pitt.

Who gave William Pitt the right to hunt to the depths of English mines to tax the miner of to-day, the right to search the corners of English factories to tax the operative of to-day, to pay perpetual interest on a debt he chose to create? Men may die, generations disappear, capital may perish, but this debt and its burdens live forever.

The moral vision will detect something wrong in anything that approaches to that transaction down to charter privileges of immortality to corporation stock.

What it sees may not justify repudiation. What it sees may be the less evil, to be endured rather than the greater. What it sees may sometime be the greater evil, to take its place among perishable things, and like our revolutionary debt, evidenced by continental money, cease to be.

If we do not want catastrophes we must be careful how we invite them.

We are with our national, state, and municipal governments, and our great moneyed corporations, pushing to the extreme limit an attempt to avoid the mortality of capital.

The civilized world is at its wits' end to raise revenues to pay interest on national debts. The principal of these debts is thrown over from generation to generation as a burden on all enterprise, all possibilities of development.

This may be stated as a general principle in reference to governments.—no generation has a right to incur a greater amount of debt than it pays. The argument that posterity will reap the benefits of a debt, and so may be saddled with its burdens, is very fallacious.

Posterity may see no blessing in the debt, or wisdom in the policy out of which it grew.

Governmental problems, even of deep importance, are usually of scarce a generation in life, and the new generations cannot reinstate the history of former times. They have their own problems to work out and ought to be free so to do.

It is cowardice and shirking to put on the unborn the burdens of our political experiments.

If we cannot trust the patriotism of to-day to carry the burdens of our times we shall be simple to trust the virtue of posterity to pay our debts. The public mind cannot always be held to old problems.

The people have a moral right to some forgetfulness.

That is not all the right there is in such cases, but a moral right of oblivion there is.

They will be wise who do not tempt to the exercise of such a right.

Our national debt must be paid in the lifetime of the generation which contracted it. Other great problems will press on the coming generations. Let them have a free field for their own exigencies.

The historic sense is not very strong. An historic sense of duty to pay the debts of predecessors is very likely to become weak.

Caveat capital.

You cannot make men remember the equities of these debts which run from generation to generation. There are sentimental equities, if not legal, on the side of "re-adjusters," of recalcitrant debtor municipalities, such as lay behind farm mortgages given for railroads never built, town bonds stolen and set afloat. A bond is a sacred thing. But it is not esteemed so sacred if the obligee plied the obligor with wine before he signed it.

Municipal bonds to large amount in aid of railways were issued in a delirium, a frenzy, a drunkenness of the public mind, the result of expectations high-wrought and misrepresentations made by capitalists. When the bonds mature and the people find that at last their drunkenness "biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder," it is not strange that they are slow in feeling the obligation to pay their bonds. It is best for the people to be held not to get drunk, or, if they do, to take the consequences.

But capitalists must also remember that there is a "woe" pronounced against him "who putteth his bottle to his neighbor's lips and maketh him drunken also."

It is better that they be reminded that in the long run they cannot escape this "woe."

We are giving railway corporations the lives of governments, and their stock is a consol on which interest is to be paid in perpetuity.

That is a favor granted to no other capital.

The operation called "watering stock" is a privilege given certain men to *assume* that they have a certain amount of capital, and then to tax the people perpetually to pay dividends on the amount assumed.

Take a railway map of the United States and observe how the country is covered with railway lines, and realize that the capital represented in that tremendous network, amounting already in stock and bonds to two or three times the sum of the national debt, is guaranteed immortality by charter, while everything else is subject to disintegration, and you see a condition that may be questioned some day in bad temper.

Professor Bowen has suggested the United States debt should be paid in twenty-five year annuities. That plan of payment ought to be worked with regard to the capital

stock of all railway corporations. They ought to be set to the problem of paying off the cost of their construction, and so to be free from any contribution to the original capital invested, in an average lifetime.

We ought to be paying interest on the original cost of Cleopatra's needle as much as on the original cost of the New York Central Railway.

If ever the people extinguish the right of private property in railways they should not pay for watered stock. It will be just to reimburse only money actually invested.

Then, even, some account ought to be made of the fact of the mortality of capital.

If the principal of all other property suffers shrinkage in the lapse of time, so ought the principal invested in railways.

This would be no conversion of private property to public use, but would be merely recognizing the system on which this universe is run—waste in everything, even to the energy of the sun's heat.

The fundamental moral position is this: No capital has a right as against other capital, or the industries of man to be so protected by charter as that it shall be placed beyond the possibility of attrition, comminution, and decay. If there are positions that would give eternal life to any capital they ought to inure to the benefit of the people—they ought to take their place with the road and the river, the sunlight and the air. The notion that you can confer upon some capital such superiority over other capital must go where has gone the notion of the divine right of kings.

Other topics press for discussion. To them I can only allude.

Our laws of inheritance may need inspection as well as those of England and France.

What right has a man to inherit a property of millions got by "watering" corporation stocks?

Ought not property that goes by descent to pass some sort of probate as to its integrity?

From forty to fifty millions of watered New York Central Railway stock ought to have been caught by probate in the transit of inheritance—ought to have been

canceled and the people freed from paying revenues thereon.

What are capitalists doing toward supplying cheap homes in the city, or cheap transportation to suburban homes for laborers?

When the dark days of panic and disaster come, it will make a great difference as to the safety of property whether the laboring masses have homes or are homeless. What is doing to transfer this element from the dangerous to the conservative side?

There are some things that ought to be amended at once.

The abstract-to-title business is enough to excuse communism. An abstract of title often costs more than a lot is worth.

Illinois ought to be ashamed of its so-called "homestead exemption" act. The exemption of a thousand dollars in a homestead is neither fish, flesh, nor herring. Call that homestead exemption! Think how much of a home a thousand dollars would exempt. Laws have heretofore been made too much for the benefit of the creditor. It is about time we had courage to exempt *a home* for the protection of wives and children.

Commerce can adapt itself to an exempt homestead as easily as it did to the abolition of imprisonment for debt.

The subjection of all the interests of a home to the selfishness and carelessness of the trade factor of industry is a relict of barbarism which ought no longer to be tolerated.

If the men, who are in our system of commerce and law, will make the matters with which they become familiar a subject of moral concern, difficulties will be avoided, or, if they arise, will be satisfactorily settled.

" Well for gain if it ungrudging yields
Labor its just demand, and well for ease
If in the use of its own it sees
No wrong to him who tills its pleasant fields,
And spreads the tables of its luxuries.
The interests of the rich man and the poor
Are one and same, inseparable evermore,

And when scant wage or labor fail to give
 Food, shelter, raiment, wherewithal to live,
 Need has its rights, necessity its claim.
 Yea, even self-wrought misery and shame
 Test well the charity, suffering long and kind.
 The home-pressed question of the age can find
 No answer in the catch-words of the blind
 Leaders of the blind. Solution there is none,
 Save in the golden rule of Christ alone."

1897. *In re* William Pitt—it may appear at the end of the century that his huge national debt was a blunder in statesmanship. It may appear that the march to Moscow was the sanest military movement in the century. It may appear that the battle of Waterloo in its total effects was a defeat for Great Britain. The Eastern Question is a much larger affair than anything which has divided France and Great Britain in this century. It is only the West in totality that can solve the Eastern Question in such way as that from the solution humanity will receive no permanent detriment.

THE GREENBACK

is simply an unpaid portion of the national debt. The nonsense we have evolved about it is proof positive that every generation should pay its own debts.

After trying to repudiate it we have made a god of it and seek to decree to it immortality. We fondle a greenback as a Chinaman does his queue. Both are symbols of national disaster and degradation.

CHAPTER XII.

MORALS AND LABOR.

HAVING viewed some of the aspects of capital in the forum of morals, we turn to look at labor and morals.

Our work would be exceedingly imperfect if we were to leave untouched one side of a mutual relation.

Within a few years we have seen many American laborers looking in the direction of communism for the solvent of the difficulties of labor. Now communism may be a party name to cover a great many purposes, ranging through good and indifferent to bad.

But so far as communism means the obliteration of the right to private property, morals have something to say; and to what they would say we had better look at the outset, so that we shall have no fundamental misunderstanding.

If the right of private property be not a moral intuition, i. e., something native to the very structure of the mind of man, it is one of the first found of moral principles and has existed in the moral perception and judgment for a time whereof neither the memory nor the history of man runneth to the contrary.

The possessive pronouns "mine" and "thine" and their equivalents are among the oldest words in all languages. The right of private property as revealed by these pronouns is one of the most primitive of human conceptions. It is perfectly safe to say that back as far as these terms have run an ethical sense has attached to them.

"Mine" has enclosed the claim of a moral right to whatever it has attached, and "thine" the recognition of a similar moral claim by some one else.

It has not been proved that the animals have "thine" at all, nor that beneath their "mine" is an ethical conception. In the contrast of those terms lies one of the main fountains of ethics.

It is not to be asserted that there has not been attempt

to place "mine" over things to which moral right did not attach.

But since man has been man there has been no difficulty in distinguishing these cases from others to which moral right did attach—no difficulty in calling up a different sort of sentiment and feeling towards the former than arose towards the latter.

We have some definite ideas about the virtues of love of family and of patriotism.

But it may be questioned whether those virtues are not derivative and do not rest back on this more primitive ethical sense—the right of possession of property. Historically property was before the family.

The rights of individuals in the family in the early ages were not clearly differentiated. The family was the property of its head.

We may have divided and distributed that right of proprietorship in modern times, but we have not extinguished it. The man who says "my wife" has a possession in that wife as against all mankind else. She is "his" and there is ethics in that "his."

The same is true in reference to the woman who says "my husband." She has a proprietorship in that man as against all the race else. In modern times, as against ancient times, we are making this proprietorship mutual as between husband and wife. We have neither invented nor abolished the idea of proprietorship. It is simply spread out into broader range in our days. It was and it is.

The same truth holds in reference to the relation of parent to child and of child to parent.

The old notion was that the child was the property of the father. We have not set aside that notion. We have modified it by the recognition of the fact that this proprietorship must take into account the different nature of the child from that of any animal or thing, and we are adding mutual proprietorship in bringing forward the mother to equality with the father in the ownership and by making the ownership in the relation mutual between parent and child.

We are enlarging and strengthening the ethical grounds

in the relationship. But we are doing nothing to obliterate that primitive notion of property in everything to which "my" attached, and the ethical sense of right which went along therewith.

Patriotism will yield the same ethical outcome on the same base. The country, the larger family, has a proprietorship in its citizens as against other nations, so that it may say "my" citizens in reference to them; and the word *treason* sums up the body of moral wrong which we attribute to those who are unfaithful to the "mine" pronounced over them by their native or adopted land.

When you come to look at what man calls property there is no question about its ancient standing before the moral discriminations of the race; there is no question about the existing moral strength of the idea of proprietorship. It is native to man as against his fellows to crave a relationship as to some animals and things which "my" only expresses, and ethics supports this craving.

If communism means the abolition of the right of private property it may stand aside, for, in the forum of morals, it is simply wrong and not right.

There cannot be much worse said about a man than that he has not much idea of *meum* and *tuum*. No party movement, or movement in the aggregate, can make that right which is wrong in the individual. "*Suum cuique*"—to each his *own*—is given in morals.

I have a right to have *my* wife, and *my* house to shelter her, and *my* day's wages to support her and *our* children.

We had better get a clear idea that the property, the wealth of the world will be owned in severalty and in such partnership as comes from mutual consent.

It is best for us to recognize the fact that all co-operation and co-partnership have in view a division of proceeds so as to invest each person interested with absolute title to his share when division is made.

Communism itself must contemplate such private ownership. If it does not it is mere lunacy, intellectually and morally.

All co-partnership, co-operative or communistic ownership, is merely a means to an end—and the end is private ownership.

In this world where nothing is done according to exact law, as the cant of science would lead us to suppose, but only approximately, there will be all manner of inequality and even injustice in the realization of the end, but the end is there and the race will forever hold to it.

We shall try to eliminate the inequalities and rectify the injustices, but the end will be steadily pursued.

There is nothing which the working men of this country need more than just this inspiration—to own *in severalty* all the property they can honestly. The mass of the working men of the country have this inspiration and they face life with a nobility of intent to take care of themselves and to provide for their own.

But down on the lower plane of life there seems to be an outcry against the existing—against even the normal order of things, which sounds very much like a nerveless whimper.

It has been possible, in generations past, and there is no reason why it should not be possible for generations to come, in this country, for a healthy laboring man without vices to accumulate property sufficient to give himself and his family not only the necessities of existence, but to afford them some taste of the higher elements of civilization and refinement, in education and home decoration. This has been the rule with healthy and virtuous men; and we cannot expect the labor *system* to be adjusted to anything other than what is normal.

It ought not to be held to responsibility for the sickly and the vicious. Something else must meet their case.

There is that open possibility, and all young men should be inspired with an ambition to meet it.

Thoreau found that he could in six weeks do work enough to pay for the actual necessities of his life for a year, i. e., for food and clothing. That may be called "lowest terms." But if those are the lowest terms, it is not manly to whine over the struggle for existence as communism does. Working men are spending more time in growling about those who accumulate property, than they are in forecasting to secure property themselves.

I read in one of the utterances of an apostle of communism that "working men must be relieved from care and anxiety." Why?

That is simply an abandonment of the problem of life.

I do not know why a working man, more than any one else, should be allowed to throw his problem over on some one's else shoulders.

A man has no business with life if he will not assume care and anxiety especially for himself. Care and anxiety ought to come to all. What a man does with his care and anxiety determines the quality of the man.

Socialism and communism are having a terribly destructive effect on the manhood of the working classes. They are producing in them the feeling that somebody else—that society is to take care of a man; whereas he is to take care of himself. There really is no possibility of respect for men who give up the problem of life and want society to take care of them.

Just what life means is contention with difficulty.

The pleasure of being taken care of is not to be compared with the pleasure of looking resistance in the face, laying our plans to overcome it and seeing ourselves gradually approaching the accomplishment of our projected ends.

Herbert Spencer says: "Acceptance from others of the results of their activities can only take place on the condition of relinquishing the pleasures derived from one's own activities."

Communistic schemes in reference to the labor problem would make the life of the laborer a more dismal, toneless, sapless thing than it is now.

If what you want is to cause all laborers to curse existence, all you have to do is to adopt any forced leveling scheme.

No socialism will abolish the necessity of "struggle for existence"—the necessity to earn a living by the sweat of the brow or by a more consuming care of the mind. And the rule is that struggle shall be a success when certain conditions are observed. The outlook is not dismal for a man who takes care of his health and his morals, keeps a clear head, and has some definite purpose before him.

There is a great deal said in these days about co-operation, and for some purposes and in some kinds of business

that does afford a clearer sky for the labor problem. But everything is not to be merged into the co-operative form of labor.

Man is still a unit, and however we may develop the advantages of combined labor, we shall never abolish individualism. We are losing sight of that fact in these days.

We ought not only to inspire men to accumulate property in severalty, but, as far as possible, to encourage the independence and individuality of man in the processes of his labor.

We are concentrating and combining much by the influence of machinery. But under this system there is a possibility of cultivating individuality so that each man shall have his own problem of labor as well as his own part of its profits.

Piece work, job work should be sought by working men, so that each man's problem may be as far as possible his own.

Machinery *per se* cannot reduce all men to the same level. The worst tendency among working men is their combinations among themselves to produce this bad result. There are advantages in the combinations of working men to secure many ends they have in common. But it is subject to question whether all these advantages added together are a compensation for the interference of such combinations with individualism—it is a question whether the profits and the happiness of the laboring classes would not in the main be increased if each man worked his own problem far more than he is now allowed to do by the restrictions placed upon him by the organizations which he has called into existence to take care of his problem.

Working men complain of the caste tendencies of society—of the tendency to separate into capitalists and laborers—and for these castes to become hereditary.

Well, there is nobody doing so much to secure this result as working men themselves.

They assume to be a caste, they organize as a caste, their organization legislates for them as a caste, and they are pursuing a course to make the caste hereditary.

When we settled this country we threw away castes of

the higher orders, but working men are striving with might and main to build them up from beneath. Working men need only go on in the direction in which some of their societies are drifting to install here both the aristocracies of Europe and the castes of India, and to secure the position of Sudras for themselves and their posterity. The true interest of working men lies in mobility in industry. Labor in the main ought to be transitional in its character—at least that feature ought carefully to be preserved. There is labor which may well be performed at a certain stage of a man's life or career which at some time he ought to be past.

Coal heaving is an honorable business, but it is not one to which a man ought to look forward as a life occupation, or seek to make hereditary in his family.

Yet it is only necessary for coal heavers to combine to regulate wages, in the way they ordinarily do, in order to secure poverty for everybody who works at the business and make both business and poverty hereditary.

If some athletic young man wants to work at coal heaving for a season or two in order to lay up money enough to buy a span of horses, a wagon and a plow for the homestead he is going to take up, and to buy some household comforts for the young woman he is to marry, and he can handle twice as much coal in a day as men usually handle, he ought to have the benefit of his inspiration and his athleticism and receive twice as much wages as other men; as he would if he had a clear field, free from the control of coal heavers' societies.

Coal heaving pursued in this way would be an honorable and respectable occupation. But it loses its respectability the moment it becomes tied up by the regulations of a society and made hereditary. Working men's societies may make each kind of labor a caste, and when they have done this they will have taken the dignity and nobility away from labor.

Communism can only drift to this bad end.

The curse of this country is that we are not trying to resolve our own problem, but are simply imitating the old world. Working men complain of this when they see the rich imitating the aristocracies of Europe, but

they themselves are guilty of it when they imitate the customs and ape the regulations of the low castes of society in the old world.

I cannot get the chance for my boy to learn the business of a nail maker unless the nail makers' society will let him work at the trade, nor can the boy have anything to say about the rate of his wages. That attitude of the nail makers is a more dangerous attack on the liberties of labor than anything which I know of done by capitalists, and one tending more directly to its degradation.

That position is simply wrong. The moment you by your unions keep some one else from acquiring your trade, that moment you ought to go out of your union or of your trade, for you are in an immoral attitude toward your fellow men.

All the tendencies to mass and class labor and to reduce it to one level ought to be resisted to the uttermost.

They are an importation from the old world. They might have had place there, but they are out of place here, and are only used because working men have lost sight of the possibilities of labor in this country and are weakly imitating the processes of Europe.

It is said that machinery has a tendency to reduce all men to the same level.

That tendency is overestimated. There is just as much difference in men in their ability to manipulate machinery as there was in them to do the work before the machinery was invented.

It is only necessary to encourage individualism in the handling of machinery, and to encourage the resulting mobility of industry, to take away all evil effect from the competition of machinery with hand work.

Machinery has not, of itself, in any great degree, interfered with the possibilities of individuality. A man whose own manhood tingles within him has as good a chance, one way and another, as he ever had, as an individual.

I know of a man who, in spite of Sheffield and Meriden, whistles away in a shop of his own and makes more than a living yearly out of the manufacture of butcher knives. He has his own boat on a beautiful lake,

and trolls for pickerel morn and eve at his will.

The hand occupations of the tailor, the dressmaker and the shoemaker are not gone and never will be. There is an effect in personal skill in many occupations which no machinery can compass.

With all the work done by machinery on shoes in these days, a skillful hand shoemaker could perhaps never make as much money as he can to-day.

Side by side with the processes going on to destroy individuality—to substitute machinery and a corporation for the individual—are processes tending to make more out of the individual than ever before. The very aggregation of men together gives them opportunities for culture. Birmingham has its working men's courses of lectures running over all human knowledge, its monster libraries for working men, and John Bright to explain to them English politics. Not so was it before steam and corporations aggregated men. Cheap printing is putting it into the power of every working man to have his own library of the world's best thought. Men need no longer be dependent on public libraries; every man may have his own, and it ought to be a pride with every working man to have *his own*.

It is one of the favorite watchwords of the communistic element among working men that to the laborers must belong the tools. Certainly, if they pay for them. But if I hire a man to work in my garden I think I shall not make a present to him of my spade, either before or after the day's work is done. The spade is mine. I paid for it, and he can get one by the same process by which I got mine.

Will a communist pass his jackknife around for the general benefit, without care whether it returns to his own pocket?

A jackknife tells the whole story about this new proposition that to the workmen belong the tools. The tools belong just to whoever has bought and paid for them by his own industry.

Suppose an Irishman comes to this country and marches up to the "plant" of a rolling mill. "This is a good tool," he says, "and I guess I'll enter in and possess it."

Why will he not do it?

Simply because not only the owners of the "plant," but the working men about, do not propose to throw away civilization and have crime inaugurated in its place.

There is no law against a working man owning his tools.

But the civilized world has well-recognized terms by which to designate the act of coming by a tool without paying for it, and a well-known mode of treatment of such act. First as well as last it may be understood that society will never see any man come into the possession of any tool, small or large, except by the regular old road of purchase out of the gains of industry.

Working men can, if they choose so to waste their time, get together in the cities and resolve that to the workman belong the tools. But they must remember that the mass of the community are decidedly conservative on the subject of the private ownership of property. There will be a very sudden end to any attempt to convert one man's property to another man's use. Nor is there any use in thinking of obliterating title to private property by law. A plain word is the best in this matter. Society does not and will not tolerate an issue in this direction.

It is best for working men to realize that they are to make their peace with society on the basis of its perpetual attachment to the principle of the private ownership of property, and that they are to get their individual status therein on the same basis.

There is no need that I gather up the statistics of the millions of money that working men spend in vices. The working men spend their share of the seven hundred millions of dollars which we pay annually for intoxicating liquors.

To pay off the national debt in three years might grind so that we should feel it.

But we are carrying an annual tax in liquor consumption that in three years would liquidate the national debt.

Then add tobacco. Liquor and tobacco complicate the situation of the laborer in this country more than the state of our national export trade.

The money spent on liquor alone amounts to more than

the value of all the national exports for the most favorable year.

That which is spent on liquor and tobacco is fairly equal to the sum of the whole foreign trade, imports and exports.

Working men do not consume all this liquor and tobacco, but they do consume so much that these expenditures are one of the heaviest burdens on the labor situation.

More money is spent on liquor alone than changes hands in the whole annual trade of the country in neat cattle.

That means to the laboring man that he might have sirloin twice where he now has it once, or might lay by each year the amount of the butcher's bill.

A working man's tobacco bill would bring often a dish of fresh fruits to the family table; and his liquor bill would put shoes on his children's feet, buy their school books and put many a book into his own home library.

The outlook for luxuries for a laboring man's wife is not very promising.

It is a plain home with which she must be content at best. There is iniquity of deep dye when a man indulges in the vices of liquor drinking and tobacco chewing and smoking, and brings the burden of his selfishness to bear on his wife in the deprivation of comforts or of those little luxuries which a woman prizes so much in a home.

In the regeneration of labor, judgment must begin at the house of God. Men must practice virtue toward the inmates of their own homes if they expect to impress society with the conviction that capitalists must be virtuous toward them.

Why society looks so languidly upon efforts to increase the wages of laboring men, or to decrease the hours of their labor, is because it feels that over a very wide realm the realization of either or both of these schemes would do little or nothing for the weal of working men's homes. More pay means all too widely more drink; fewer hours of work, more time for dissipation. The low moral tone of laborers is the greatest marplot of their situation.

You can give this receipt to make a capitalist in America:

A healthy young man of eighteen, clad in coarse, strong clothes, with a Sunday suit in a bundle, fifty cents or even nothing save a jackknife in his pocket, perhaps a photograph of "the girl he's left behind him" somewhere in his effects, and the end will be—a family supported and educated, and perhaps money to loan, *if* he does not touch whisky and tobacco. They are the most profound levelers—low levelers—in this country. They kill ambition, blunt affection, dull perception, and slacken nerve.

No philanthropy, find expression howsoever it may, can build up as fast as they can pull down. The accumulation of property cannot go on side by side with dissipation on any plane of life. If you want property out of labor, you must practice the self-denials out of which it comes.

There is one object which I wish to press upon the attention of the working men of Chicago. It should be the ambition of every man to own and live in a home of his own.

Heretofore everything has been in an unsettled state with the people of this city, because much was problematic about it.

Houses, lands, have heretofore been held like stocks of goods, simply at so much money value.

Cash has been the ruling idea of all life, that of the laborer as well as that of the capitalist.

Men have come here to get money, intending, perhaps, to stay no longer than while they were getting rich. But the day of problem is gone by. Chicago is to be a large city and hereafter very much like other cities. The speculating era must pass away, and life come down to the ordinary level of life elsewhere.

The half million of inhabitants that are here are here to stay.

They are here with their families. Children are to be born here to whom Chicago is to be a home city, and they ought to be born and reared in a family home.

The old days of speculation, in corner or other lots, are pretty much passed, and now we must as a people settle down to a life supported by sustained, continued industry.

Whoever now imagines that his life is to be cast in and about the industries of Chicago ought to address himself at once to the problem of owning a home either in the city or in its environs.

It is not a healthy condition socially for so many people to be homeless as are so in Chicago.

The worst of it is, there is little ambition to own a home.

The working men had better begin to rectify that.

Associations for purchase of land, and for building houses to be owned in severalty, should be formed and encouraged by every legitimate means. What has been done in Philadelphia should be done here. Philadelphia is one of the most beautiful of American cities and it is a city of homes. Working men of all classes own homes, and the habitations show care in use, attention to repair, and decoration as only homes can.

Working men ought to agitate for a homestead exemption law in this state which should mean something. Every lot of land on which a dwelling house is erected, or which is publicly recorded as intended for a homestead, ought, with all buildings put thereon appertaining to a home, to be exempt from sale on execution or any legal process akin.

Hitherto everything about Chicago has been held subject to the purposes of trade.

When trade could not take care of itself it has asked that the power of the county put at its disposal, substantially, all the property of an individual.

It is time that that were altered—that trade were notified that society has some interest in homes as well as in the feasibility of the collection of debts. Working men ought to make this movement which shall turn Chicago and its suburbs from an aggregation of lodging places for rent into a collection of homes. Ask the state to give you a title to your land of which nothing but your own solemn deed, or covenant under seal, could divest you.

Then when the pinch of hard times comes—when sickness comes and wages stop, you will not be troubled with the thought that in a few days wife and children can be turned into the street by a writ of eviction for non-payment of rent.

You ought not to repeat the follies of the old world when there is no necessity for it.

In England out of 34,000,000 people there are 25,000,000 who are property-less, not merely homeless but property-less. And they are property-less because they are homeless. To a laborer there is no nest-egg for property like a home. That will be especially true in reference to Chicago and vicinity in the generations to come.

Without claiming that we shall make hereafter any unexampled growth, yet Chicago must be a great and growing city for generations to come, unless the lakes run dry or the continent is submerged beneath the sea.

Whoever can procure a home now or in the coming years at rational rates—and that can be done, either in the city or as conveniently out of it—will make an investment of increasing value, an investment whose aggregate value would never be got together at all were it not for its localization in a home.

What did not go in rents would in theater tickets and in drinks at the saloon.

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune."

That tide is high now. Prosperity seems once more to be making a home among us.

If you, O working men, do not now take advantage of this tide and create an enthusiasm in your ranks for homes, you may leave your children to the poverty-stricken condition of the homeless, we may fairly say houseless, tenants at will of England and Ireland.

Real estate has not here yet passed into the hands of a few great capitalists, so that that dire fate need loom up before you, and it will not, if you soon begin to make the genius of the city and its surroundings to be symbolized not by a writ for rack-rent, but by the indefeasible deed of a homestead.

Combination for cheap homes in the city or cheap steam to suburban homes is the first wisdom for laboring men.

Much is said in these days about co-operation; much is hoped from it. The difficulty in regard to co-operation

is that it will take a very high degree of moral culture on the part of working men to make it successful. There is no reason, except one moral, why the larger composite industrial operations—such as have for their theater, furnaces, foundries, factories—are not carried on now by co-operation. You can sit down now and prove by figures that almost any co-operative scheme may be successful. And there is no falsehood in the figures. Co-operative schemes could be successful, so far as every other element is concerned, except the men engaged in them.

There will have to be a great deal more of honesty and self-abnegation in laborers than now finds practical exposition, before a rolling mill can be made to pay as a co-operative concern.

Herbert Spencer says: "Any arrangements which in a considerable degree prevent superiority from profiting by the rewards of superiority, or shield inferiority from the evils it entails—any arrangements which tend to make it as well to be inferior as superior, are arrangements diametrically opposed to the progress of organization and the reaching of a higher life."

Just what will have to be done, to make co-operation successful, is to come to an agreement, supported by a common moral conviction, that superiority shall have the rewards of superiority and inferiority shall have only its deserts.

This morale in morals, I assume to say, is the wanting element, "the missing link" in the co-operative system. This it is which prevents the realization of so many mathematically demonstrable successes.

Here lies before me a deliverance of a so-called apostle of the labor movement. He says the power of discharge must be taken away from the manager of an industrial enterprise. But that power would have to exist in a co-operative movement or it would be doomed.

More than all that, the very men who entered into such movement would have to bind themselves to the liability to discharge for shiftlessness and inefficiency, or the movement could not be inaugurated at all.

Nobody would go into a concern and put his industry in on even terms against the laziness of his co-laborer.

A co-operative industry will never be a success until the participators therein have morals enough to bind themselves to the principle of inequality in the distribution of the rewards of the industry. No man will put his strength or his knowledge against weakness and ignorance. It would be unjust for him so to do. Co-operation will not succeed until this fact is realized.

It will take a very high degree of moral attainment in operatives to submit to the division of the profits of an enterprise according to a scale of deserts fixed by a committee—and a very high degree of moral character established, it may be said, to secure appointment on such committee.

Men must learn humility as they never have yet, if co-operation is to succeed.

In fact it will be discovered that very many of the things about which so much complaint is now made must be preserved—that the difficulty is not so much in the existing system of labor as in the kind of men morally who are concerned in it.

After all the warfare that is made on capital we shall find that we must have it, and that too, in private, individual hands. Abolish capital and we return to barbarism. Abolish capital and wages cease.

You may think you do not have wages enough as things are, but suppose you had none at all?

In ancient times, when the business of ancient society was war, there were leaders,

“One blast upon whose bugle horn
Were worth a thousand men.”

Now that the business of society is industry, there are such men in existence, and any co-operative scheme, to be successful, must find and employ them and pay them as “worth a thousand men.” The industry of the world will stand a long time upon a competitive basis. That is the road on which progress travels. It is the path of moral discipline also. That which would win must excel and ought to excel—ought to be held to excel. Industry cannot be organized upon any other than a competitive basis till you have made an agreement with the last man

in the heart of the "dark continent" or in the isles of the sea. Time will be hoary ere that consummation.

But till that day there will be inequalities in the pay of workmen. To remedy some of these inequalities, to be sure, will be the intellectual problem, but to endure others, the moral discipline of industry. The organizers must be paid as organizers, the managers as managers, and the hewers of wood and drawers of water as hewers of wood and drawers of water. You cannot make the results of industry equal, however much you may try.

Some men must have desirable results of which other men must be deprived.

The manager must race over the earth to study the human problem.

Audit, if you please, his expense account and pay him in that way; then he has a very different problem, one far preferable too, to that of a member of a night gang in a saw mill, a mine or a blast furnace.

At the end of the year, after expenses have been paid, if you divide what remains equally, yet one man has seen the sunlight and the moonlight rainbow over Niagara, the gleam and play of colors on Mont Blanc, or the sheen of the descending spray in Yosemite, and another has looked in the face of a coal seam from day to day by the light of the Davy on his cap. This will be so. Men must learn to be content to have it so. Here is the discipline of life—"the faith and patience of the saints."

The difficulty here is and forever will be moral.

Maladjustment, *malaise*, will exist till men shall be more willing, than now, to seek what is right, and to endure the inevitable discipline distributed by the appointment of God.

It is claimed by leaders in the so-called labor party, that industry should be managed, like politics, in town meeting.

That is not a new thought. It has been tried in various quarters of the globe by various methods. Notably, the Pilgrims tried it for a few years in the first settlement of the Plymouth Colony.

If it failed with them, what is the probability of its success elsewhere? They were a few people, knit close by a

common cause, and their industry was very simple. It was confined, in fact, to not much more than supply of food and fuel. Now take our complicated industries and our heterogeneous population into consideration, and think of a town meeting trying to regulate the labor problem *de novo*! If the folly of that project is not apparent at a glance, argument would not probably shed light upon it.

What lunatic would propose to throw the industry of New York City into town meeting? Or shall the industries of wards be taken care of by wards, so that a man going from one ward to another, perchance, must change his occupation, because a ward meeting there has made certain decisions upon the industry to be practiced in that ward? Perhaps it is contemplated to have the matter decided by representatives. But men decide now largely for themselves. Nobody but a fool will let out to representatives affairs which he does and can better dispose of himself. It seems a waste of breath to discuss such a proposition. But there are apostles who proclaim this as a mode of labor reform and who find credulous hearers.

Its nonsense must be painstakingly stated.

The project to have the town regulate industry is a proposal for a backward and not a forward step in civilization. It is simply a proposition to reinstitute the tribe or clan once more. In Russia to-day lands are held and worked by the communal plan.

But the Russian commune is a survival out of the degradation of primitive barbarism, when men associated to fight wild beasts, and of later serfdom, when they were held together as beasts. What will happen in Russia is this. As soon as the communes redeem their lands from the dues to be paid to the nobles or the crown, division will be called for. The land of Russia is destined yet to be owned and worked in severalty.

Do American laborers hear such glorious accounts of the life and privileges of Russian peasants that they wish to install themselves in their condition?

The associated Trade and Labor Unions of the city of Chicago a year or two since made a demonstration on Sunday, I think in favor of the Eight Hour Law. At

any rate that was one of the objects those engaged in this Sunday demonstration had in view.

I wish to ask the working men of Chicago, if they do not know that the force which has freed Sunday for the laborer from the greed and demands of capital is a moral force.

I wish to ask if they do not know that the reason assigned for the Hebrew Commandment—that prime, eldest charter of freedom to labor—was that as against capital labor should have one day in seven for rest.

“Keep the Sabbath day to sanctify it, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee.

“Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work.

“But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son nor thy daughter, nor thy manservant nor thy maidservant, nor thine ox nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: that thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest as well as thou. *And remember* that thou wast *a servant* in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a stretched out arm; *therefore* the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the Sabbath day.”

I wish to ask the working men if they think, that, when the public conscience ceases to regard the Sabbath as a rest day—i. e., when the *moral tone* is lost out of the day—when for sober, reflective religious uses, vacuity and frivolity are substituted, they will have any Sabbath at all.

I wish to ask if they do not know that as a heritage of labor the day has been best preserved where it has been most religiously observed.

I wish to ask if such Sunday demonstrations, as that of the Trade and Labor Unions in Chicago, do not tend to reduce the day to the European level, where the necessities of rest to labor are recognized far less than in this land.

I would like to ask if you ever sat down and figured what the profit would be if you lost the Sabbath to gain an eight hour law. Eight instead of ten hours a day

would give you two-twenty-fourths or one-twelfth more of time for yourselves than you now have. And to get a twelfth you throw away a seventh.

There is not only moral but intellectual idiocy behind that operation.

When the Hebrew slaves wanted to break the hold of the task-masters in Egypt, they did not ask for some existing Egyptian holiday or holy day, on which to make a demonstration in favor of liberty; but they said, "Let us go *three days'* journey into the wilderness"—taking the time out of the Egyptians, not out of themselves.

That was a courageous, manly thing to do.

If you wanted to make a demonstration against capital in favor of an eight hour law, why did you not take the time for your demonstration out of the time of capital?

You *had* the Sabbath. It belonged to you. It did not affect capitalists for you to tramp through Chicago on Sunday.

They looked on with indifference. They could say: Let these men tramp their rest day down and then they will work it down. Public sentiment will say a steady day's work is no worse than marching in the heat of the sun. By and by men will get work, only by contract to work on Sunday.

When capital wants to crowd through a piece of work where profit depends on time, it will not stop for a play day. Nothing but the resistance of the profoundest moral conviction will keep from the Sabbath the clutch of its selfishness. Then the competition of labor for subsistence will put the rest day forever out of reach.

When the public conscience ceases to regard the Sabbath as a Holy Day, there will not be morals enough left to care whether as a holiday you have it or not.

No, no, gentlemen, you cannot throw away all that has been done for you in history and expect to bring down something better out of the air. You cannot throw away the oldest charter of liberty to labor—the commandment to observe one day in seven as a rest day, and to keep it holy—without suffering the bitter fate of those who are careless about liberties' charters, and are contemptuous toward historic privileges.

You cannot afford, in your struggle for something better yet to be realized, to throw away the sympathies of the religious elements of society.

Bondage, gentlemen, complete subserviency to capital, was the end toward which you were tramping on that hot summer Sabbath day.

"Oh, sweeter than the marriage feast,
'Tis sweeter far to me,
To walk together to the kirk
With a goodly company!

"To walk together to the kirk,
And all together pray,
While each to his great Father bends,
Old men, and babes, and loving friends,
And youths and maidens gay!"

Gentlemen of the Trade and Labor Unions, you will never get anything better than that out of lager and dances and processions and—work on the Sabbath day.

THE END.

THIS BOOK
RETURNED

